刨根问底，Stakeholder究竟是什么意思？
大家都知道，“stakeholder”在项目管理里，是项目干系人或“项目利益相关者”的含义，下文就讲一讲它的英文解释。
1. Google Dictionary中的解释
stakeholder
/ˈsteɪkhəʊldə(r)/ DJ /-hoʊ-/ DJ US /'stekˈholdɚ/ KK
1). a person or company that is involved in a
particular organization, project, system, etc., especially because
they have invested money in it（某组织、工程、体系等的）参与人，参与方；有权益关系者
The government has said it
wants to create a stakeholder economy in which all members of
society feel that they have an interest in its success.
政府表示希望建立一种人人参与的经济模式，让社会全体成员觉得其繁荣将给每个人带来利益。
2). a person who holds
all the bets placed on a game or race and who pays the money to the
winner 赌金保管人
2. WiKi的解释
Stakeholder may refer to:
Stakeholder (corporate), a person, group, organization, or
system who affects or can be affected by an organization's
Project stakeholder, a person, group or
organization with an interest in a project.
Stakeholder theory, a theory that identifies
and models the groups which are stakeholders of a corporation or
Stakeholder analysis, the process of
identifying those affected by a project or event
Stakeholder (law), a third party who temporarily holds money or property
while its owner is still being determined
3. 在Google Dictionary中刨根问底
/steɪk/ DJ /stek/ KK
1). a wooden or metal post that is pointed at
one end and pushed into the ground in order to support something,
mark a particular place, etc.桩；标桩；篱笆桩 countable
2). something that you risk losing, especially
money, when you try to predict the result of a race, game, etc., or
when you are involved in an activity that can succeed or
countable usually
e.g.& They were playing
cards for high stakes(= a lot of money). 他们当时正在打扑克，赌注很高。
3). a wooden post that somebody could be tied
to in former times before being burnt to death(= killed by fire)as
a punishment火刑柱
Joan of Arc was burnt at the
stake. 圣女贞德被处以火刑。
Alternate: the stake
4). money that somebody invests in a
company股本；股份
&a 20% stake in the business
那家公司 20% 的股份
5). an important part or share in a business,
plan, etc. that is important to you and that you want to be
successful（在公司、计划等中的）重大利益，重大利害关系 singular ~ in sth
&She has a personal stake in the success
of the play. 这出戏成功与否对她个人有重大利害关系。
Many young people no longer
feel they have a stake in society. 很多年轻人不再觉得他们与社会休戚相关。
6). the money that is paid to the winners in
horse racing赛马奖金
&Alternate: stakes
7). Idiom: at stake
that can be won or lost,
depending on the success of a particular action成败难料；得失都可能；有风险
We cannot afford to take risks
when peoples' lives are at stake. 现在人们性命交关，不容我们有闪失。
The prize at stake is a place
in the final. 这次如果获胜，便能进入决赛。
8). Idiom: go to the stake over/for
to be prepared to do anything
in order to defend your opinions or beliefs为坚持自己的观点（或信仰）甘冒一切危险；为维护自己的观点（或信仰）不惜赴汤蹈火
9). Idiom: in the… stakes
used to say how much of a
particular quality a person has, as if they were in a competition
in which some people are more successful than
others（评论一个人的某种品质高或低）要是比…的话，论…
John doesn't do too well in the
personality stakes. 论人格魅力，约翰很一般。
1). to risk money or something important on
the result of something（就某事）以…打赌，拿…冒险 ~ sth (on sth) VN
He staked &25 on the
favourite(= for example, in horse racing). 他在那匹众人看好的马上押了 25 英镑。
&She staked her political career on tax
reform, and lost. 她把自己的政治前程押在税制改革上，结果赌输了。
That's him over
there─I'd stake my life on it(= I am completely
confident). 就是那边那个人
我敢拿脑袋打赌。
2). to support something with a
stake用桩支撑
~ sth (up) VN
&to stake newly planted trees
用木桩支撑新植的树
3). Idiom: stake (out) a/your claim (to/for/on
something)
&to say or show publicly that you think
something should be yours公开宣布自己（对某物）的所有权；向公众表示某物应属于自己
Adams staked his claim for a
place in the Olympic team with his easy win yesterday.
亚当斯昨天轻松获胜，这无异于告诉人们奥运代表队中应有他的位置。
4). Phrasal: stake something&out
&to clearly mark the limits of something
that you claim is yours清楚地界定自认为属于自己的东西
to state your opinion,
position, etc. on something very clearly明确阐述自己的看法（或立场等）
The President staked out his
position on the issue. 总统明确阐述了他在这个问题上的立场。
to watch a place secretly,
especially for signs of illegal activity监视
Detectives had been staking out
the house for several weeks. 侦探们已对这所房子监视了几个星期。
已投稿到：
以上网友发言只代表其个人观点，不代表新浪网的观点或立场。(window.slotbydup=window.slotbydup || []).push({
id: '2014386',
container: s,
size: '234,60',
display: 'inlay-fix'
下载本文档需要登录，并付出相应积分。（）
(已有5人评价)
下载：15次格式：pdf页数：84贡献者：Ccaldwell上传时间： 09:14
0人评价56页
0人评价21页
0人评价1,072页
0人评价3页
0人评价6页
所需积分：（友情提示：所有文档均可免费预览！下载之前请务必先预览阅读，以免误下载造成积分浪费！）
（多个标签用逗号分隔）
文不对题，内容与标题介绍不符
广告内容或内容过于简单
文档乱码或无法正常显示
若此文档涉嫌侵害了您的权利，请参照说明。jingen_zhou 的BLOG
用户名：jingen_zhou
文章数：467
评论数：248
访问量：407321
注册日期：
阅读量：900
阅读量：15739
51CTO推荐博文
　　复杂系统的复杂不仅在与架构开发流程本身，还与是否获得大范围涉众的一致同意有关，涉众管理的好不能肯定企业架构一定做得好，但是涉众管理做得不好，企业架构肯定做不好。对于管理类型项目来说，客户的满意度有时就能体现出我们和客户一开始交流得够不够。在A阶段（架构愿景）中我们需要进行涉众管理，交付类似下图的Stakeholder Map Matrix。本篇介绍一下涉众管理。
650) this.width=650;" onclick='window.open("/viewpic.php?refimg=" + this.src)'
src="/img/zhoujg/0.jpg" alt="" />
标识重要的涉众，能在早期更好的框定架构需求和范围
通过重要涉众的支持，可以获取更多的资源
早期频繁的和涉众沟通，可以确保更完整的理解架构流程
650) this.width=650;" onclick='window.open("/viewpic.php?refimg=" + this.src)'
style="float: right" src="/img/zhoujg/9.jpg" alt="" />
获取涉众列表
谁从项目中收益或遭受损失?
谁控制项目?
谁来设计系统?
谁作出决策?
谁获得IT系统并决定是否购买?
谁控制资源?
谁有项目要求的专业技能?
谁对项目有影响力?
问发起人或客户
检查组织机构
比较类似项目组
650) this.width=650;" onclick='window.open("/viewpic.php?refimg=" + this.src)'
src="/img/zhoujg/7.png" width="600" height="453" alt="" />
认识涉众的态度
这个人是否准备好了从当前现状改变到目标架构上？如故事，准备怎么改变？
这个人是否有能力作为一个企业架构发动人和推动者？如果是，他有什么能力？
如何参与到企业架构活动中？只是感兴趣了解而已，还是需要详细了解？
对企业架构的开发是否有合约性的承诺？
当前清楚改变
需要清楚改变
当前责任义务
需要责任义务
知道关键涉众: Power/Interest
A 不关注他
B 让他知道
C 使他满意
D 与他协作
650) this.width=650;" onclick='window.open("/viewpic.php?refimg=" + this.src)'
src="/img/zhoujg/0.png" alt="" />
裁剪涉众相关交付视图（ViewPoint）
　　不同项目中自行进行裁剪，在TOGAF文档中举了一个裁剪示例：
(Corporate Functions);
e.g., CEO, CFO, CIO, COO
This stakeholder group is interested in the high-level drivers, goals, and objectives of the organization, and howthese are translated into an effective process and IT architecture to advance the business.
