求一篇关于旅游营销的外文文献，急~~~~~~_百度知道
求一篇关于旅游营销的外文文献，急~~~~~~
急求一篇关于旅游营销方面的外文文献，要有作者，出版社，年月，最重要的是内容摘要，七八百字以上吧，全都是英文的，别搞个中文的过来，急求，谢啦~~~~
我有更好的答案
按默认排序
旅游营销指旅游产品或旅游服务的生产商在识别旅游者需求的基础上，通过确定其所能提供的目标市场并设计适当的旅游产品、服务和项目，以满足这些市场需求的过程。 旅游营销的整合传播与分众传播
旅游品牌整合营销仍然是旅游营销的主导形式
旅游品牌整合营销，是旅游营销的主导形式，主要以旅游形象的整合为核心，进行形象传播，以旅游吸引力的驱动结果，实现旅游产品的购买，达到旅游销售的目标。
绿维将旅游品牌整合营销传播系统（TBIMC）从实战的角度划分为品牌塑造、品牌包装、品牌传播、品牌管理四个步骤 。
旅游营销的分众模式正在成为旅游营销的有效支撑结构
分众模式，要求对旅游产品进行细分，以细分的产品，对应细分的市场需求，通过分众的渠道，选择分众媒介，进行分众传播，最后实现细分市场的有效营销。
品牌整合营销传播，是以品牌为载体，对大量的旅游信息进行压缩，形成凝聚，并以品牌整合所有的产品，形成统一形象结构的过程。
旅游营销的分众模式与分众化发展趋
1、旅游产品销售的机理――吸引力响应及体验过程预卖
2、细分市场的需求差异
（1）旅游市场的社会经济变量划分
（2）出游中的旅游市场划分
（3）休闲旅游的五大主力市场
3、吸引力打造与包装的分众化发展
4、吸引力传播的分众化
5、旅游产品销售渠道的分众化Tourism Marketing means the tourism product or travel service providers in identifying the manufacturer on the basis of the needs of tourists, by identifying its target market and can provide the design of appropriate tourism products, services and projects to meet these market requirements process. Tourism Marketing integration of communication and dissemination of Focus Tourism Brand Integrated Marketing is still the dominant form of tourism marketing Tourism brand of integrated marketing, is the dominant form of tourism marketing, mainly the integration of tourism image as the core, to the image of the spread of the results of the tourism attraction of the drive to achieve tourism products to buy, to achieve the objective of tourism marketing. Green Tourism Victoria will be the brand of integrated marketing communication systems (TBIMC) from the actual point of view is divided into brand building, branding, brand communication, brand management in four steps. Tourism Marketing sub-Focus model is as a tourist marketing, effective support structure Focus mode, requested a breakdown of the tourism products in order to breakdown products, the corresponding segments of the market demand, through a separate group of channels to choose Focus Media, Focus transmitted to the final realization of an effective marketing segments. Brand Integrated Marketing Communication is based on the brand as the carrier, a large number of tourist information is compressed to form a pool, and to integrate all the brand products, to form a unified image of the structure, process. Tourism Marketing Focus Mode and Focus of the development trend 1, the mechanism of tourism product marketing - appealing to respond to and experience the process of pre-selling 2, the needs of different market segments (1) the socio-economic variables into the tourism market (2) traveling in the tourism market segmentation (3) the five main market leisure travel 3, attractiveness and packaging to create a sub-Focus Development 4, the spread of the audience appeal of 5, travel sales channels, audience fragmentation
其他类似问题
外文文献的相关知识
您可能关注的推广回答者：
等待您来回答
下载知道APP
随时随地咨询
出门在外也不愁文档贡献者
该文档贡献者很忙，什么也没留下。
下载此文档
正在努力加载中...
毕业设计-外文文献及译文 The Significance of the Tendering Contract on The Opport.
