Just a moment...
Please turn JavaScript on and reload the page.
Checking your browser before accessing .
This process is automatic. Your browser will redirect to your requested content shortly.
Please allow up to 5 seconds&
Ray ID: 2222Books to Read
Click a title below to READ a particular book.
“Little children, and as you have heard... the Antichrist is coming... the man of sin... the son of perdition, who opposes and exalts himself above all that is called God or that is worshiped... He will even sit in the temple of God, claiming that he himself is God.”—1 John 2:18; 2 Thess. 2:3-4—NKJ; NLT. (Published 12-12-11)
Perhaps the most shocking book you will ever read! This fast-paced and dynamic little book examines the Christian customs of Christmas, Easter, Sunday worship, heaven, hell, the baptism of children, and the popular Christian teaching of saved through faith alone. Are ALL of these Christian teachings from the Bible? Are ANY of them? Or, do they instead stem from another source? Find out the answers to these questions and more by reading this stirring booklet today! (Updated 3-26-11)
Armageddon! 666! The Antichrist! The four horsemen of the apocalypse! What do all these things mean and what significance do they have for those of us living today in the 21st century? Read this fascinating booklet and find out the answers to these questions and more as the book of Revelation comes alive! (Updated 8-15-12)
Whatever became of the apostolic church that Jesus Christ founded in the first century? Did it eventually evolve into the Roman Catholic Church and then split into the Protestant denominations of today? Or, did it instead remain a “small flock” as prophesied in the pages of your Bible? And if so—where is that church today? Read this stunning booklet and find out the answers to these questions and more as the actual history of God’s true church will simply astonish you! (Updated 3-26-11)
Most people in the Christian world believe that Jesus Christ was crucified on a Friday—“Good Friday.” But this is absolutely, positively, NOT what your Bible teaches! On the contrary—the Bible makes it clear that Jesus was killed on a different day! And it wasn’t Wednesday either—as many others believe! But which day was it? Read this startling booklet for yourself and discover exactly which day it was! (Updated 3-26-11)
How about it? Though many churches today teach tithing, what does the Bible teach? Does God indeed command us to give 10% of our income to the church? What do you think—is tithing fact or fiction? (Updated 4-5-11)
“Come, I will show you the judgment of the great harlot who sits on many waters, with whom the kings of the earth committed fornication, and the inhabitants of the earth were made drunk with the wine of her fornication”—Rev. 17:1-2. “And on her forehead a name was written: mystery, Babylon the great, the mother of harlots and of the abominations of the earth. I saw the woman, drunk with the blood of the saints and with the martyrs of Jesus”—Rev. 17:5-6. (Updated 6-26-11)
“Then at the time of the end, the king of the south will attack the king of the north. The king of the north will storm out...He will invade various lands and sweep through them like a flood. He will enter the glorious land of Israel, and many nations will fall...He will conquer many countries, and even Egypt will not escape. He will gain control over the gold, silver, and treasures of Egypt, and the Libyans and Ethiopians will be his servants”—Dan. 11:40-43—NLT. (Updated 6-18-11)
“Nations, listen to Me and proclaim My words on the far-off shores. I scattered My people, but I will gather them and guard them as a shepherd guards his flock.... I, the LORD, have spoken.”—Jer. 31:10, 14—TEV. (Updated 8-6-11)
This small book covers the basic and most important teachings of the Bible, from Christian living to prophecy, in a simple and easy to understand manner. (Published 1-17-12)
This book includes 190 doctrines of the Bible. (Published 1-31-12)
I feel that this is the most important book that I have ever written! And I really think you will enjoy it! (Published 5/8/12)
Real life scenario of man’s last seven years on earth under the sway of Satan. And beyond! (Published 5/21/13)
Are you intolerant? Angry? Full of hate? Are you a homophobe? Islamophobe? Xenophobe? So how about it? Are you intolerant? Are you filled with hate? Am I intolerant? Am I filled with hate? Was Jesus intolerant? Was He filled with hate? Also, are you a mad, angry person? Am I? Was Jesus? (Published 4/30/16)
— RECOMMENDED READING —
Although I highly recommend the following books,
I do not agree with everything they contain.
A Woman Rides the Beast
— Dave H written by best-selling Protestant author Dave Hunt who clearly identifies the woman who rides the beast of Revelation.
Windswept House
— Malachi M written by Catholic Jesuit priest Malachi Martin—a must-read for all those who would like to know what really goes on at the Vatican—you won’t believe your eyes!
A Thousand Shall Fall
— Susi Hasel M amazing story about how one family survived Nazi Germany during WWII while obeying and trusting in God.
The Pilgrim Church
— E. H. B outstanding book on the history of true Christianity (until Broadbent gets to the Protestant Reformation–then he makes a sharp turn in the wrong direction).
In God’s Name
— David Y shows how Pope John Paul I didn’t just die of natural causes–but was murdered–and murdered by...
Rome’s Challenge: Why Do Protestants Keep Sunday?