KEEP SATISFIED
Business Footprint
Goal/Objective/ Service Model
Organization Chart
Program Management Office
(Corporate Functions);
e.g., Project Portfolio Managers
This stakeholder group is interested in prioritizing, funding, and aligning change activity. An understanding ofproject content and technical dependencies between projects adds a further dimension of richness to portfolio managementdecision-making.
KEEP SATISFIED
Business Footprint
Application Communication
Functional Decomposition
Procurement
(Corporate Functions);
e.g., Acquirers
Major concerns for these stakeholders are understandingwhat building blocks of the architecture can be bought, andwhat constraints (or rules) exist that are relevant to the purchase.The acquirer will shop with multiple vendors looking for thebest cost solution while adhering to the constraints (or rules) appliedby the architecture, such as standards. The key concern isto make purchasing decisions that fit the architecture, and thereby toreduce the risk of added costs arising from non-compliantcomponents.
KEY PLAYERS
Standards View
Human Resources (HR)
(Corporate Functions);
e.g., HR Managers, Training & Development Managers
Key features of the enterprise architecture are the roles and Actors that support the functions, applications, andtechnology of the organization. HR are important stakeholders in ensuring that the correct roles and actors are represented.
KEEP INFORMED
Organization Chart
Organization/Actor/ Location
Enterprise Security
(Corporate Functions);
e.g., Corporate Risk Management, Security Officers, IT Security Managers
Major concerns for this group are understanding how to ensure that the information, data, and systems of theorganization are available to only those that have permission, and how to protect the information, data, and systems fromunauthorized tampering.
KEY PLAYERS
Data Security View
Networked Computing Hardware View
Communications View
QA/Standards Group
(Corporate Functions);
e.g., Data Owners, Process Owners, Technical Standards Bodies
Major concerns for this group are ensuring the consistent governance of the organization's business, data,application, and technology assets.
KEY PLAYERS
Guidelines
Specifications
Standards View
Application Portfolio
Technology Portfolio
Technology Standards
(End User Organization);
e.g., Business Unit Directors, Business Unit CxOs, Business Unit Head of IT/Architecture
This stakeholder group is interested in the high-level drivers, goals, and objectives of the organization, and howthese are translated into an effective process and IT architecture to advance the business.
KEEP SATISFIED
Business Footprint
Goal/Objective/ Service Model
Organization Chart
Line Management
(End User Organization);
e.g., Senior Business Managers, Operations Regional Managers, IT Managers
This stakeholder is interested in the top-level functions and processes of the organization, and how the keyapplications of the IT estate support these processes.
KEY PLAYERS
Organization/Actor/ Location
Goal/Objective/ Service Model
Application & User Location View
Business Domain Experts
(End User Organization);
e.g., Business Process Experts, Business/Process Analyst, Process Architect, Process Designer, Functional Managers, BusinessAnalyst
This stakeholder is interested in the functional aspects of processes and systems. This can cover the human actorsinvolved in the system, the user processes involved in the system, the functions required to support the processes, and theinformation required to flow in support of the processes.
KEY PLAYERS
Process Flow
Service/Information Events
Functional Decomposition
Application - Application Communication View
Data Entity/Business Function Matrix
IT Service Management
(Systems Operations);
e.g., Service Delivery Manager
Major concerns for this group are ensuring that IT services provided to the organization meet the service levelsrequired by that organization to succeed in business.
KEEP INFORMED
Standards View
Enterprise Manageability View
IT Operations - Applications
(System Operations);
e.g., Application Architecture, System & Software Engineers
Major concerns for these stakeholders are: Development Approach, Software Modularity and Re-use, PortabilityMigration, and Interoperability.
KEY PLAYERS
Process - System Realization View
Application - Data View
Application Migration Cost View
Software Engineering View
Platform Decomposition View
Networked Computing - Hardware View
Software Distribution View
Data Entities to Application Systems View
IT Operations - Infrastructure
(System Operations);
e.g., Infrastructure Architect, Wintel support, Mid-range support, Operational DBA, Service Desk
Infrastructure stakeholders are typically concerned with location, modifiability, re-usability, and availability ofall components of the system. In general these stakeholders are concerned with ensuring that the appropriate components aredeveloped and deployed within the system in an optimal manner.
KEY PLAYERS
Platform Decomposition View
Standards View
Enterprise Manageability View
Networked Computing - Hardware View
Processing View
Environments & Locations View
IT Operations - Data/Voice Communications
(System Operations);
e.g., Network Management
Communications engineers are typically concerned with location, modifiability, re-usability, and availability ofcommunications and networking services. In general these stakeholders are concerned with ensuring that the appropriatecommunications and networking services are developed and deployed within the system in an optimal manner.
KEY PLAYERS
Communications View
(Project Organization);
e.g., Sponsor, Program Manager
This stakeholder group is interested in on-time, on-budget delivery of a change initiative that will realizeexpected benefits for the organization.
KEEP INFORMED
Architecture Requirements
Architecture Principles
Architecture Vision
Functional Decomposition
Application & User Location View
Line Management
(Project Organization);
e.g., Project Manager
This stakeholder group is responsible for operationally achieving on-time, on-budget delivery of a changeinitiative with an agreed scope.
KEEP INFORMED
Application - Application Communication View
Functional Decomposition
Environments & Locations View
Business Process/Functional Expert
(Project Organization);
e.g., Financials FICO Functional Consultant, HR Functional Consultant
This stakeholder group will elaborate the functional requirements of a change initiative based on experience andinteraction with business domain experts in the end-user organization.
KEY PLAYERS
Process Flow
Service/Information Events
Functional Decomposition
Application - Application Communication View
Product Specialist
(Project Organization);
e.g., Portal Product Specialist
This stakeholder group is responsible for specifying technology product designs in order to meet projectrequirements and comply with the Architecture Vision of the solution.
In a packages and packaged services environment, product expertise can be used to identify product capabilities that can bereadily leveraged and can provide guidance on strategies for product customization.
KEY PLAYERS
Software Engineering View
Application - Data View
Technical Specialist
(Project Organization);
e.g., Application Architect
This stakeholder group is responsible for specifying technology product designs in order to meet projectrequirements and comply with the Architecture Vision of the solution.
KEY PLAYERS
Software Engineering View
Platform Decomposition View
Process System
Realization View
Application - Data View
Application Migration Cost View
Regulatory Bodies
(Outside Services);
e.g., Financial Regulator, Industry Regulator
The main concerns of this group are that they canreceive the information they need in order to regulate the clientorganization, and that their information requirements are beingunderstood and properly satisfied. They are specifically interestedin reporting processes, and the data and applications used to provideregulatory return information.
KEEP SATISFIED
Business Footprint
Application - Application Communication View
(Outside Services);
e.g., Alliance Partners, Key Suppliers
The main concerns of this group are that the information exchange requirements that they have are met in order thatagreed service contracts with the client organizations can be fulfilled.