文档星级：
内容提示：毕业设计-外文文献及译文 The Significance of the Tendering Contract on The Opportunities
文档格式：DOC|
浏览次数：21|
上传日期： 22:14:41|
下载积分：
该用户还上传了这些文档
官方公共微信
下载文档:毕业设计-外文文献及译文 The Significance of the Tendering Contract on The Opportunities.DOC文档分类：
在线文档经过高度压缩，下载原文更清晰。
【毕业设计翻译用外文文献---企业创新管理--协同创新】Innovation, collaboration and SMEs internal research capacit Research Policy 31 (–747Innovation, collaboration and SMEs internal research capacitiesFrédéric Bougraina,, Bernard Haudevilleba CSTB, 4 Avenue du Recteur Poincaré, 75782 Paris Cedex 16, Franceb CEREFI, Université d’Aix-Marseille III, 13627 Aix-en-Provence Cedex 1, epted 3 July 2001AbstractThe aim of this research paper is to assess how SMEs’ internal research capacities help them to exploit external scienticand technical knowledge and to works of innovators. Our empirical analysis draws upon case studies made of projectswhich were partly nanced by ANVAR, a French national agency responsible for the development of innovation projects inindustry. The results of this study are three-fold. Technological co-operation does not seem to increase the chance of ess of innovative projects. R&D intensity does not lead to discriminate between ess and failure. Internal R&D capacities, such as a design ofce, enhance the rm’s ability to co-operate and to carry its project to ess. 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.JEL classication: O32Keywords: L Industrial co- Internal technological capabilities1. IntroductionStereo-types usually associate innovation with thework of ‘a scientist of genius who can propose bining, go against the tide, show stubborn deter-mination to make his idea essful’(Callon, 1994,p. 6). Indeed, innovation and scientic discovery areattributed to individuals. The prizes awarded eachyear by the Nobel Foundation perfectly illustratethis situation. However, this emblematic picture ismisleading. Every scientic and technological break-through results from numerous contributions ratherthan from individual creations. essful innova- Corresponding author. Tel.: +33-1-40-50-29-04.E-mail address: f.bougrain@cstb.fr (F. Bougrain).tions appear heavily dependant on trials and errors,uncertainty, compromises among several actors.The growth of strategic alliances in new core tech-nologies during the 1980s illustrates this situation(Hagedoorn, 1995). New interfaces have been createdbetween disciplines (biotechnology plays a growingrole in chemical, pharmaceutical, food-processingindustries). The technological environment withinwhich rms operate has been transformed. Technol-ogy has e plex that it cannot be handledby individual corporations. Even the pa-nies have been touched by ‘the declining technicalself-sufciency’(Fusfeld, 1986, p. 144). Scienticand technical knowledge is scattered among a largenumber of people. Its acquisition needs to rely ongroups which interact works./$ – see front matter
2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.PII: S) F. Bougrain, B. Haudeville / Research Policy 31 (–747All rms have been affected by this technologi-cal challenge. Even small rms which performs R&Dhave been engaged in co-operation (Kleinknecht andReijnen, 1992).In most OECD’s countries, this tendency has beenreinforced by public authorities who prefer to favourinter-rm co-operation rather than to provide directnancial assistance.Public sectors interventions are three-fold. Public authorities have laid increasing emphasison inter-rm collaboration in advanced technology.Most of the time these programmes urge large rmslocated in the same geographical area to co-operate(e.g. the Esprit and Alvey programmes in theEuropean Union). They also tend to focus on prec-ompetitive research activities (Fusfeld, 1986). Thispolicy has been inuenced by similar essfulalliances in the puter industry. The ess of co-operation among small tradi-tional rms in Italy has inspired regional initiatives(Rosenfeld, 1996). Public authorities have tried torecreate the Italian district atmosphere by providingnew services and by fostering technology transfer. The ess works in the Silicon Valley hasled to the development of science parks/technopolewhich involve universities, public R&D laboratoriesand rms. The aim of this policy is to enhance theinnovative capability of the host region by strength-ening the ties among scientic, technical and insti-tutional agents. Unlike policies inspired by Italiandistricts, universities and research institutions in-volvements are stronger. 1In spite of these initiatives, one must not forgetthat co-operative agreements are based on technologytransfers which imply the respect of economic rules.The challenge is particularly delicate for SMEs. Thosewho establish weak ties with their environment maynot favourably react to public policies which emphasison inter-rm collaboration. Conversely, rms engagedin a virtuous process to acquire -1 In France, different levels of public authorities are engaged inthese policies. The munity and the French centralgovernment lead the large projects. The institutional infrastructurebuilt to promote regional co-operation was initiated by the cen-tral government. But its implementation is a matter for regionalauthorities. Finally, the technopolitan movement was launched bylocal authorities.petencies should