— From the Catholic Mirror (Published by Teach Services, Inc.); incredible book (written by Cardinal Gibbons of the Roman Catholic Church) proving beyond a shadow of a doubt that Saturday is the Sabbath of the Bible and that Sunday is the Sabbath of the Roman Catholic Church—that the Bible never ordained Sunday (either in the Old Testament or in the New Testament!) as its day of worship and that Sunday is solely and exclusively the invention of the papacy!
Babylon Mystery Religion
— Ralph W this book plainly demonstrates how much of what is commonly taught in “Christian” churches today does NOT come from the Bible at all–but instead has its roots in the ancient pagan Baby earlier editions are better than latter editions.
Christ The Healer
— F. F. B clearly shows that God still heals today if...
Judah’s Sceptre and Joseph’s Birthright
— J. H. A written in 1902, this book proves behind a reasonable doubt where the “lost 10 tribes of Israel” are today.
The Divine Secret: The Awesome & Untold Truth About Your Phenomenal Destiny
— Joe K 2012; Excellent book on our ultimate destiny and the absolutely mind-boggling potential of each and every human being. Inspirational!
— Matthew 4:4 —
Man shall not live by bread alone, but by every word of God.> Question 19
Question 19. The will of God
Article 1. Whether there is will in God?
Objection 1. It seems that there is not will in . For the object of
is the end and the . But we cannot assign to
any end. Therefore there is not will in .
Objection 2. Further,
is a kind of . But , as it is directed to things not possessed, implies imperfection, which cannot be imputed to . Therefore there is not will in .
Objection 3. Further, according to the
(De Anima iii, 54), the
moves, and is moved. But
is the first
of movement, and Himself is unmoved, as
in Phys. viii, 49. Therefore there is not will in .
On the contrary, The
says (): "That you may
what is the
I answer that, There is will in , as there is : since will follows upon . For as
things have actual
by their form, so the
is actually
by its intelligible form. Now everything has this aptitude towards its
form, that when it has it not, and when it has it, it is at rest therein. It is the same with every
perfection, which is a
. This aptitude to
in things without
. Whence also
natures have a like aptitude as apprehended through its intelligible form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed to seek to possess it, both of which pertain to the . Hence in every
being there is will, just as in every sensible being there is animal . And so there must be will in , since there is
in Him. And as His
is His own , so is His .
Reply to Objection 1. Although nothing apart from
is His end, yet He Himself is the end with respect to all things made by Him. And this by His , for by His
He is , as shown above (): for the end has the aspect of .
Reply to Objection 2. Will in us belongs to the
part, which, although named from , has not for its only act the seeking what it does not possess; but also the
and the delighting in what it does possess. In this respect
is said to be in , as having always
which is its object, since, as already said, it is not distinct from His .
Reply to Objection 3. A will of which the principal object is a
outside itself, must but the object of the divine
is His , which is His . Hence, since the
is His , it is not moved by another than itself, but by itself alone, in the same sense as understanding and willing are said to be movement. This is what
meant when he said that the first mover moves itself.
Article 2. Whether God wills things apart from Himself?
Objection 1. It seems that
does not will things apart from Himself. For the divine
is the divine . But
is not other than Himself. Therefore He does not will things other than Himself.
Objection 2. Further, the willed moves the willer, as the appetible the , as stated in De Anima iii, 54. If, therefore,
wills anything apart from Himself, His
must which is impossible.
Objection 3. Further, if what is willed suffices the willer, he seeks nothing beyond it. But His own
suffices , and completely satisfies His . Therefore
does not will anything apart from Himself.
Objection 4. Further, acts of will are multiplied in proportion to the number of their objects. If, therefore,
wills Himself and things apart from Himself, it follows that the act of His
is manifold, and consequently His , which is His . But this is impossible. Therefore
does not will things apart from Himself.
On the contrary, The
says (): "This is the
of , your sanctification."
I answer that,
wills not only Himself, but other things apart from Himself. This is clear from the comparison which we made above (). For
things have a
inclination not only towards their own proper , to acquire it if not possessed, and, if possessed, but also to spread abroad their own
amongst others, so far as possible. Hence we see that every agent, in so far as it is perfect and in act, produces its like. It pertains, therefore, to the
to communicate as far as possible to others the
possessed; and especially does this pertain to the divine will, from which all perfection is derived in some kind of likeness. Hence, if
things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their
to others, much more does it appertain to the divine will to communicate by likeness its own
to others as much as possible. Thus, then, He wills both Himself to be, an but Himself as the end, and other things as ordained inasmuch as it befits the divine
that other things should be partakers therein.
Reply to Objection 1. The divine
, yet they differ in aspect, according to the different ways of understanding them and expressing them, as is clear from what has already been said (. For when we say that , no relation to any other object is implied, as we do imply when we say that
wills. Therefore, although He is not anything apart from Himself, yet He does will things apart from Himself.
Reply to Objection 2. In things willed for the sake of the end, the whole reason for our being moved is the end, and this it is that moves the , as most clearly appears in things willed only for the sake of the end. He who wills to take a bitter draught, in doing so wills noth and this alone moves his will. It is different with one who takes a draught that is pleasant, which anyone may will to do, not only for the sake of health, but also for its own sake. Hence, although
wills things apart from Himself only for the sake of the end, which is His own , it does not follow that anything else moves His , except His . So, as He understands things apart from Himself by understanding His own , so He wills things apart from Himself by willing His own .