KEEP SATISFIED
Business Footprint
Service-Information View
Application - Application Communication View
ArchiMate对ViewPoint的分类
ArchiMate架构语言从视图的目的和抽象级别来对ViewPoint进行了如下分类：
650) this.width=650;" onclick='window.open("/viewpic.php?refimg=" + this.src)'
src="/img/zhoujg/1.png" alt="" />
Viewpoint Purpose
architect, software developer, business process designer
navigate, design, support design decisions, compare alternatives
UML diagram, BPMN diagram, flowchart, ER diagram
manager, CIO, CEO
decision-making
cross-reference table, landscape map, list, report
employee, customer, others
explain, convince, obtain commitment
animation, cartoon, process illustration, char
　　Viewpoint Abstraction Levels
software engineer, process owner
design, manage
UML class diagram, BPMN process diagram
operational managers
analyze dependencies, impact of-change
views expressing relations like &use&, &realize&, and &assign&
enterprise architect, CIO, CEO
change management
landscape map
欢迎转载，转载请注明：转载自 [
本文出自 “” 博客，请务必保留此出处
了这篇文章
类别：┆阅读(0)┆评论(0)【讨论】stratgegic reassurance怎么译？ - .cn - 译文论坛交流区 - 读书俱乐部 - 英汉大词典
上海译文出版社 .cn 译文论坛交流区 [外国文学 BBS]
&& 查看帖子
8 : 此主题共有19帖 此页19帖 每页30帖
【讨论】stratgegic reassurance怎么译？
stratgegic reassurance是奥巴马政府在九月间提出的美国政府关于美中关系的设想
当中的一个重要概念，似乎至今没有一个理想的中文译法。
美国人自己把它译为“战略保障”，中国媒体上出现的是“战略再保证”，这些提法好像都没有说明其本质。
以下是美国副国务卿詹姆斯?斯坦伯格（James B. Steinberg）9月24日在华盛顿演讲的几段,第一次提到这个概念;
&Adapting to the rise of China, as well as other emerging powers like India and Brazil, while protecting our own national interests. This, I believe, is one of the key strategic challenges of our time. And the key to solving it is what I would call strategic reassurance.
Strategic reassurance rests on a core, if tacit, bargain. Just as we and our allies must make clear that we are prepared to welcome China’s “arrival”, as you all have so nicely put it, as a prosperous and successful power, China must reassure the rest of the world that its development and growing global role will not come at the expense of security and well-being of others. Bolstering that bargain must be a priority in the U.S.-China relationship. And strategic reassurance must find ways to highlight and reinforce the areas of common interest, while addressing the sources of mistrust directly, whether they be political, military or economic.
ECD2 reassurance n.1.再保证；再安慰；（信心、勇气等的）恢复 2.再保险
这些释义似不合适。
下面引用由dptb00发表的内容：
ECD2 reassurance n.1.再保证；再安慰；（信心、勇气等的）恢复 2.再保险
这些释义似不合适。
战略互信（机制）？[ 这个贴子最后由ipsediem在 4:21:06编辑过 ]& &
SVPPOSITICIVS?SIBI?IPSE
332){var tmpwidth=this.var tmpheight=this.this.width=332;this.height=(tmpheight*this.width)/}if(this.height>200){;var tmpwidth=this.var tmpheight=this.this.height=200;this.width=(tmpwidth*this.height)/}" src=".cn/mybbs/images/upload//023522.jpg" onload="javascript:if(this.width>332){var tmpwidth=this.var tmpheight=this.this.width=332;this.height=(tmpheight*this.width)/}if(this.height>200){;var tmpwidth=this.var tmpheight=this.this.height=200;this.width=(tmpwidth*this.height)/}" align=absmiddle border=0>
Πιστεύομεν τῷ &θεῷ
战略承诺重申？
战略性和平承诺&332){var tmpwidth=this.var tmpheight=this.this.width=332;this.height=(tmpheight*this.width)/}if(this.height>200){;var tmpwidth=this.var tmpheight=this.this.height=200;this.width=(tmpwidth*this.height)/}" src="../images/upload//221504.jpg" onload="javascript:if(this.width>332){var tmpwidth=this.var tmpheight=this.this.width=332;this.height=(tmpheight*this.width)/}if(this.height>200){;var tmpwidth=this.var tmpheight=this.this.height=200;this.width=(tmpwidth*this.height)/}" align=absmiddle border=0>&
这个 reassurance 是不是让对方放心的意思？
下面引用由陆谷孙发表的内容：
战略承诺重申？
其实，美国人在玩弄语词，到底啥意思，白宫自己都不定义！别是 strategic ambiguity 与时俱进的产物，加了点糖衣而已。
But neither the White House nor the State Department has said much since the speech, leaving the interpretation to China-watchers and academics.
James Steinberg 后面还有一段：
The risks of mistrust are especially acute in the arena of strategic nuclear weapons, space, and, increasingly, in the cyber realm. Achieving mutual reassurance in these areas is challenging, but, as we learned during the Cold War, essential to avoiding potentially catastrophic rivalry and misunderstanding. Both sides need to devote creative thinking into how we might address these thorny challenges.
到底战略点啥好呢？搜索 zdic.net, 发现两个备选语词：
hé xié ㄏㄜ@ ㄒㄧㄝ @
和协（f）　
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
亦作“ 和叶 ”。
1.和睦相处。《左传?隐公十一年》：“寡人有弟，不能和协，而使b其口於四方。” 唐 康骈 《剧谈录?含元殿》：“君臣和叶，四表靖k。”中国近代史资料丛刊《辛亥革命?民报?烈士吴樾君意见书》：“民族间之利害n突，势所不免。惟势力平均者，始有和协提携之希望。”
(2).谓使之和睦相处。《三国志?吴志?胡综传》：“其和协彼此，使之无隙， 综 有力焉。” 宋 苏辙 《龙川别志》卷上：“z 张安道 {奉茸缎砉竦辣罚浼矣院托隆喜幌病！
(3).同心协力。《逸周书?允文》：“人知不弃，爱守正户，上下和协，靡敌不下。” 清 袁枚 《随园诗话》卷五：“从古权贵在朝，未有能和协者。”
(4).使和谐；协调。 南朝 宋 鲍照 《河清颂》：“]荐郊庙，和协律吕。” 鲁迅 《呐喊?鸭的喜剧》：“其间时时夹着蛇鸣‘嘶嘶’！可是也与虫声相和协。”
(5).犹和合。谓男女欢聚。 元 曾瑞 《山坡羊?妓怨》曲：“恰和协，又离别。被娘间阻郎心趄，离恨满怀何处h。” 明 梁辰鱼 《好事近?寄妓》套曲：“初相见甚干涉，料姻缘前生未定，难道就和叶。”
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
和合协调。《国语?周语中》：“女今我王室之一二兄弟，以时相见，将协典礼，以示民训则。” 韦昭 注：“协，合也。”
(1).和平治理。《穆天子传》卷三：“予归东土，和治诸夏。”
(2).太平，安定。《淮南子?本经训》：“天下和治，人得其愿。”
没想到，和协的内涵竟然是如此的“丰富”，提供了足够多的解说和联想空间。将来“和哄”玩不转了，还可以“和离”。
Ipsediem 备注：
从前叫做“和番”吧。居安思危一点呢，可以考虑“备和”（as opposed to 备战）。[ 这个贴子最后由ipsediem在 14:10:11编辑过 ]& &
SVPPOSITICIVS?SIBI?IPSE
332){var tmpwidth=this.var tmpheight=this.this.width=332;this.height=(tmpheight*this.width)/}if(this.height>200){;var tmpwidth=this.var tmpheight=this.this.height=200;this.width=(tmpwidth*this.height)/}" src=".cn/mybbs/images/upload//023522.jpg" onload="javascript:if(this.width>332){var tmpwidth=this.var tmpheight=this.this.width=332;this.height=(tmpheight*this.width)/}if(this.height>200){;var tmpwidth=this.var tmpheight=this.this.height=200;this.width=(tmpwidth*this.height)/}" align=absmiddle border=0>
Πιστεύομεν τῷ &θεῷ
演讲全文：
James B. Steinberg
Deputy Secretary of State
Keynote Address at the Center for a New American Security
Washington, DC
September 24, 2009
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPUTY SECRETARY STEINBERG: Well, thank you, Nate, for that kind introduction.