from the policy orientations(Le Bas, 1993).In the present paper, we report how rms’ inter-nal capacities generate this virtuous process. We willdraw upon case studies made of projects which werecarried out by about 300 SMEs, from 1980 to 1987.We will focus on rms which co-operate with anisations. Before this empirical study, we willdescribe the notion works and discuss theirrole in innovation. Then, we will examine the role ofthe manager in the innovation process. Indeed, man-agers play a key role in the running of their business.Depending on their risk adversity, they will innovateand works information differently.2. Industrial co-operation: from exchangeto productionFrom a theoretical point of view, the notion -work is still very fuzzy. However, we can distinguishat least following two approaches. The transaction cost perspective worksas an intermediate governance structure betweenmarkets and hierarchies. In this perspective, tech-nology is dissociated from production which issecondary. The evolutionary theory considers that technologyacquires its specic character through a learningprocess. In this perspective, we should place em-phasis on the production activity.2.1. Limits of the transaction cost ording to Williamson, asset specicity, uncer-tainty, the frequency with which transactions recur,bounded rationality and opportunism determine whichgovernance structure is best adapted to manage trans-action (Williamson, 1989).Low asset specicity petitive bargainsand leads to contractual solutions. To explain theemergence works (the hybrid form betweenmarkets and hierarchies), Williamson puts forwardthe existence of strong property bined withintermediary asset specicity. However markets andhybrid forms are not always adapted. When agentshave to support durable investment, competition istransformed into a bilateral transaction. In such asituation, vertical integration is best adapted to avoidF. Bougrain, B. Haudeville / Research Policy 31 (–747 737opportunistic behaviours. This decision is consideredas a choice of last resort (‘try markets, try long-termcontracts and other hybrid modes, and revert to hi-erarchy only pelling reasons’(Williamson,1991, p. 83)).Notwithstanding the interest of this approach to pro-vide an analytical scheme for the study works,several limits remain. The primary goal of this theory is to know whethera rm should make or buy a good or a service. Inthis framework, rm and market are considered asperfect substitute. This situation derives from theassumption that information is costly for transac-tion purpose but not for production purpose (Dem-setz, 1991). If one considers that the acquisition ofinformation is costly, rms will not bear the sameproduction costs. So it ‘might be in the interest ofa rm to produce its own inputs even if transac-tion costs were zero and management costs werepositive’(Demsetz, 1991, p. 164).Considering that technology is costly to producealso reverses the transactional approach. Accordingto this theory, arm’s length agreements for technol-ogy transfer are costly. First, agents are engagedin negotiations to dene the terms of the contract.Once the agreement is signed, they will under-take inspection to make sure that their partner isnot shirking. Given these assumptions on oppor-tunistic behaviours, transaction costs should reachprohibitive levels when innovation is involved.However, this is not the case. In fact, negotiationswhich lead up to a bargain should not be consideredas a cost but as an investment (Everaere, 1993).Agents rely on this process to learn about theirmutual needs and to make decision to avoid bottle-necks during the implementation of the project. The transactional approach puts too much em-phasis on opportunism. However, ‘anisationshould be understood at least much as a mecha-nism to enhance co-operation than as a device toreduce cheating and shirking’(Ménard, 1992). Byand large recurrent transactions lead partners in-volved in work to gradually trust one another.These collaborative relationships entail learning(Lundvall, 1993). As one of the ‘four contemporary paradigms in theTheory of the Firm’ described by Winter (1991,p. 187), transaction cost theory is rst and fore-most a matter of exchange and bounded rationality.Production is secondary. Consequently, it fails to‘examine how new resource uses are discovered,how resources are accumulated, how rms learn,which governance structures best promote learning,etc.’(Foss, 1996, p. 12).2.2. Co-operation as a learning processKnowledge for production purpose cannot be con-sidered as free. The role of the rm is not to allocatecostless petencies (Pelikan, 1988). 