Reply to Objection 3. From the fact that His own
suffices the divine will, it does not follow that it wills nothing apart from itself, but rather that it wills nothing except by reason of its . Thus, too, the divine , though its perfection consists in its very
of the divine , yet in that
other things.
Reply to Objection 4. As the divine
is one, as seeing the many only in the one, in the same way the divine
is one and simple, as willing the many only through the one, that is, through its own .
Article 3. Whether whatever God wills He wills necessarily?
Objection 1. It seems that whatever
wills He wills . For everything
is . But whatever
wills, He wills from , for otherwise His
would be mutable. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills .
Objection 2. Further,
wills things apart from Himself, inasmuch as He wills His own . Now
wills His own
. Therefore He wills things apart from Himself .
Objection 3. Further, whatever belongs to the
is of Himself
being, and the principle of all , as above shown (). But it belongs to His
to will whatever H since in
there can be nothing over and above His
as stated in Metaph. v, 6. Therefore whatever He wills, He wills .
Objection 4. Further, being that is not , and being that is possible not to be, are one and the same thing. If, therefore,
will a thing that He wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, and therefore possible for Him to will what He does not will. And so the divine
is contingent upon one or the other of two things, and imperfect, since everything contingent is imperfect and mutable.
Objection 5. Further, on the part of that which is indifferent to one or the other of two things, no action results unless it is inclined to one or the other by some other power, as the
says in Phys. ii. If, then, the Will of
is indifferent with regard to anything, it follows that His determination to act and thus He has some
prior to Himself.
Objection 6. Further, whatever
. But as the divine
is His , so is the divine will. Therefore whatever
wills, He wills .
On the contrary, The
says (): "Who worketh all things according to the counsel of His ." Now, what we work according to the counsel of the , we do not will . Therefore
does not will
whatever He wills.
I answer that, There are two ways in which a thing is said to be , namely, absolutely, and by supposition. We judge a thing to be absolutely
from the relation of the terms, as when the predicate forms part of the definition of the subject: thus it is absolutely
is an animal. It is the same when the subject forms part of the not thus it is absolutely
that a number must be odd or even. In this way it is not
sits: wherefore it is not
absolutely, though it may
for, granted that he is sitting, he must
sit, as long as he is sitting. Accordingly as to things willed by , we must observe that He wills something of absolute : but this is not
of all that He wills. For the divine will has a
relation to the divine , since that is its proper object. Hence
wills His own
, even as we will our own
, and as any other faculty has
relation to its proper and principal object, for instance the sight to color, since it tends to it by its own . But
wills things apart from Himself in so far as they are ordered to His own
as their end. Now in willing an end we do not
will things that conduce to it, unless they are such that the end cannot be a as, we will to take food to preserve life, or to take ship in order to cross the sea. But we do not
will things without which the end is attainable, such as a horse for a journey which we can take on foot, for we can make the journey without one. The same applies to other means. Hence, since the
is perfect, and can
without other things inasmuch as no perfection can accrue to Him from them, it follows that His willing things apart from Himself is not absolutely . Yet it can be
by supposition, for supposing that He wills a thing, then He is unable not to will it, as His
cannot change.
Reply to Objection 1. From the fact that
wills from
whatever He wills, it does not follow that H except by supposition.
Reply to Objection 2. Although
wills His own , He does not
will things willed on account of H for it can
without other things.
Reply to Objection 3. It is not
to will any of those other things that He does not will ; and yet it is not unnatural or contrary to His , but .
Reply to Objection 4. Sometimes a
has a non-necessary r owing to a deficiency in the effect, and not in the . Even so, the sun's power has a non-necessary relation to some contingent events on this earth, owing to a defect not in the solar power, but in the effect that proceeds not
from the . In the same way, that
will some of the things that He wills, does not result from defect in the divine will, but from a defect belonging to the
of the thing willed, namely, that the perfect
o and such defect accompanies all
Reply to Objection 5. A
contingent
must be determined to act by some external power. The divine will, which by its
is , determines itself to will things to which it has no
Reply to Objection 6. As the divine
of itself, so is the divine will but the divine
re not the divine will to the thing willed. The reason for this is that
is of things as but the
is directed to things as they
in themselves. Since then all other things have
i but no absolute
so as to be
in themselves, in so far as it follows that
whatever He wills, but does not will
whatever He wills.
Article 4. Whether the will of God is the cause of things?
Objection 1. It seems that the
is not the
of things. For
says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "As our sun, not by
nor by pre-election, but by its very being, enlightens all things that can participate in its light, so the divine
by its very
pours the rays of
upon everything that ." But every
agent acts by
and pre-election. Therefore
does not act by will; and so His
is not the
of things.
Objection 2. Further, The first in any order is that which is
so, thus in the order of burning things, that comes first which is fire by its . But
is the first agent. Therefore He acts by H and that is His . He acts then by , and not by will. Therefore the divine
is not the
of things.