It’s a great pleasure to be back and to be here at this CNAS event. It’s great to see, although I had no doubt about it, that CNAS is still thriving despite the Obama Administration’s best efforts to deprive you of each and every one of your leading lights. And every meeting I go to seems to be populated by so many of the good people C not only Kurt and Michele, obviously, but Jim Miller and so many others who made CNAS so successful, and the really remarkable achievement in such a short period of time that CNAS has become an indispensable feature on the Washington landscape, no mean feat with the number of competitors that you all have out here, including some that I used to work for. And I think that this study that you’re launching today really is a reflection of the continued critical role that CNAS plays in creative and timely work that you do.
Obviously, as everyone in this audience knows, and we will be seeing a lot of it in the coming week or so, this year marks the 60th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China, which, of course, is part of the reason you scheduled this event now. As we think back on those 60 years, for about half of them C for about 30 C the relationship between the United States was not exactly the best, ranging from hostile at its worst, to nonexistent through much of the time.
And so in some ways, from a policymaker’s perspective and from a U.S. perspective, the more significant and momentous anniversary is not so much the 60 years since the founding of the PRC, but the 30 years since the United States and China normalized relations under President Carter and Deng Xiaoping in 1979. And I think it’s not entirely coincidental that if you look for a date, that you could roughly time the rise of China and its remarkable transformation C it’s about that time as well that the rise began C part of which having to do with the bilateral relationship and obviously largely to do with decisions China made about its own internal developments.
I think it’s fair to say that despite C I know, the great ambitions and hopes of Kurt and Michele, I don’t think even they, perhaps, would have guessed how far CNAS has come. And in the same way, I think those who were present in 1979 probably could not imagine how far China has come in those 30 years. It’s really truly a remarkable story. And for those of us who have been visiting China over the years, it’s just amazing, each time you visit, how much change you see happening right before our eyes.
It is a remarkable period to reflect back on and the decisions that were made during that period and the transformation of the U.S.-China relationship, and the great insight that began with President Nixon and followed through by President Carter was the fundamental recognition that the long-term interests of the United States were better served not by trying to thwart China’s ambitions, but rather to explore the possibility of whether China could become a partner with the United States. And while the motivations for those decisions in the 1970s were largely rooted in the dynamics of the Cold War, when we were focused on getting Chinese help encountering the Soviet Union, it is even more important in today’s reality that we recall that basic insight.
Secretary Clinton described that reality recently in her Council on Foreign Relations speech as a reality characterized by two inescapable facts, and I’m quoting her: “First, no nation can meet the world’s challenges alone,” and “Second, most nations worry about the same global threats.”
In this world, and under those circumstances, the logic of international cooperation is overwhelming. Countries have a great deal to gain if we can work together, and much to lose if we don’t. But applying this insight to our relations with China poses a fundamental conundrum. Given China’s growing capabilities and influence, we have an especially compelling need to work with China to meet global challenges. Yet China’s very size and importance also raises the risk of competition and rivalry that can thwart that cooperation.
Now, you all know I’m a part-time academic and so I can’t resist this part of the speech, but historians since Thucydides have pointed to a long string of conflicts generated by the emergence of rising powers that disturb the old order and challenge the existing power structure and predict the same gloomy future for China’s rise. Political scientists and IR theorists talk darkly of security dilemmas that lead nations to take actions to protect their own security against potential adversaries, and that, by taking those actions, fuel the very conflicts they were hoping to avert.
These academic perspectives obviously have strong resonance in the political debates we hear not only in the United States, but in China today. So how do we square this circle? Adapting to the rise of China, as well as other emerging powers like India and Brazil, while protecting our own national interests. This, I believe, is one of the key strategic challenges of our time. And the key to solving it is what I would call strategic reassurance.
Strategic reassurance rests on a core, if tacit, bargain. Just as we and our allies must make clear that we are prepared to welcome China’s “arrival”, as you all have so nicely put it, as a prosperous and successful power, China must reassure the rest of the world that its development and growing global role will not come at the expense of security and well-being of others. Bolstering that bargain must be a priority in the U.S.-China relationship. And strategic reassurance must find ways to highlight and reinforce the areas of common interest, while addressing the sources of mistrust directly, whether they be political, military or economic.
Now part of this reassurance comes from sustained dialogue. It’s important to recall, and Secretary Kissinger just reminded me of it a few days ago, that we began the new era of our relationship with China with some 25 hours of extended dialogue between Henry Kissinger and Zhou Enlai. And the importance of broad-ranging dialogue is at the core of our decision to elevate and broaden the strategic and economic dialogue between the United States and China. Part of achieving strategic reassurance comes from enhancing transparency.
But if our efforts are truly to be successful, they must go beyond words to actions that reassure. We must each take specific steps to address and allay each other’s concerns. The first eight months of the Obama Administration, building on the important efforts of our predecessors C and I want to stress the importance of continuity in the U.S.-China relationship, which has brought us to this very important stage today C have provided solid evidence that there is a reason to believe that this approach can bear fruit.
When Secretary Clinton traveled to China in February on her first trip as Secretary of State, she set out to demonstrate our commitment to this objective. When President Obama and President Hu met on the margins of the London G-20 in April, they pledged to work together to build a positive, cooperative, and comprehensive relationship for the 21st century. And we have seen in the subsequent meetings, including just the other day in New York and in the President’s planned visit to China, our determination to sustain this momentum.
Now the global financial crisis has offered a clear example C both the importance of the United States and China working together and the real benefits that come from that cooperation. China and the United States have implemented the two largest stimulus packages in history C coordinating them with one another and with other governments around the globe. And as China leads the way with renewed growth, the good news is not just that we are seeing the beginnings of a turnaround in much of the world, but we are also beginning to see a new effort to find greater global structures to assure that this doesn’t happen again. Just as we have said about getting our own house in order, China understands that it too must play its part by becoming a more important source of global consumption. There is a common commitment to putting growth on a stronger foundation, and we’ll see this in the discussions in Pittsburgh.
Of course, this effort takes more than just the combined efforts of the United States and China, and that’s why our global cooperation is so important. But without the United States and China working together effectively, the prospects of success would be much dimmer. We’re building towards the same kind of cooperation on addressing climate change, driven by the knowledge that the United States and China are the two biggest emitters of greenhouse gases. We in the United States acknowledge our historic responsibility for the emissions that have created the dangers of climate change, the indispensability of our taking strong actions here at home, and the need to accommodate China and other developing countries’ legitimate development goals.
At the same time, China is increasingly acknowledging that it must find a way to mitigate the climate effects of its continued development. A memorandum of understanding signed at the Strategic and Economic Dialogue demonstrated a joint commitment to expanding cooperation on low carbon growth and forging a successful international agreement on climate change, a task that we will pursue together in Copenhagen. And the statements of both President Obama and President Hu at the UN Climate Summit, I think, reinforced this sense of mutual commitment.
Our cooperation has also been an essential in forging a common front in response to North Korea’s recent missile and nuclear tests. Working with our partners in the Six-Party Talks, we forged a unified position leading to a presidential statement after the missile test, and UN Security Council Resolution 1874 following the nuclear test. And since the adoption of that resolution, we have worked effectively together to implement strong measures, which we hope will lead to a resumption of Six-Party Talks and the North Koreans’ recommitment to complete denuclearization.
Now, it will be important for us to demonstrate the same possibility of cooperation in dealing with Iran’s nuclear programs through the P5+1. China has also played an active role in fostering security and stability along its western border in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and I’m not just talking about the economic investments that China has made, such as the Aynak copper mine. It’s also played a role in training Afghans as well as Iraqis to diffuse landmines, and helping to work to encourage the Pakistan Government to step up its efforts against dangerous extremists.
China is demonstrating its willingness to play a constructive role in securing the global commons by contributing its destroyers to anti-piracy efforts off the Horn of Africa.
We’ve worked together to address the threat of transnational terrorism, and China has begun to do more to support the international nonproliferation regime, starting by joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group. We continue to work and encourage China to enhance export controls and other measures, but it is clear that in recent years, China is increasingly sharing our concerns and beginning to assume greater responsibility for addressing them.