2They have to set them up. petencies changeover time through a learning process and e tacitand specic to the rm (Foss, 1996). This changehas crucial consequences for rms’ performances anisations. The tacitness petencies make them dif-cult to imitate. Therefore, rms’ endowments intechnical capacities are not similar. Once they arebuilt, they provide the rm with petitiveadvantage. 3 The process of knowledge creation is costly to main-tain. Therefore, rms need to achieve economiesthrough specialisation (Demsetz, 1991). This mayexplains why rms usually prefer to concentratetheir resources toward core activities. To plementary assets, two solutions are possible:Market transaction or co-operation. However, tac-itness and specicity impede pletion oftechnology transfer. 4 Thus, rms cannot rely onmarket to have access to new capabilities.Co-operative agreements are adapted when rmsare reluctant to develop additional capacities but need2 Pelikan considers that ‘petence is pe-tence for designing products and production processes in terms ofphysical variables, and includes also petence to learn petence, or technical talents’(Pelikan, 1988, p. 383). Follow-ing this denition, we regard knowledge as a mean to petence.3 ‘. . . The concept of anisational capabilities that permitit (the rm) to petitive, and therefore protable, innational and international markets (is) more pertinent than thoseof bounded rationality and opportunism’(Chandler, 1992, p. 490).4 ‘Know-how has a strong learning-by-doing character, and itmay be essential that human capital in an effective team congu-ration pany the transfer’(Teece, 1980, p. 228).738 F. Bougrain, B. Haudeville / Research Policy 31 (–747to have access to plementary and dis-similar activities (Richardson, 1972). It is soughtwhen ex ante co-ordination between different phasesof production is necessary. Despite production andtransaction costs, rms should not be reluctant to pur-sue a strategy of co-operative agreements for at leastfollowing two reasons. Considering that rms are not equally endowed petence but need to construct them, in-creases the nancial constraints which rms bear. Inthis scheme, investment costs are dissociated fromreceipts (Amendola and Gaffard, 1994). Thus, ittakes time to recover the initial investment. Collab-orative relationships will release the nancial con-straints by helping the rm to share the sunk costsassociated with innovation. The second reason relates to learning. Collaborativerelationships might take a hierarchical form. How-ever, when trust replaces uncertainty and oppor-tunism, informal obligations may constitute a morestable framework for interaction (Lundvall, 1988).This is possible if rms consider that the future ismore signicant than the present (Jacquemin, 1987).In the case of user–producer relations, the frequencyof interactive relationships have proved to speed upthe innovation process. Indeed, mu-nications help them to specify their mutual needs.In this case, unlike the transaction cost theory, re-current transactions favour co-operative agreement.This interactive learning has following three dimen-sions (Lundvall, 1993). Technical learning exists when interaction be-tween users and producers induces an under-standing of reciprocal needs. Communicative learning involves the establish-ment of technical codes, tacit and specic to thepartners. Social learning limits opportunism by creatingsimilar behavioural codes.The access to external linkages is assumed to becrucial for petitiveness.3. SMEs and municationSMEs tend to be less innovative than pa-nies and to dedicate less resources to the acquisition ofexternal technologies. In France, from 1990 to % of rms with a number of employees rangingfrom 20 to 49, were considered as innovators and 93%of those with more than 2000 employees were engagedin this process (SESSI, 1996). These results do notmean that SMEs are less efcient than big rms. 5 Theabsence of hierarchical levels and mu-nications favours quick reaction to keep abreast withenvironmental disturbances and fast changing marketrequirements.In fact, what distinguishes SMEs parisonwith panies is not in that they have a lowerturnover or a smaller size. The crucial point is thatthey are usually managed by their owners.3.1. The crucial role of the manager duringthe innovation processIn SMEs, the manager bears the responsibility oftaking the decisions regarding all aspects of technicalchange. Thus, risk adversity may impede the innova-tion process. Following two types of behaviour areusually applicable to managers (OCDE, 1993). In the rst category, one nds managers who lookfor the stability of pany and consider thatinnovation represents a large nancial risk. So theyonly innovate under the pressure of their environ-ment. They limit their contacts with the externalenvironment to suppliers and clients. The manage-ment style is centralised. The second kind of entrepreneurial managers en-courage rapid growth of pany. They ac-cept risk and try to take