Objection 3. Further, Whatever is the
of anything, through being "such" a thing, is the
by , and not by will. For fire is the
of heat, whereas an architect is the
of a house, because he wills to build it. Now
says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32), "Because
is , we ." Therefore
of things by His , and not by His .
Objection 4. Further, Of one thing there is one . But the
things is the
of , as said before (. Therefore the
cannot be considered the
of things.
On the contrary, It is said (), "How could anything endure, if Thou wouldst not?"
I answer that, We must hold that the
o and that He acts by the , and not, as some have supposed, by a
of His . This can be shown in three ways:
First, from the order itself of active . Since both
act for an end, as
in Phys. ii, 49, the
agent must have the end and the
means predetermined fo as the end and definite movement is predetermined for the arrow by the archer. Hence the
agent must precede the agent that acts by . Hence, since
is first in the order of agents, He must act by
This is shown, secondly, from the character of a
agent, of which the property is to produce one for
operates in one and the same way unless it be prevented. This is because the
of the act is according
and hence as long as it has that , its acts will be in a for every
agent has a determinate being. Since, then, the Divine Being is undetermined, and contains in Himself the full perfection of being, it cannot be that He acts by a
of His , unless He were to
something undetermined and indefinite in being: and that this is impossible has been already shown (). He does not, therefore, act by a
of His , but determined effects proceed from His own
perfection according to the determination of His
Thirdly, it is shown by the relation of effects to their . For effects proceed from the agent that
them, in so far as they pre- since every agent produces its like. Now effects pre-exist in their
after the mode of the . Wherefore since the Divine Being is His own , effects pre-exist in Him after the mode of , and therefore proceed from Him after the same mode. Consequently, they proceed from Him after the mode of will, for His inclination to put in act what His
has conceived appertains to the . Therefore the
of things.
Reply to Objection 1.
in these words does not intend to exclude election but only in a certain sense, in so far, that is, as He communicates His
not merely to certain things, and as election implies a certain distinction.
Reply to Objection 2. Because the
and will, from the fact of His acting by His , it follows that He acts after the mode of
Reply to Objection 3. Good is the object of the . The words, therefore, "Because
is , we ," are
inasmuch as His
is the reason of His willing all other things, as said before ().
Reply to Objection 4. Even in us the
of one and the same effect is
as directing it, whereby the form of the work is conceived, and will as commanding it, since the form as it is in the
only is not determined to
in the effect, except by the . Hence, the speculative
has nothing to say to operation. But the power is , as executing the effect, since it denotes the immediate principle of operation. But in
all these things are one.
Article 5. Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will?
Objection 1. It seems that some
can be assigned to the divine . For
says (Qq. lxxxiii, 46): "Who would venture to say that
made all things irrationally?" But to a
agent, what is the reason of operating, is the
of willing. Therefore the
has some .
Objection 2. Further, in things made by one who wills to make them, and whose
is influenced by no , there can be no
assigned except by the
of him who wills. But the
of all things, as has been already shown (). If, then, there is no
of His , we cannot seek in any
things any , except the divine will alone. Thus all science would be in vain, since science seeks to assign
to effects. This seems inadmissible, and therefore we must assign some
to the divine will.
Objection 3. Further, what is done by the willer, on account of no , depends simply on his will. If, therefore, the
has no , it follows that all things made depend simply on His , and have no other . But this also is not admissible.
On the contrary,
says (Qq. lxxxiii, 28): "Every efficient
is greater than the thing effected." But nothing is greater than the
of . We must not then seek for a
I answer that, In no wise has the
of which we must consider that, since the
follows from the , there is
who wills, in the same way as there is a
of the understanding, in the
that understands. The case with the understanding is this: that if the premiss and its conclusion are understood separately from each other, the understanding the premiss is the
that the conclusion is . If the understanding perceive the conclusion in the premiss itself, apprehending both the one and the other at the same glance, in this case the
of the conclusion would not be
by understanding the premisses, since a thin and yet, it would be
that the thinker would understand the premisses to be the
of the conclusion. It is the same with the , with respect to which the end stands in the same relation to the means to the end, as do the premisses to the conclusion with regard to the understanding.
Hence, if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means to that end, his willing the end will be the
of his willing the means. This cannot be the case if in one act he will for a thing cannot be its own . Yet it will be
to say that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as
by one act understands all things in His , so by one act He wills all things in His . Hence, as in
to understand the
is not the
of His understanding the effect, for He understands the effect in the , so, in Him, to will an end is not the
of His willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end. Therefore, He wills this to but does not will this on account of that.
Reply to Objection 1. The will of
is reasonable, not because anything is to
of willing, but in so far as He wills one thing to be on account of another.
Reply to Objection 2. Since
wills effects to proceed from definite , for the preservation of order in the , it is not unreasonable to seek for
secondary to the divine will. It would, however, be unreasonable to do so, if such were considered as primary, and not as dependent on the
of . In this sense
says (De Trin. iii, 2): "Philosophers in their vanity have thought fit to attribute contingent effects to other , being utterly unable to perceive the
that is shown above all others, the
Reply to Objection 3. Since
wills effects to come from , all effects that presuppose some other effect do not depend solely on the
of , but on something else besides: but the first effect depends on the divine will alone. Thus, for example, we may say that
to have hands to serve his
by their work, and , and willed him to be
that he might enjoy Him, or for the completion of the . But this cannot be reduced to other
secondary ends. Hence such things depend on the simple will but the others on the order of other .