Now, this growing list of areas of cooperation is impressive. But it is important that we neither overlook nor downplay the continued areas of mistrust and disagreement, many of which are highlighted in the volume that CNAS is launching today.
Reassurance is especially critical when it comes to military activities. I think it’s timely that I came in just after the few words I heard of the previous panel. As China’s economy has grown and its global interests have expanded, its military spending has quite naturally increased, and its capabilities have been extended at sea, in the air, and in space. And in some cases, these enhanced capabilities have been coupled with actions, such as China’s over-broad assertion of its rights in the EEZs, that have caused the United States and China’s neighbors to question China’s intentions.
While China, like any nation, has the right to provide for its security, its capabilities and its actions also heighten its responsibility to reassure others that this buildup does not present a threat. That we have restarted high-level military-to-military dialogues is a positive step. And I’m hopeful that this will allow us to help resolve some of the ongoing tensions, for example, with respect to the South China Sea and the PLA Navy’s activities. These discussions between us must be stable and ongoing, not a stop-and-start conversation easily derailed by disagreement.
We also are urging China to increase its military transparency in order to reassure all the countries in the rest of Asia and globally about its intentions, averting instability and tension in its own neighborhood. We’re encouraged by the positive dialogue between China and Taiwan, and we encourage both China and Taiwan to explore confidence-building steps that will lead to closer ties and greater stability across the Taiwan Strait.
The risks of mistrust are especially acute in the arena of strategic nuclear weapons, space, and increasingly in the cyber realm. Achieving mutual reassurance in these areas is challenging, but as we learned during the Cold War, essential to avoiding potentially catastrophic rivalry and misunderstanding. Both sides need to devote creative thinking in how we might address these thorny challenges.
Resource competition is another area of concern. With its rapid growth and large population, China’s demand for resources, whether oil, gas, or minerals, is surging, but resource mercantilism is not the appropriate response. China’s moves in that direction have raised legitimate concern not only in the United States, but also among our other partners and among resource-rich developing nations.
The problem is not just that China’s mercantilist appro it also leads China to problematic engagement with actors like Iran, Sudan, Burma, and Zimbabwe, and undermines the perception of China as a country interested in contributing to regional stability and humanitarian goals.
The United States and China share an interest in stable and sustainable energy supplies. And far from seeing China as a competitor, we’re eager to enlist China to help in developing well-functioning markets and bolstering our common energy security in the years ahead. China must, in turn, demonstrate that it will be a constructive participant in its efforts rather than seeking to secure its own energy needs at the expense of others.
Another area of frequent tension is our economic relationship. Our two-way trade and investment has benefited both of us enormously, and we both depend on it for our growth and prosperity. At the same time, it does create tension and misunderstanding. But that is why we have placed our economic relationship so central in our dialogue. And we’re making progress, for example, on a bilateral investment treaty while China takes steps to become a constructive member of the global economic architecture, including its membership in the WTO.
I want to say something about the recent dispute about tires. That dispute highlights some of the risks of our economic relationship, and there’s been no shortage of commentary warning of spiraling economic nationalism and a coming trade war. But it also is clear that this is a worst-case scenario, which is far from inevitable. We do disagree with the Chinese Government on the substance of this issue, which is why the President reached his decision, and we followed that decision with the imposition of a tariff.
But the important point is this all took place within the WTO framework accepted by the United States and China, as well as our own bilateral understandings. And I am convinced that both sides are intent on making sure that this particular disagreement does not spark a trade war or widespread protectionism. And if we succeed, it will be because we have established well designed avenues of cooperation and dialogue that allow us to handle these disputes in a broader context.
Now, some say that human rights have nothing to do with our strategic relationship, and therefore doesn’t belong in the list that I’m discussing today. Indeed, some in China have even argued that our interest in human rights and ethnic minorities and religious freedom is designed to weaken China and so inconsistent with the basic bargain I’ve been talking about. But I couldn’t disagree more.
Of course we stand up for human rights because, as President Obama has said, it is who we are as a people. But we also believe that a China that respects the rule of law and universal norms provides reassurance to others that it will bring the same approach to its international behavior, as well as providing greater stability and growth for its own people.
Now, strategic reassurance does not only apply to the relationship between China and the United States. Our partners, particularly in Asia, must have the same certainty that China’s expanding role will not come at the expense of their interests. And this not only requires that the United States bolster its own bilateral relationships, especially with key allies like Japan, South Korea and Australia, but also that we lead in updating and strengthening the regional and international institutions that shape the context in which China’s development occurs, so that change is constructive rather than destabilizing.
In what President Obama calls this new era of engagement, we are refining and reinforcing regional cooperation in Asia, which is why Secretary Clinton recently announced our accession to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. And along with developing new forums for regional dialogue and cooperation, we will stay committed to our key alliances. They are consistent with a vision of a peaceful, stable Asia that we and China share.
When it comes to the international system, we must ensure that new powers like China C and there are others as well, of course C can take their rightful place at the table without generating fear or mistrust. That means making the institutions more inclusive so that they reflect the world of today, rather than the world of 1945 or the 1970s, and more effective so that we can collectively overcome the problems of interdependence. As we pursue these policies, we will be open to China’s growing role, but we will also be looking for signs and signals of reassurance from China. If China is going to take its rightful place, it must make those signals clear.
In the face of uncertainty, policymakers in any government tend to prepare for the worst to focus on the potential threat down the road, and of course, some of that is necessary. But we also have to make sure that by preparing for the worst, we don’t foreclo that we leave ourselves open to the positive, and avoid the trap of self-fulfilling fears. Your volume quotes my predecessor Rich Armitage, “Nobody, including the leadership with China knows how it’s going to come out. If it comes out badly, if it comes out well, it can benefit all of us. And that’s what we must dedicate ourselves to.” A wise man, that Deputy Secretary. (Laughter.)
And as President Obama said at the opening of the SE&D*, “I believe in a future where China is a strong, prosperous and successful member of the community of nations, a future where our nations are partners, not out of necessity, but also out of opportunity. This future is not fixed, but it is a destination that can be reached if we pursue a sustained dialogue like the one that you and we will commence today, and act on what we hear and what we learn.”
We in the Obama Administration will uphold the United States’ side of this bargain. We are ready to accept a growing role for China on the international stage, and in many areas, we have already embraced it. China too needs to demonstrate the same commitment to doing its part C reassuring the United States, its neighbors in Asia, and the rest of the world that we have nothing to fear from a more influential China, that Beijing shares our vision of a new geopolitics of win-win solutions rather than zero-sum rivalries. With such strategic reassurance and a shared commitment to building an international system based on mutual trust, I have no doubt that we can succeed in our common interests, not just in common actions, and that will be a great benefit to us all. Thanks for your time, and I look forward to your questions. (Applause.)