advantages of every newopportunity. To enhance the performance and thegrowth of pany, they forge external tech-nical and scientic linkages with educational es-tablishments, research associations and other publicagencies. They know that the ess of -pany is based on the quality of their employees andon mitments works of innovators. Inthis prospect, the managers’ educational level in-uences the scope of work. Highly educated5 The survey carried out by the SPRU revealed that from 1945to 1980, SMEs highly contributed to innovation. Their share ininnovation was higher than their share in total formal R&D (Roth-well and Zegveld, 1982).F. Bougrain, B. Haudeville / Research Policy 31 (–747 739managers tend to rely more on research and advi-sory agencies and less on informal contacts.3.2. The role works in petitivenessFirms which
from interpersonal works will gain following three kinds petitive advantages. Information is the nerve petition which setsup among rms. Nevertheless, plexity ofinformation makes it more difcult to master. Be-cause of their lack of nancial resources, SMEs areoften disadvantaged in their ability to gather tech-nical information of paramount importance (Julien,1994). Vis-à-vis large rms, they suffer from an in-formation gap. Networks allow SMEs to decode andappropriate ows of information. They reinforceSMEs’ competitiveness by providing them with awindow on technological change, sources of tech-nical assistance, market requirements and hoices made by other rms. Tacit knowledge is very important in innovation(Senker, 1995). This knowledge cannot be trans-ferred through written documents. 6 It is embodiedin the personal knowledge of technical and scien-tic agents. Therefore, works whichfavour acquaintances e the main channel forits transfer. To know who holds information is cru-cial when one plex technological issues.Members works ‘provide the know-why,know-how, know-when, and know-what necessaryfor entrepreneurial ess’(Malecki and Tootle,1996, p. 45). Innovation is characterised by its uncertainty. Firmsneed to raise nancial means as soon as they launchresearch projects. Conversely, results are uncertainand remote. Ten years can elapse between mercialisation. As time passes, e more specic. This augments the irre-versibility of the rm’mitment. Moreover,in many elds, where technical changes are rapidand product life cycle very short, the acquisitionof technology through traditional means (licence6 ‘In each technology there are elements of tacit and specicknowledge that are not and cannot be written down in a ‘blueprint’form, and cannot, therefore, be entirely diffused either in the formof public or proprietary information’(Dosi, 1988, p. 1131).agreement) turns out to be risky and subject toobsolescence. By using either formal or works, SMEs reduce their irreversibility costs 7and have access to new knowledge.To assess how co-operative R&D foster the suc-cess of innovative projects, we draw upon case studiesmade of projects which were launched by small busi-ness enterprises of the Centre region (around the LoireValley).4. Impact of co-operative relationshipson essful innovation: analysis froma panel of French SMEs4.1. Research methodologyThe rms of our sample received public funds topartly nance their innovative activities. These fundswere allocated by ANVAR, a French national agencyresponsible for the development of innovation projectsin industry. The regional agencies, located everywherein France, aid small rms not only through nancialassistance, 8 but also through technological advice.Therefore, they play a key role in the existence of re-works consisting of rms, academic institu-tions and government agencies.We ground our study on 313 projects (247 enter-prises) which were partly nanced by the agency lo-cated in Orléans from 1980 to 1987. By selectingprojects which were launched between 1980 and 1987,we wanted to be able to judge whether the rms hadachieved their technological mercial goals. In1995, at the time of our inquiry, the results of eachinnovative projects were just known for the period.Our analysis is parison of the ways in ess differ from failures. We estimated a logistic7 According to Foray (1991), co-operative R&D can take anisational forms. It goes from internal to contractual research.Along this axis, resources are less specic but reversibility isstronger.8 The nancial assistance can cover up to 50% of the costs ofthe innovation project. The rms refund the agency only in caseof ess and without paying any interest. Large rm are usuallyexcluded from this procedure. In France, about 5% of rms withmore than 500 employees ed from the nancial aid.740 F. Bougrain, B. Haudeville / Research Policy 31 (–747regression model, with the dependant variable, the re-sult of the innovative project, dened equal to 1 if therm refunded ANVAR without notifying any technicalproblems to the agency, and equal to 0 if the project isa failure. The independent variables are the categoriesof