Article 6. Whether the will of God is always fulfilled?
Objection 1. It seems that the
is not always fulfilled. For the
says (): " will have all
to be saved, and to come to the
of the ." But this does not happen. Therefore the
is not always fulfilled.
Objection 2. Further, as is the relation of
to , so is that of the
all . Therefore He wills all . Bu for much more
might . Therefore the
is not always fulfilled.
Objection 3. Further, since the
is the first , it does not exclude intermediate . But the effect of a first
may be hindered by a de as the effect of the motive power may be hindered by the weakness of the limb. Therefore the effect of the divine will may be hindered by a defect of the secondary . The will of , therefore, is not always fulfilled.
On the contrary, It is said (): " hath done all things, whatsoever He would."
I answer that, The will of
must needs always be fulfilled. In
of which we must consider that since an effect is conformed to the agent according to its , the rule is the same with active
. The rule in forms is this: that although a thing may fall short of any particular form, it cannot fall short of the universal form. For though a thing may fail to be, for example, a man or a living being, yet it cannot fail to be a being. Hence the same must happen in active . Something may fall outside the order of any particular active , but not outside the order of the universal ; under which all particular
are included: and if any particular
fails of its effect, this is because of the hindrance of some other particular , which is included in the order of the universal . Therefore an effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal . Even in corporeal things this is clearly seen. For it may happen that a star is hindered from p yet whatever effect does result, in corporeal things, from this hindrance of a corporeal , must be referred through intermediate
to the universal influence of the first . Since, then, the
is the universal
of all things, it is impossible that the divine will should not produce its effect. Hence that which seems to depart from the divine will in one order, returns into it in another order; as does the sinner, who by
falls away from the divine will as much as lies in him, yet falls back into the order of that will, when by its
he is punished.
Reply to Objection 1. The words of the , " will have all
to be saved," etc. can be understood in three ways.
First, by a restricted application, in which case they would mean, as
says (De praed. sanct. i, 8: Enchiridion 103), " wills all
to be saved that are saved, not because there is no
whom He does not wish saved, but because there is no
saved whose
He does not will."
Secondly, they can be understood as applying to every class of , not to
in which case they mean that
wills some men of every class and
to be saved, males and females,
and , great and small, but not all of every .
Thirdly, according to
(De Fide Orth. ii, 29), they are understood of the antecedent will not of the consequent will. This distinction must not be taken as applying to the divine will itself, in which there is nothing antecedent nor consequent, but to the things willed.
To understand this we must consider that everything, in so far as it is , is willed by . A thing taken in its primary sense, and absolutely considered, may be
or , and yet when some additional circumstances are taken into account, by a consequent consideration may be changed into the contrary. Thus that a and that a man should be killed is , absolutely considered. But if in a particular case we add that a man is a murderer or dangerous to society, to kill that he live is an . Hence it may be said of a just judge, that antecedently he wills all
to live; but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. In the same way
antecedently wills all
to be saved, but consequently wills some to be damned, as His
exacts. Nor do we will simply, what we will antecedently, but rather we will it i for the
is directed to things as they are in themselves, and in themselves they
under particular qualifications. Hence we will a thing simply inasmuch as we will it when all particular circumst and this is what is meant by willing consequently. Thus it may be said that a just judge wills simply the hanging of a murderer, but in a qualified manner he would will him to live, to wit, inasmuch as he is a man. Such a qualified will may be called a willingness rather than an absolute will. Thus it is clear that whatever
simply wills although what He wills antecedently may not take place.
Reply to Objection 2. An act of the cognitive faculty is according as the thi while an act of the
faculty is directed to things as they
in themselves. But all that can have the
of being and
in , though it does not all
things. T but does not will all , except in so far as He wills Himself, in Whom all
virtually .
Reply to Objection 3. A first
can be hindered in its effect by deficiency in the secondary , when it is not the universal first , includin for then the effect could in no way escape its order. And thus it is with the
of , as said above.
Article 7. Whether the will of God is changeable?
Objection 1. It seems that the Will of
is changeable. For the Lord says (): "It repenteth Me that I have made ." But whoever repents of what he has done, has a changeable will. Therefore
has a changeable will.
Objection 2. Further, it is said in the
of the Lord: "I will speak against a nation and against a kingdom, to root out, and to pull down, but if that nation shall repent of its , I also will repent of the
that I have thought to do to them" () Therefore
has a changeable will.
Objection 3. Further, whatever
does, He does . But
does not always do the same thing, for at one time He ordered the
to be observed, and at another time forbade it. Therefore He has a changeable will.
Objection 4. Further,
does not will of
what He wills, as said before (). Therefore He can both will and not will the same thing. But whatever can incline to either of two opposites, is changeable substantially; and that which can
in a place or not in that place, is changeable locally. Therefore
is changeable as regards His .