美国国务院的中译文：
本届美国政府关于美中关系的设想
副国务卿詹姆斯?斯坦伯格
在新美国安全中心发表主题演讲
华盛顿哥伦比亚特区
副国务卿斯坦伯格：纳特，感谢你的热情介绍。
我很高兴能再次来到这里参加新美国安全中心的这次活动。尽管奥巴马政府（Obama Administration）不遗余力地想挖走你们的每一位精英人物，但贵中心仍能蓬勃发展，我对此深为赞佩，而且从未产生过怀疑。在我参加的每一次会议上，似乎都能见到贵中心如此众多的博学多才之士――不仅有库尔特（Kurt）和米歇尔（Michele），当然还有吉姆?米勒（Jim Miller）和其他很多帮助贵中心取得如此巨大成功的人士。贵中心在短时间内成为华盛顿地区一个不可或缺的景观，的确是一个可观的成就，尤其是你们的竞争对手如林，我还为其中一些机构工作过，能够脱颖而出实为不易。我认为，今天你们发布的这项研究报告确实体现了贵中心的工作富于创新，善于抓住时机，始终发挥着重要作用。
当然，在座的各位都知道，我们下个星期还会看到很多有关活动，因为今年是中华人民共和国成立60周年，这当然也是你们将本次活动安排在此时进行的原因之一。回顾这60年，其中一半时间――大约有30年――与美国的关系并不好，关系最紧张的时期相互敌对，有很长一段时期互不往来。
因此，从某些方面讲，从决策者的角度和美国的角度来看，意义更重大、影响更为深远的不是中华人民共和国成立60周年，而是美国和中国于1979年在卡特总统（President Carter）和邓小平主政时期实现关系正常化30周年。我认为，从时间上讲，这个时期大约也是中国崛起并经历巨大转型的时期，这并不完全是巧合――中国的崛起大约从这个时候开始――两国建立双边关系是原因之一，但在很大程度上显然是中国根据本国国内形势做出的决策。
我认为，可以恰当地说，尽管――我知道库尔特和米歇尔才识过人，很有远见，但我认为即使他们可能也没有预见到新美国安全中心能有如此良好的发展。同样，我想人们在1979年可能也没有想到中国30年来能取得如此长足的进步。这段历程的确不同凡响。对于我们这些多年来经常访问中国的人来说，每次去都会看到巨大的变化就出现在眼前，令人赞叹不已。
回首这段不平凡的时期，重温当时的种种决策和美中关系转变的历程及以尼克松总统（President Nixon）为开端，后由卡特总统实现的远见卓识，人们从根本上认识到，更有利于美国长期利益的不是试图挫败中国的抱负，而是探求中国能否与美国结为伙伴的可能性。尽管20世纪70年代的有关决策主要出于对冷战（Cold War）形势的考虑，因为当时我们的重点是争取中国的帮助制衡苏联（Soviet Union），但面对今天的现实，重提上述基本认识甚至尤为重要。
国务卿克林顿（Secretary Clinton）最近在对外关系委员会（Council on Foreign Relations）发表讲话时谈到，有两种不可回避的事实决定了今日之现实。她是这样说的，“首先，没有一个国家能单独应对世界上各种挑战”，“其次，大多数国家对共同的全球威胁感到担忧”。
在当今世界上，鉴于目前的这种形势，进行国际合作的理由极其充分。如果我们能够合作，各国可受益匪浅，否则便将蒙受重大损失。但以这种认识处理我们同中国的关系，不免从根本上面临两难的局面。考虑到中国的实力和影响日益增强，我们尤为迫切地需要同中国共同应对全球性挑战。然而，中国自身的规模和重要地位也带来了相互竞争与对抗的风险，结果有可能阻挠相互合作。
各位都知道，我是半个学者，因此我忍不住要发表评论，因为自修昔底德（Thucydides）以来的历史学家都指出大国的崛起会引发一系列冲突，结果打乱了旧秩序并对现有权力结构提出挑战，因此中国的崛起也可能导致同样暗淡的前景。政治学家和国际关系学者往往悲观地谈到，安全面临的困境可导致各国采取行动保护自己的安全免受潜在敌人的威胁，但这类行动反过来又会为他们原来希望避免的冲突推波助澜。
今天，这些学术观点不仅在美国，而且在中国的政治讨论中显然都产生了强烈的回响。我们怎样才能解决这个难题呢？一方面需要保护本国的国家利益，另一方面也需要适应中国的崛起，适应印度（India)和巴西（Brazil)等其他大国的崛起。我认为，这是我们这个时代的重大战略挑战之一。而应对这个挑战的关键就是我所说的战略性保障（strategic reassurance）。
战略性保障取决于一项关键的相互约定，或许也是一个不言而喻的条件。我们和我们的盟友必须明确表示，我们已准备好欢迎中国作为一个繁荣昌盛的大国的“arrival”（到来），这里借用你们的措辞，很贴切；中国也必须向全世界其他国家保证，中国的发展及其在全球日益增长的作用将不以其他人的安全和福祉为代价。维护这项条件必须成为美中关系的重点。战略性保障必须通过各种途径强调并增进存在共同利益的领域，同时直接消除导致相互不信任的根源，不论是在政治上、军事上，还是在经济上。
战略性保障在一定程度上可以通过持续对话得到实现。人们不应该忘记，几天前基辛格国务卿也提醒我，当年亨利?基辛格（Henry Kissinger）与周恩来经过长达约25个小时的交谈，我们才打开了对华关系的新时代。进行广泛对话的重要性是我们决定促进和拓宽美国与中国的战略与经济对话的核心。战略性保障在某种程度上也可以通过提高透明度实现。
为了我们的努力切实获得成功，不能只靠言辞，必须见诸于有保证的实际行动。我们必须各自采取具体步骤，处理和解决彼此关注的问题。在执政的前8个月，奥巴马政府主要以前任进行的重大努力为基础――我需要强调保持美中关系连续性的重要意义，正因为如此我们才能发展到今天这个重要阶段――有力的事实说明，应该有理由相信这种方式能够产生实效。
今年2月，国务卿克林顿首次以国务卿的身份出访中国，着重表明我们坚持这个目标的立场。今年4月，奥巴马总统和胡主席在伦敦G-20峰会期间举行会晤，双方承诺为建设21世纪的积极、合作、全面的关系共同努力。通过随后的一系列会谈，包括不久前在纽约举行的会谈以及总统拟定的中国之行，我们都看到我们决心在这个基础上再接再厉。
目前的全球金融危机为美中两国合作的重要性以及合作带来的实际利益提供了明显的例证。中国和美国实施了有史以来两个规模最大的刺激经济方案CC两国互相协调并与全球其他国家的政府互相协调。中国已率先恢复增长；令人欣慰的是，我们不仅看到世界许多地区正开始出现好转，而且还开始看到，为保证危机不再重演，人们正在进行新的努力，寻求更高层次的全球性机制。关于我们谈到的恢复国内秩序的问题，中国认识到，中国必须尽其努力，成为全球消费一个更重要的来源。共同的义务要求增长应有更坚固的基础，我们将在匹兹堡的讨论中看到这一点。
当然，这方面的努力不仅要求美国和中国付出共同努力，所以我们的全球合作也非常重要。然而，没有美国与中国的有效合作，成功的前景将会更暗淡得多。美国和中国认识到两国是最大的温室气体排放国，为此在气候变化问题上相互合作，我们正逐步发展类似的合作。我们美国一方承认，废气排放造成了气候变化的危害，对废气排放承担着我们的历史责任，因此应义不容辞地在国内采取有力的措施，同时也需要尊重中国和其他发展中国家合乎实际的发展目标。
与此同时，中国也日益认识到，中国必须寻找方法，降低继续寻求发展对气候造成的影响。两国在战略与经济对话期间签署的谅解备忘录表明了一项共同承诺，要求扩大在低碳增长方面的合作，同时在气候变化问题上成功地达成一项国际协议，我们将在哥本哈根（Copenhagen）会议期间共同努力实现这项目标。我认为，奥巴马总统和胡主席在联合国气候问题首脑会议上发表的讲话，进一步明确了这个共同承诺的精神。
我们的合作还为应对北韩最近的导弹及核试验建立共同战线具有重要意义。通过与六方会谈的伙伴进行合作，我们达成了一致立场，随后促成安理会在北韩进行导弹试射后发表主席声明，另在北韩进行核试验后，又通过了联合国安理会第1874号决议。自从该决议通过以来，我们为实施更强硬的措施进行了有效的合作，我们希望将有助于恢复六方会谈，敦促北韩重新承诺无核化的义务。
同时，我们有必要表明，为了通过五常加一（P5+1）的模式处理伊朗核计划问题，应该有同样的可能进行合作。中国还发挥了积极作用，加强与巴基斯坦及阿富汗接壤的西部边界的安全与稳定。我所说的不仅是中国已进行的经济投资，如对艾娜克（Aynak）铜矿的投资。中国还在训练阿富汗人及伊拉克人如何排除地雷，并为鼓励巴基斯坦政府打击危险的极端主义分子尽自己的努力。