rms, the sector of production of the innovation andthe technical partners.The categories of the rms: the enterprises wereclassied into eight categories depending on their sizeand their ownership status (Appendix A). These rmsare not supposed to be representative of the populationof French SMEs. If a rm asks for the assistance ofthe agency, it proves that it innovates and is open toits institutional environment.4.1.1. The sector of production of the innovationThe innovative projects were classied accordingto the French Industrial Classication of Productsand Activities (NAF 16) (SESSI, 1995). We addedve categories to this nomenclature: food-processingindustry, software industry, building industry andagriculture. The projects which did not t into thisclassication belong to the ‘other’ category. The dis-tribution of projects according to the size of the rm,the ownership status and the sectors of production ofthe innovations are presented in Table 1.4.1.2. The technical partnersSome SMEs worked on their innovation project byrelying exclusivelOther collaborated both on formal and informal basis.Table 1Distribution of projects according to rm size, ownership status and the sectors of production of the innovations (NAF 16)Size and status of rms Employees Regional group Subsidiaryof groupTotalaSectors 1–9 10–19 20–49 50–99 100–250 251–499Consumer goods 5 3 3 6 5 1 0 1 24 (7.7)Automobile 2 0 0 1 3 2 1 2 11 (3.5)Capital goods 29 17 37 20 19 4 10 12 148 (47.3)Intermediate goods 10 4 13 9 9 6 1 22 74 (23.6)Food processing 1 1 1 0 3 2 8 2 18 (5.7)Agriculture 3 0 3 2 0 0 0 0 8 (2.6)Construction 2 1 1 0 3 0 1 0 8 (2.puting activities 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 (1)Other 2 2 7 1 2 2 1 2 19 (6.1)Total 55 30 65 39 44 17 18 45 313Percentages 17.6 9.6 20.8 12.5 14.0 5.4 5.7 14.4 100a The values shown in the parenthesis are in percentages.Several technical partners were identied: clients,suppliers, other rms (than clients and suppliers),professional and technical centres, educational insti-tutions (university, engineering school, technical col-lege), research institutions (CNRS, INRA, INSERMand CEA). Individual inventors and designers are the‘other partners’(Table 2).In Table 2, we report following three differentmodels. The rst tests the effect of co-operative relation-ships as a whole. One of the dependant variable iscollaboration. It is equal to 1 if the rm relied petencies, and equal to 0 if the rm didnot co-operate with external partners. The second tests the role of the partners which wereapproached by the rms for technical purposes. The last model only keeps the variables which werethe most signicant in models 1 and 2, in predictingthe results of the innovative projects.However, our approach is not exhaustive. It doesnot show how SMEs are linked works.4.2. The role of linkages to external resourcesThe ess rate of small and medium enterpriseswhich obtained external knowledge from -panies or from public research institutions throughtechnological co-operation, was higher (Table 3).However, from the results of our estimating procedure(Table 2, model 1), we cannot say that technologicalF. Bougrain, B. Haudeville / Research Policy 31 (–747 741Table 2Logistic regression of the likelihood of ess of innovative projectsDependant variable: ess of innovative projectsName of the explanatoryvariablesCoefcient (t of Student):model 1Coefcient (t of Student):model 2Coefcient (t of Student):model 3Constant 0.) 0.) 0.)Categories of rmsVery small enterprises(1–9 employees)0.) 1.) 1.)Very small enterprises(10–19 employees)0.240 (0.487) 0.216 (0.415) –SME (20–49 employees) 0.) 0.) –SME (50–99 employees) 0.) 0.) 0.)SME (100–250 employees) 0.) 0.) –SME (251–499 employees) 0.) 0.) 0.)Regional group 0.) 0.) 1.)Subsidiaries Reference Reference –Sectors of production of the innovationsConsumer goods industry 0.123 (0.244) 0.257 (0.479)Automobile industry 1.) 1.6095+ (1.827) 1.)Capital goods industry 0.) 0.) 0.4722+ (1.829)Food processing industry 1.9053+ (1.677) 1.) 1.83 (1.591)Agriculture 0.) 0.) –Other 0.473 (0.103) 0.) –Intermediate goods industry Reference Reference –Co-operative relationships 0.196 (0.616) ––PartnersSupplier – 0.) 0.)Client – 0.) –Enterprise – 0.) 0.)Technical centre – 0.) –Engineering and technicalschool/university– 0.213 (0.587) –National research centre – 1.) 