On the contrary, It is said: " is not as a man, that He should lie, nor as the son of , that He should be changed" ().
I answer that, The will of
is entirely unchangeable. On this point we must consider that to chan to will that certain things should be changed is another. It is possible to will a thing to be done now, and its and yet for the
to remain permanently the same: whereas the
would be changed, if one should begin to will what befo or cease to will what he had willed before. This cannot happen, unless we presuppose change either in the
or in the disposition of the
of the willer. For since the
regards , a man may in two ways begin to will a thing. In one way when that thing begins to be
for him, and this does not take place without a change in him. Thus when the cold weather begins, it becomes though it was not so before. In another way when he
for the first time that a thing is
for him, though h hence we take counsel in order to
for us. Now it has already been shown that both the
are entirely unchangeable (; ). Therefore His
must be entirely unchangeable.
Reply to Objection 1. These words of the Lord are to be understood metaphorically, and according to the likeness of our . For when we repent, we destr although we may even do so without change of will; as, when a man wills to make a thing, at the same time intending to destroy it later. Therefore
is said to have repented, by way of comparison with our mode of acting, in so far as by the
He destroyed from the face of the earth
whom He had made.
Reply to Objection 2. The will of , as it is the first and universal , does not exclude intermediate
that have power to produce certain effects. Since however all intermediate
are inferior in power to the first , there are many things in the divine power,
and will that are not included in the order of inferior . Thus in the case of the raising of , one who looked only on inferior
might have said: " will not rise again," but looking at the divine first
might have said: " will rise again." And
wills both: that is, that in the order of the inferior
but that in the order of the higher
or He may will conversely. We may say, then, that
sometimes declares that a thing shall happen according as it falls under the order of inferior , as of , or , which yet does not happen as not being in the designs of the divine and higher . Thus He foretold to : "Take order with thy house, for thou shalt die, and not live" (). Yet this did not take place, since from
it was otherwise disposed in the divine
and will, which is unchangeable. Hence
says (Moral. xvi, 5): "The sentence of
changes, but not His counsel"--that is to say, the counsel of His . When therefore He says, "I also will repent," His words must be understood metaphorically. For men seem to repent, when they do not fulfill what they have threatened.
Reply to Objection 3. It does not follow from this argument that
has a will that changes, but that He sometimes wills that things should change.
Reply to Objection 4. Although
willing a thing is not by absolute , yet it is
by supposition, on account of the unchangeableness of the divine will, as has been said above ().
Article 8. Whether the will of God imposes necessity on the things willed?
Objection 1. It seems that the
on the things willed. For
says (Enchiridion 103): "No one is saved, except whom
has willed to be saved. He must therefore for if He wills it, it must
Objection 2. Further, every
that cannot be hindered, produces its effect , because, as the
says (Phys. ii, 84) "Nature always works in the same way, if there is nothing to hinder it." But the
cannot be hindered. For the
says (): "Who resisteth His ?" Therefore the
on the things willed.
Objection 3. Further, whatever is
by its antece it is thus
that animals should die, being compounded of contrary elements. Now things
are related to the divine will as to an antecedent , whereby they have . For the conditional statement is
wills a thing, and every
conditional statement is . It follows therefore that all that
absolutely.
On the contrary, All
things that
wills to be. If therefore His
on things willed, it follows t and thus there is an end of , counsel, and all other such things.
I answer that, The divine will imposes
on some things willed but not on all. The reason of this some have chosen to assign to intermediate , holding that wha and what He produces by contingent
. This does not seem to be a sufficient explanation, for two reasons.
First, because the effect of a first
is contingent on account of the secondary , from the fact that the effect of the first
is hindered by deficiency in the second , as the sun's power is hindered by a defect in the plant. But no defect of a secondary
can hinder
will from producing its effect.
Secondly, because if the distinction between the contingent and the
is to be referred only to secondary , this must be independent of the divine
and will; which is inadmissible. It is better therefore to say that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. For when a
is efficacious to act, the effect follows upon the , not only as to the thing done, but also as to its manner of being done or of being. Thus from defect of active power in the seed it may happen that a child is born unlike its father in
points, that belong to its manner of being. Since then the divine
is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, which
wills to be done, but also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now
wills some things to be done , some contingently, to the right ordering of things, for the building up of the . Therefore to some effects He has attached
, but to others defectible and contingent , from which arise contingent effects. Hence it is not because the proximate
are contingent that the effects willed by
happen contingently, but because
prepared contingent
for them, it being His
that they should happen contingently.
Reply to Objection 1. By the words of
we must understand a
in things willed by
that is not absolute, but conditional. For the conditional statement that if
wills a thing it must
Reply to Objection 2. From the very fact that nothing resists the divine will, it follows that not only those things happen that
wills to happen, but that they happen
or contingently according to His .
Reply to Objection 3. Consequents have
from their antecedents according to the mode of the antecedents. Hence things effected by the divine will have that kind of
wills them to have, either absolute or conditional. Not all things, therefore, are absolute necessities.
Article 9. Whether God wills evils?