中国向非洲之角派出驱逐舰打击海盗活动，表明愿为保障全球共同利益发挥建设性作用。
我们已为消除跨国恐怖主义的威胁共同努力。中国以加入核供应国集团（Nuclear Suppliers Group）为开端，开始为支持国际不扩散体制付出更大的努力。我们继续为此进行努力，并鼓励中国加强出口管制等措施。显而易见的是，近年来中国正越来越多地与我们有着共同的关注，并开始为解决这些问题承担更大的责任。
合作的领域不断扩大令人赞叹。然而，必须认识到我们既不能忽视，也不能淡化继续存在不信任和分歧的领域，贵中心今天发布的报告重点谈到了其中很多方面的问题。
消除疑虑在军事活动方面尤为关键。我认为，在听了前面的一些讨论后轮到我发言正是时候。随着中国经济的增长及其全球利益的扩展，其军事开支也很自然地有所增加，中国在海上、空中和太空的实力都有所增强。在某些情况下，实力的增强还伴随着相应的行动，中国要求对专属经济区（EEZ）行使权利的范围过宽就是一个例子，已引起美国和中国的邻国对中国的意图提出质疑。
中国同其他任何国家一样，有权保障自身安全，但其实力和行动也要求增强自身的责任，向其他国家承诺发展军备不构成威胁。我们已经重启高级别军方对话，这是一项积极举措。我希望这能有助于我们缓和目前的某些紧张状况，例如南中国海问题和中国人民解放军海军部队的活动。我们之间的这类磋商必须稳步、持续地进行，不应该轻易受到分歧的干扰，成为时断时续的对话。
我们还在敦促中国提高其军事透明度，从而消除亚洲和全世界其他所有国家对其意图的疑虑，避免其周边地区出现不稳定和紧张状态。我们对中国和台湾之间的积极对话感到高兴。我们鼓励中国和台湾都寻求有助于信心建设的措施，增强台湾海峡两岸的联系和稳定。
彼此不信任的风险在战略核武器和太空领域尤为严重，在网络空间也日甚一日。在上述领域实现相互保障需要克服很多困难，但我们已从冷战中汲取了教训，深知这是避免灾难性的对抗和误解的关键。双方都必须以创造性的思维考虑如何解决这些棘手的难题。
资源竞争是另一个值得关注的领域。中国增长迅速、人口众多，对油、汽和矿物资源的需求急剧上升，但资源重商主义不是适当的应对手段。中国的这种倾向已经引起了合理的关注，不仅来自美国，还来自我们的其他伙伴和资源丰富的发展中国家。
问题不仅在于中国的重商主义倾向扰乱了市场，还在于这种行为导致中国同伊朗（Iran）、苏丹（Sudan）、缅甸（Burma）和津巴布韦（Zimbabwe）等国进行有问题的接触，破坏了中国作为一个愿为地区稳定和人道主义目标做出贡献的国家的形象。
美国和中国在保障稳定的、可持续的能源供给方面拥有共同利益。我们决不会视中国为竞争对手，同时还迫切希望争取中国的帮助，以便今后建立正常运转的市场并增进我们共同的能源安全。与此同时，中国必须表明，中国将作为一个建设性的参与者进行努力，不会为保障自己的能源需求而损害他人的利益。
另一个往往导致关系紧张的领域是我们的经济关系。我们的双向贸易和投资使我们两国受益匪浅，我们的增长和繁荣都有赖于此。但贸易也不免造成了关系紧张和误解。这就是我们在两国对话中如此重视双方经济关系的原因。我们正在这方面取得进展，例如双方正努力达成一项双边投资协定，与此同时中国正采取步骤，争取成为WTO等全球经济体系的一名建设性成员。
我想谈谈最近发生的有关轮胎的争端。这场争端突出地反映了双方经济关系中的某些风险。有关经济民族主义情绪不断上升的预言和贸易战一触即发的评论数不胜数。但同样很明确的是，这是一种最坏的估计，绝非不可避免。对于这个问题的实质，我们的确同中国政府持不同意见。因此，总统做出了他的决定，我们依照这项决定加征了关税。
但重要的是，这都发生在美国和中国所接受的WTO的框架内，也没有超出两国双边谅解的范畴。我坚信，美中双方都要求防止这一特定的分歧引发贸易战或保护主义的蔓延。如果我们能够做到这一点，那将归功于我们已经建立的合作与对话的良好渠道，使我们能在全局之下处理这些争端。
有人说人权问题与我们的战略关系毫不相干，因此不应在我今天讨论的问题之列。不仅如此，中国有些人士甚至认为我们关注人权、少数民族和宗教自由问题，用意在于削弱中国，因此与我一直在谈的基本精神不符。对此我实在不敢苟同。
毋庸置疑，我们捍卫人权，因为正如奥巴马总统所指出的，人权体现了我国人民的本质。但我们也认为，一个尊重法制和国际惯例的中国可以打消别国的疑虑，相信中国能为本国人民促进稳定和增长，同时在国际上也将采取同样的行为。
如今，战略保障不仅涉及中美两国关系。我们的合作夥伴，尤其是亚洲的合作伙伴必须能够同样确信，中国的作用日益强大，不至于以牺牲他们的利益为代价。这不仅需要美国维护其本身与各国的双边关系，特别是与日本、韩国及澳大利亚等主要盟国的关系，而且需要我们发挥主导作用，改善和加强某些对中国实现发展的环境产生影响的地区性和国际性机制，使其变革具有建设性，而不至于导致不稳定。
奥巴马总统称这个新时代是相互接触的时代。我们正在调整和加强在亚洲的地区性合作。正是因为如此，国务卿克林顿最近宣布我国加入《东盟友好合作条约》 (ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation)。我们在为地区性对话与合作发展新的渠道的同时，还将坚持维护与我们主要盟国的关系。这符合我们与中国关于亚洲和平稳定的共同构想。
在涉及国际体系的问题上，我们必须确保中国这样的新兴大国，当然还有其他一些国家，能够在交往中采取适宜的姿态，不至于引起恐惧或不信任。这要求促进有关机制的广泛性，使其充分反映今日世界的实际，不再逗留在1945年或1970年代。这还要求提高这些机制的效果，有助于我们共同解决相互依赖带来的问题。我们在采取这些政策的同时，将欢迎中国发挥日益重要的作用，但是也希望看到中国提供保障的迹象和表示。中国如果准备采取适宜的姿态，必须明确发出这些信号。
面临不确定的状况，任何政府的决策者一般会做最坏的打算，高度警惕未来潜在的威胁。当然，在某些情况下，的确有必要这样做。但是，我们还应该注意到，在做最坏的打算的同时，也不可忽视积极的结果；我们欢迎产生积极的结果，同时避免坠入自以为是的惊恐。你们的报告援引我的前任里奇?阿米蒂奇(Rich Armitage)的话说：“任何人，包括中国领导层，都不能断定将来的结局。结局如果不好，对我们也不利；结局如果很好，对大家都有利。我们必须为此努力。”副国务卿是一位智者。(笑声)
奥巴马总统在战略与经济对话开幕式上指出：“我所相信的未来是：中国是国际社会强大、繁荣和成功的一员；届时我们的国家将不仅是出于需要而且也是出于寻求机遇成为合作的伙伴。未来并非一定如此，但是，如果我们坚持进行像今天即将开始的对话，并基于我们听到和学到的内容行事，这应当是一个能够达到的目标。”
奥巴马政府将坚持美国在对话中采取的立场。我们准备接受中国在国际舞台上发挥日益重要的作用。在许多领域，我们已经对此表示欢迎。中国也同样有必要表明，中国将履行自己的义务，使美国、亚洲邻国和全世界相信，我们不必对中国的影响扩大有任何疑虑，北京方面也认同我们有关地缘政治的新构想，要求以双赢的方式解决问题，不再陷入你死我活的争斗。有了这一战略性保障和建立以互信为基础的国际体系的共同承诺，我坚信我们不仅能成功地采取共同行动，而且能够实现我们的共同利益。这对我们大家都大有裨益。谢谢诸位，现在我准备回答你们的提问。(掌声)
（回答问题部分略）
下面引用由JJTJJT发表的内容：
这个 reassurance 是不是让对方放心的意思？
“你崛起，我放心”？
下面引用由dptb00发表的内容：
“你崛起，我放心”？
我崛起，你放心！
下面引用由ipsediem发表的内容：
其实，美国人在玩弄语词，到底啥意思，白宫自己都不定义！别是 strategic ambiguity 与时俱进的产物，加了点糖衣而已。
到底战略点啥好呢？搜索 zdic.net, 发现两个备选语词：
“保障”“保证”似乎都不太合适，是因为这两个词都体现不出“互相”的意思。按斯氏讲话，所谓strategic reassurance要旨是“消除彼此的疑虑，建立互相信任”，这两个备选还是少了“让人放心”。
下面引用由dptb00发表的内容：
“保障”“保证”似乎都不太合适，是因为这两个词都体现不出“互相”的意思。按斯氏讲话，所谓strategic reassurance要旨是“消除彼此的疑虑，建立互相信任”，这两个备选还是少了“让人放心”...