1.)Other partners – 0.) –n 313 313 313Log likelihood 195.5 186.8962Prediction with the logic Prediction Observations Prediction (%)Failures essModel 1Failures 156 30 186 83.ess 80 47 127 37.0Total 236 77 313 64.9Model 2Failures 141 45 186 75.ess 60 67 127 52.8Total 201 112 313 66.4742 F. Bougrain, B. Haudeville / Research Policy 31 (–747Table 2 (Continued)Prediction with the logic Prediction Observations Prediction (%)Failures essModel 3Failures 153 33 186 82.ess 73 54 127 42.5Total 226 87 313 66.1+ Signicant at 10%. Signicant at 5%. Signicant at 1%.Table 3Links between co-operative relationships and innovation ess ess rate Failures Failure rate Number of projectsTechnological partnerships 109 42.2 149 57.8 258Number of technological partnerships 18 32.7 37 67.3 55Number of projects 127 40.6 186 59.4 313a According to the χ2-test, there is no direct link between the result of a project and technological partnerships.co-operation increases the chance of ess of inno-vative projects.As can be seen the predictive performance of suc-cess is increased when the categories of collaborationsare separated. Surprisingly, the two categories whichappear signicant affect negatively the results of theprojects. Co-operative agreements with suppliers andresearch institutions decrease signicantly the chancesof ess. 9However, we cannot cast doubt over policies whichtend to establish partnerships between SMEs and otherinstitutions. The failure of a project does not meanthat SMEs would have done better by relying on theirown capabilities. The weaknesses of our study arethree-fold. Firstly, we lack qualitative information about thenature of the ties instituted between SMEs and theirpartners. Developing mutual trust implies the es-tablishment mon codes of information. This9 The size affects negatively the results of the innovative projectsonly for very small enterprises (less than 10 employees). Forextensive results on the relation between rm size and innovationand on co-operative relationships between SMEs and researchinstitutions, see Bougrain (2000).process takes time before being effective (Lundvall,1988). Secondly, this es up against the way toapprehend informal relationships. All co-operativeprojects between customers and suppliers do notalways lead to payment in full. This is the casewhen a customer tests for free the new product ofhis supplier. In such a situation, informal exchangemay not have appeared in the progress report ofthe project. Thus, we probably underestimated thecustomer–supplier relations. 10 This lack of infor-mation is problematic because of the importance ofinformal interactions to transfer tacit knowledge. 11 Finally, to analyse if co-operative relationships areeffective, we cannot assume that SMEs adopt a pas-sive behaviour vis-à-vis their partners. Indeed, anupsurge of co-operative R&D agreements has beennoticed in recent years. However, this increase did10 In his study, Hagedoorn drew similar conclusions (1995).11 According to Von Hippel, informal know-how trading is veryactive when ‘(1) the needed know-how exists in the hands of somemember of the work, and when (2) the know-how isproprietary only by virtue of its secrecy, and when (3) the valueof a particular traded module is too small to justify an explicitnegotiated agreement to sell, license or exchange’(Von Hippel,1987, p. 300).F. Bougrain, B. Haudeville / Research Policy 31 (–747 743not indicate that collective research was a substitutefor corporate research. Both plementary(Mowery, 1983).So we need to examine how rms’ internal researchcapacities help them to exploit external scientic andtechnical knowledge.5. Relationships between rms internalcapabilities and essful innovations5.1. Relation between absorptive capacityand external learningFirms do not delegate their research activities toother industrial corporations. To keep initiative andtechnical leadership, they need to strengthen theirin-house research facilities.According to Cohen and Levinthal (1989), innova-tive capabilities depend on the ability to exploit exter-nal knowledge and on in-house R&D efforts. Thesearguments reverse Arrow’s analytical framework whoconsidered that rms underinvest in R&D because im-itation costs are smaller than the cost of creating newknowledge. If ‘these costs are relatively small, it is byvirtue of the considerable R&D already conducted bythe rms in the vicinity of the emission’(Cohen andLevinthal, 1989, p. 570).Firms’ ability to develop an absorptive capacityheavily depends on investment made during previousperiods. These initial investments allow them to makebetter technological choices and to exploit new oppor-tunities better. If a rm temporarily neglects to investin a technical eld, it will be less aware of techno-logical opportunities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Soit will increase its initial weakness. To maintain petitiveness, rms need to have at leasta window on state-of-the-art munication systems also play a great role to in-anisational absorptive capacity. Firms mustfocus both on the interface between the departmentsand the external environment and on -munication among departments. Overlapping knowl-edge across individuals is crucial to ameliorate internaltransfer while diversity of knowledge elicit ‘learningand problem solving that yields innovation’(Cohenand Levinthal, 1990, p. 133).According to this theoretical scheme, rms’ abilityto exploit external knowledge depends on their ab-sorptive capacity. Consequently, we cannot considerthat an analysis of the link between collaborative rela-tionships and innovation is