Objection 1. It seems that
wills . For every
wills. But it is a
should . For
says (Enchiridion 95): "Although
in so far as it is
is not a , yet it is
that not only
things should , but also
things." Therefore
Objection 2. Further,
says (Div. Nom. iv, 23): " would conduce to the perfection of everything," i.e. the . And
says (Enchiridion 10,11): "Out of all things is built up the admirable beauty of the , wherein even that which is called , properly ordered and disposed, commends the
more evidently in that
is more pleasing and praiseworthy when contrasted with ." But
wills all that appertains to the perfection and beauty of the , for this is what
desires above all things in His creatures. Therefore
Objection 3. Further, that
should , and should not , are contradictory opposites. But
does not will otherwise, since various
will would not always be fulfilled. Therefore
wills that
On the contrary,
says (Qq. 83,3): "No wise
of another
becoming worse. Now
surpasses all
in wisdom. Much less therefore is
the and when He is said to be the
of a thing, He is said to will it." Therefore it is not by
becomes worse. Now it is clear that every
makes a thing worse. Therefore
I answer that, Since the ratio of
is the ratio of appetibility, as said before (), and since
is opposed to , it is impossible that any , as such, should be sought for by the , either , or animal, or by the
which is the . Nevertheless
may be sought , so far as it accompanies a , as appears in each of the appetites. For a
agent intends not privation or corruption, but the form to which is annexed the privation of some other form, and the generation of one thing, which implies the corruption of another. Also when a lion kills a stag, his object is food, to obtain which the killing of the animal is only the means. Similarly the fornicator has merely pleasure for his object, and the deformity of
is only an accompaniment. Now the
that accompanies one , is the privation of another . Never therefore would
be sought after, not even , unless the
that accompanies the
were more desired than the
of which the
is the privation. Now
more than He wills H yet He wills one
more than another. Hence He in no way wills the
of , which is the privation of right order towards the divine . The
defect, or of punishment, He does will, by willing the
to which such
are attached. Thus in willing
H and in willing the preservation of the
order, He wills some things to be
corrupted.
Reply to Objection 1. Some have said that although
does not will , yet He wills that
should be or be done, because, although
is not a , yet it is
should be or be done. This they said because things
in themselves are
and this order they thought was expressed in the words "that
should be or be done." This, however, since
is not of itself ordered to , but . For it is beside the
of the sinner, that any
sho as it was beside the
of tyrants that the patience of the
should shine forth from all their . It cannot therefore be said that such an ordering to
is implied in the statement that it is a
thing that
should be or be done, since nothing is judged of by that which appertains to it , but by that which belongs to it .
Reply to Objection 2.
does not operate towards the perfection and beauty of the , except , as said above (Reply to Objection 1). Therefore
in saying that " would conduce to the perfection of the ," draws a conclusion by reduction to an absurdity.
Reply to Objection 3. The statements that
, and that
not, are oppose yet the statements that anyone wills
and that he wills it not to be, since either is affirmative.
therefore neither wills
to be done, nor wills it not to be done, but wills t and this is a .
Article 10. Whether God has free-will?
Objection 1. It seems that
has not . For
says, in a
on the prodigal son [Ep. 146, ad Damas.]; " alone is He who is not liable to , nor can be liable: all others, as having , can be inclined to either side."
Objection 2. Further,
is the faculty of the
and will, by which
are chosen. But
does not will , as has been said (). Therefore there is not
On the contrary,
says (De Fide ii, 3): "The
divideth unto each one as He will, namely, according to the free choice of the , not in obedience to ."
I answer that, We have
with respect to what we will not of , nor be
. For our will to be
does not appertain to , but to
. Hence other animals, that are moved to act by
, are not said to be moved by . Since then
wills His own , but other things not , as shown above (), He has
with respect to what He does not
Reply to Objection 1.
seems to deny
not simply, but only as regards the inclination to .
Reply to Objection 2. Since the
consists in turning away from the divine , by which
wills all things, as above shown (De Fide ii, 3), it is manifestly impossible for H yet He can make choice of one of two opposites, inasmuch as He can will a thing to be, or not to be. In the same way we ourselves, without , can will to sit down, and not will to sit down.
Article 11. Whether the will of expression is to be distinguished in God?
Objection 1. It seems that the
of expression is not to be distinguished in . For as the
of things, so is His wisdom. But no expressions are assigned to the divine wisdom. Therefore no expressions ought to be assigned to the divine will.
Objection 2. Further, every expression that is not in agreement with the
of him who expresses himself, is . If therefore the expressions assigned to the divine will are not in agreement with that will, they are . But if they do agree, they are superfluous. No expressions therefore must be assigned to the divine will.
On the contrary, The will of
is one, since it is the very
of . Yet sometimes it is spoken of as many, as in the words of : "Great are the works of the Lord, sought out according to all His wills." Therefore sometimes the sign must be taken for the .