请看3楼，已经翻成 战略互信（机制） 了，不过就是另一种迷汤罢了，检验其有效化学成分？ 绝对禁止。
SVPPOSITICIVS?SIBI?IPSE
332){var tmpwidth=this.var tmpheight=this.this.width=332;this.height=(tmpheight*this.width)/}if(this.height>200){;var tmpwidth=this.var tmpheight=this.this.height=200;this.width=(tmpwidth*this.height)/}" src=".cn/mybbs/images/upload//023522.jpg" onload="javascript:if(this.width>332){var tmpwidth=this.var tmpheight=this.this.width=332;this.height=(tmpheight*this.width)/}if(this.height>200){;var tmpwidth=this.var tmpheight=this.this.height=200;this.width=(tmpwidth*this.height)/}" align=absmiddle border=0>
Πιστεύομεν τῷ &θεῷ
下面引用由ipsediem发表的内容：
请看3楼，已经翻成 战略互信（机制） 了，不过就是另一种迷汤罢了，检验其有效化学成分？ 绝对禁止。
“互信”似比其他词都好些。也许用“保障”“保证”的译者是因为没能从reassurance中看出“互”来？
下面引用由dptb00发表的内容：
“互信”似比其他词都好些。也许用“保障”“保证”的译者是因为没能从reassurance中看出“互”来？
如果把 reassurance 看作 coinsurance, 还可以翻成“联保”，这样 business 意味重些。其实 Ipsediem 倒觉得“和协”也不错，至少视觉上“温情”一点，带“和”的语词多半指 bilateral 或 multilateral 关系, 而 unilateral 是单边主义，好比只有一个巴掌，不容易拍得响。
当然，最后哪个能成为定译，一靠集体智慧，二靠政治嗅觉灵敏的把好文字关，最终还得经得起时间的检验。
SVPPOSITICIVS?SIBI?IPSE
332){var tmpwidth=this.var tmpheight=this.this.width=332;this.height=(tmpheight*this.width)/}if(this.height>200){;var tmpwidth=this.var tmpheight=this.this.height=200;this.width=(tmpwidth*this.height)/}" src=".cn/mybbs/images/upload//023522.jpg" onload="javascript:if(this.width>332){var tmpwidth=this.var tmpheight=this.this.width=332;this.height=(tmpheight*this.width)/}if(this.height>200){;var tmpwidth=this.var tmpheight=this.this.height=200;this.width=(tmpwidth*this.height)/}" align=absmiddle border=0>
Πιστεύομεν τῷ &θεῷ
下面引用由ipsediem发表的内容：
战略互信（机制）？
An update:
中国需要的是一个和平稳定的世界环境；中国需要的是一个平等友好的美中关系。
“战略互信”：美中关系的新概念
“严峻的现实是，作为美国的最大债权国，中国已经成为唯一一个能够挑战美国超级大国地位的国家，美中关系的核心已经发生变化。”
接着它说，“奥巴马的前辈们总是致力于推动和刺激中国应按照西方模式开放经济和政治，与此不同，奥巴马则花费更多的精力来让中国放心而不是劝诫中国。”
这两句话可是一针见血，一语道破奥巴马访华的性质。
奥巴马这次到中国是寻求中国的“战略互信”（Strategic Reassurance），而不是布什时代的“负责任的利益攸关方”（Responsible Stakeholder），这表明奥巴马时代已不再以“你负责，我认可”的不平等条件对待中国，这是一大改善。但但中国仍然十分谨慎。正如德国《法兰克福汇报》11月16日说：“……中国对此只会迟疑地做出一些让步，北京不想过早把头伸出窗外，也不想伸得太远。面对美国，中国感到很不安全，认为美国不可信任。”
SVPPOSITICIVS?SIBI?IPSE
332){var tmpwidth=this.var tmpheight=this.this.width=332;this.height=(tmpheight*this.width)/}if(this.height>200){;var tmpwidth=this.var tmpheight=this.this.height=200;this.width=(tmpwidth*this.height)/}" src=".cn/mybbs/images/upload//023522.jpg" onload="javascript:if(this.width>332){var tmpwidth=this.var tmpheight=this.this.width=332;this.height=(tmpheight*this.width)/}if(this.height>200){;var tmpwidth=this.var tmpheight=this.this.height=200;this.width=(tmpwidth*this.height)/}" align=absmiddle border=0>
Πιστεύομεν τῷ &θεῷ
看样子奥巴马还是主张“多做少说”的，他来中国以后并没有使用“strategic reassurance”这个phrase，当然他用了其他话语来表示“建立互信”的意思。
斯坦伯格先生也许是“越俎代庖”了？
最后双方同意的是bilateral strategic trust
II. Building and Deepening Bilateral Strategic Trust
The United States and China are of the view that in the 21st century, global challenges are growing, countries are more interdependent, and the need for peace, development, and cooperation is increasing. The United States and China have an increasingly broad base of cooperation and share increasingly important common responsibilities on many major issues concerning global stability and prosperity. The two countries should further strengthen coordination and cooperation, work together to tackle challenges, and promote world peace, security and prosperity.
The two countries believe that to nurture and deepen bilateral strategic trust is essential to U.S.-China relations in the new era. During their discussions, the Chinese side said that it resolutely follows the path of peaceful development and a win-win strategy of opening-up, and is committed to promoting the building of a harmonious world of enduring peace and common prosperity. The United States reiterated that it welcomes a strong, prosperous and successful China that plays a greater role in world affairs. The United States stated that it is committed to working with other countries in addressing the most difficult international problems they face. China welcomes the United States as an Asia-Pacific nation that contributes to peace, stability and prosperity in the region. The two sides reiterated that they are committed to building a positive, cooperative and comprehensive U.S.-China relationship for the 21st century, and will take concrete actions to steadily build a partnership to address common challenges.
8 : 此主题共有19帖 此页19帖 每页30帖
===切换论坛至……====
返回论坛首页
├┬读书俱乐部
│├英汉大词典
│├新文本俱乐部
│├TIMEOUT
│├米奇?阿尔博姆
│├香蕉俱乐部
│├村上春树俱乐部
│└米兰?昆拉俱...
├┬译文沙龙
│├游吟诗人
├┬新书预热
└┬论坛活动区
　├论坛事务区
　├版主交流
　└论坛回收站
长度不得超过255字
内容(最大97K)
是否是UBB代码
&其它选项:&
& Alt+S或Ctrl+Enter快速提交
Powered By&&&&&