adequate. We need to takeinto account internal factors which would improvethe learning capacity and contribute to the ess ofco-operative projects. Following three factors whichcharacterised in-house innovative capabilities will beanalysed: R&D the number of executive and the existence of a design ofce.We did not take into account all the above-mentionedprojects (313). We restrained our survey to SMEswhich were involved in a co-operative agreement.Moreover we dismissed many projects becausedata were not fully available for each case. From1980 to 1987, ANVAR changed its administrativeforms. Thus, along the period, information con-cerning the rms were not homogeneous rmation related to the existence of a designofce was available in 91 cases. We decided notto take into account the percentage of executivesto employees for SMEs with less than 10 employ-ees. We thought that these gures would not havebeen signicant. Consequently, we just relied on83 projects. R&D intensity was available for 79les.Due to the limited sample size, we only estimatedbasic logistic regression models and we performeda χ2-test for the three factors which characterisedin-house innovative capabilities.5.2. Links between R&D intensity and ording to our regression 1 (Table 4) and to theχ2-test (Table 5), R&D intensity does not inuencefuture prospects of a project. These results based on asmall sample, conrm those of Rocha (1999, p. 268).He considered that greater R&D intensity is not nec-essary when rms need ‘to absorb external knowledgeproduced through inter-rm alliances’.However, our research methodology may ex-plain these results. Production, diffusion and use of744 F. Bougrain, B. Haudeville / Research Policy 31 (–747Table 4Logistic regression of the likelihood of ess of innovative projectsDependant variable: ess of innovative projectsName of the explanatoryvariablesCoefcient (t of Student):model 1Coefcient (t of Student):model 2Coefcient (t of Student):model 3Constant 0.) 0.) 0.469+ (1.7997)Research intensity 0.)Size (number of employees) 0.0)Executives (%) 1.)Design ofce 0.045+ (0.088)n 79 83 91Log likelihood 53.279 185.2+ Signicant at 10%.Table 5Links between R&D intensitya and results of co-operative projectsbProjects resultsR&D ess ess rate Failures Failure rate Number of projectsWeak (less than 1% of sales) 10 43.5 13 56.5 23Middle (between 1 and 4% of sales) 13 44.8 16 55.2 29Strong (more than 4% of sales) 15 55.6 12 44.4 27Number of projects 38 48.1 41 51.9 79a These three classes of R&D intensity t the mendations advocated by the OCDE (1992). Firms which dedicate less than 1%of their turnover to R&D, belong to the class of weak research intensity.b According to the χ2-test, there is no direct link between the result of a project and R&D intensity.innovation are different among sectors (Pavitt, 1984).However, to analyse the correlation between R&Dintensity and projects results, we do not take into ac-count the sectoral patterns of innovation. In high-techsectors, a regime of fast technological change squeezesthe rms to devote more resources to R&D. In thetextile industry, technological constraints are not sostrong.Despite this drawback, our results tend to conrmthat R&D intensity cannot be considered as a perfectindicator to measure the innovative activity which isperformed in SMEs. Following two elements arguein this way. The main problem is to know which expendi-tures rms include in R&D. In France, rmsmay announce the gures which they declareto
from research tax deduction. Butthe appropriateness of the denition used bythe scal administration to determine R&D ex-penditures, is criticised (Lhuillery and Templé,1995). R&D is only one source of innovation. 12 Thisremark applies particularly to SMEs. Their re-search activities are not as formal anisedas in large rms. 13 SMEs may carry out theirR&D activities ‘without a formal R&D departmentor a formal budget and often even outside regu-lar working hours’(Kleinknecht, 1989, p. 216).Consequently, it is difcult to identify R&D invest-ments of small rms (Roper, 1998). This indicatorcannot be satisfactory to analyse SMEs’ ability toinnovate.12 ‘Whilst working on denitions and measurement of researchand development in the 1960s one frequently encountered theview that what should be measured in industry was not R&D, butR, D&D—Research, Design and Development’(Freeman, 1992,p. 50).13 ‘We have shown that when we treat technical change as syn-onymous with R&D activities in science-based industries, we arein danger of neglecting up to nearly 40% of what is going onin technical change, especially in non-electrical machinery and insmall rms’(Patel and Pavitt, 1994, p. 543).播放器加载中，请稍候...
该用户其他文档
文档介绍：
【毕业设计翻译用外文文献---企业创新管理--协同创新】Innovation, collaboration and SMEs internal research capacit Research Policy 31 (–747Innovation, collaboration and SMEs internal research capacitiesFrédéric Bougraina,, Bernard Haudevilleba CSTB, 4 Avenue du Recteur Poincaré...
内容来自淘豆网转载请标明出处.
时间： 11:06