I answer that, Some things are said of
i others by metaphor, as appears from what has been said before (. When certain
are predicated of the Godhead metaphorically, this is done because of a likeness in the effect. Hence a thing that is in us a sign of some passion, is signified metaphorically in
under the name of that passion. Thus with us it is usual for an
to punish, so that punishment becomes an expression of . Therefore punishment itself is signified by the word , when
is attributed to . In the same way, what is usually with us an expression of will, is sometimes metaphorically called will just as when anyone lays down a precept, it is a sign that he wishes that precept obeyed. Hence a divine precept is sometimes called by metaphor the
of , as in the words: "Thy will be done on earth, as it is in " (). There is, however, this difference between will and , that
is never attributed to
properly, since in its primary meaning it includes passion; whereas
is attributed to Him properly. Therefore in
there are distinguished will in its proper sense, and will as attributed to Him by metaphor. Will in its proper sense is call and will metaphorically taken is the
of expression, inasmuch as the sign itself of
is called will.
Reply to Objection 1.
is not the
of a thing being done, unless through the . For we do not put into act what we , unless we will to do so. Accordingly expression is not attributed to , but to will.
Reply to Objection 2. Expressions of will are called divine wills, not as being signs that
wills but because what in us is the usual expression of our will, is called the divine will in . Thus punishment is not a sig but it is called
in Him, from the fact that it is an expression of
in ourselves.
Article 12. Whether five expressions of will are rightly assigned to the divine will?
Objection 1. It seems that five expressions of will--namely, prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission--are not rightly assigned to the divine will. For the same things that
bids us do by His precept or counsel, these He sometimes operates in us, and the same things that He prohibits, these He sometimes permits. They ought not therefore to be enumerated as distinct.
Objection 2. Further,
works nothing unless He wills it, as the
says (). But the
of expression is distinct from the
pleasure. Therefore operation ought not to be comprehended in the
of expression.
Objection 3. Further, operation and permission appertain to all creatures in common, since
works in them all, and permits some action in them all. But precept, counsel, and prohibition belong to rational creatures only. Therefore they do not come rightly under one division, not being of one order.
Objection 4. Further,
happens in more ways than , since " happens in one way, but
in all kinds of ways," as declared by the
(Ethic. ii, 6), and
(Div. Nom. iv, 22). It is not right therefore to assign one expression only in the case of --namely, prohibition--and two--namely, counsel and precept--in the case of .
I answer that, By these signs we name the expression of will by which we are accustomed to show that we will something. A
may show that he wills something, either by himself or by means of another. He may show it by himself, by doing something either directly, or indirectly and . He shows it directly when
in that way the expression of his
is his own working. He shows it indirectly, by not hindering
for what removes an impediment is called an
mover. In this respect the expression is called permission. He declares his will by means of another when he orders another to perform a work, either by insisting upon it as
by precept, and by proh or by persuasion, which is a part of counsel. Since in these ways the
makes itself , the same five are sometimes denominated with regard to the divine will, as the expression of that will. That precept, counsel, and prohibition are called the
is clear from the words of : "Thy will be done on earth as it is in ." That permission and operation are called the
is clear from
(Enchiridion 95), who says: "Nothing is done, unless the
wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually doing it."
Or it may be said that permission and operation refer to present time, permission being with respect to , operation with regard to . Whilst as to future time, prohibition is in respect to , precept to
and counsel to
that is of supererogation.
Reply to Objection 1. There is nothing to prevent anyone declaring his will about the sam thus we find many words that mean the same thing. Hence there is not reason why the same thing should not be the subject of precept, operation, or of prohibition or permission.
Reply to Objection 2. As
may by metaphor be said to will what by His , properly speaking, H so He may by metaphor be said to will what He does, properly speaking, will. Hence there is nothing to prevent the same thing being the object of the
pleasure, and of the
of expression. But operation is always the same
while precept both because the former regards the present, and the t and because the former is of itsel the latter its effect as fulfilled by means of another.
Reply to Objection 3. Rational creatures are masters of their own acts; and for this reason certain special expressions of the divine will are assigned to their acts, inasmuch as
ordains rational creatures to act
and of themselves. Other creatures act only as moved by
therefore only operation and permission are concerned with these.
Reply to Objection 4. All
of , though happening in many ways, agrees in being out of harmony with the divine will. Hence with regard to , only one expression is assigned, that of prohibition. On the other hand,
stands in various relations to the divine , since there are
without which we cannot attain to the fruition of that , and these are the subject of precept; and there are others by which we attain to it more perfectly, and these are the subject of counsel. Or it may be said that counsel is not only concerned with the o but also with the avoiding of lesser .
The Summa Theologi& of St. Thomas AquinasSecond and Revised Edition, 1920Literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican ProvinceOnline Edition Copyright © 2016 by Kevin Knight Nihil Obstat. F. Innocentius Apap, O.P., S.T.M., Censor. Theol.Imprimatur. Edus. Canonicus Surmont, Vicarius Generalis. Westmonasterii.APPROBATIO ORDINISNihil Obstat. F. Raphael Moss, O.P., S.T.L. and F. Leo Moore, O.P., S.T.L.Imprimatur. F. Beda Jarrett, O.P., S.T.L., A.M., Prior Provincialis Angli&MARI&AE IMMACULAT&AE - SEDI SAPIENTI&AE
Copyright © 2016 by . Dedicated to the Immaculate Heart of Mary.