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3秒自动关闭窗口An Economic Theory of GATT70
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An Economic Theory of GATT70
AnEconomicTheoryofGATT；ByKYLEBAGWELLANDROBERTW.；Weproposeauni?edtheoreti；Thecentralroleplayedbyth；Webeginwitha?rstandmostb；What,then,istheinef?cien；*Bagwell:DepartmentofEco；215；For
AnEconomicTheoryofGATTByKYLEBAGWELLANDROBERTW.STAIGER*Weproposeauni?edtheoreticalframeworkwithinwhichtointerpretandeval-uatethefoundationalprinciplesofGATT.Workingwithinageneralequilibriumtrademodel,werepresentgovernmentpreferencesinawaythatisconsistentwithnationalincomemaximizationbutalsoallowsforthepossibilityofdistri-butionalconcernsasemphasizedinleadingpolitical-economymodels.Usingthisgeneralframework,weestablishthatGATT’sprinciplesofreciprocityandnon-discriminationcanbeviewedassimplerulesthatassistgovernmentsintheirefforttoimplementef?cienttradeagreements.Fromthisperspective,wearguethatpreferentialagreementsundermineGATT’sabilitytodeliveref?cientmul-tilateraloutcomes.(JELF02,F13,F15)ThecentralroleplayedbytheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade(GATT)inshapingpostwartradepolicyiswidelyac-cepted.Throughtheeightroundsoftradene-gotiationsthathavefollowedsincetheinceptionofGATTin1947,averageadvalo-remtariffsonindustrialgoodshavefallensig-ni?cantlyfromover40percenttolessthan4percent.Overthesameperiodoftime,mem-bershipinGATT[andnowitssuccessoror-ganization,theWorldTradeOrganization(WTO)]hasrisenfrom23countriestowellabove100.DespitetheimportantroleplayedbyGATTintheworldeconomy,however,economistshavenotyetdevelopedauni?edtheoreticalframeworkthatinterpretsandeval-uatestheprinciplesthatformthefoundationofGATT.Ourpurposehereistoproposesuchaframework.Webeginwitha?rstandmostbasicques-tion:Whatcangovernmentsgainfromatradeagreement?Weadopttheviewthatatradeagreementisappealingtogovernmentsifitof-fersthemgreaterwelfarethantheywouldre-ceiveintheabsenceoftheagreement.Ifintheabsenceofanagreement,governmentssettradepoliciesinaunilateralfashion,thenatradeagreementisappealingprovidedthataninef?ciency(relativetogovernments’prefer-ences)existsunderunilateraltariffsetting.Viewedfromthisperspective,theroleofatradeagreementisthentoremovetheinef?-ciency,sothatmembergovernmentscanenjoyhigherwelfare.Theprinciplesembodiedinthetradeagreementcanthenbeinterpretedandevaluatedinthislight.What,then,istheinef?ciencythattradeagreementsaredesignedtoremedy?Workingwithmodelsinwhichgovernmentsmaximizenationalincome,previousauthorshaveestab-lishedthattheclassicterms-of-tradeexternal-itycreatesaninef?ciencyinunilateraltradepolicies.1Intuitively,whenagovernmentim-posesanimporttariff,someofthecostofthis*Bagwell:DepartmentofEconomics,InternationalAffairsBuilding,ColumbiaUniversity,420West118thStreet,NewYork,NY10027,andNationalBureauofEconomicRStaiger:DepartmentofEconomics,SocialScienceBuilding,UniversityofWisconsin,1180ObservatoryDrive,Madison,WI53706,andNationalBu-reauofEconomicResearch.WethankJimAnderson,JagdishBhagwati,AlanDeardorff,RonaldFindlay,RonaldMcKinnon,T.N.Srinivasan,threeanonymousreferees,andseminarparticipantsatBostonUniversity,ColumbiaUniversity,theUniversityofMichigan,Har-vardUniversity,theUniversityofToulouse,StanfordUni-versity,theUniversityofWisconsin,theWorldTradeOrganization,andthe1997NBERSummerInstituteforhelpfulcomments.ThispaperwaswrittenwhileStaigerwasaFellowattheCenterforAdvancedStudyintheBehavioralSciences.Staigerisalsogratefulfor?nancialsupportprovidedbytheNationalScienceFoundationGrantNo.SBR-9022192.215Foranearlyformalanalysisoftheterms-of-tradeex-ternality,seeHarryG.Johnson().MorerecentdiscussionsincludeJohnMcMillan(),AvinashDixit(1987),andBagwellandStaiger(1990).1216THEAMERICANECONOMICREVIEWMARCH1999?rstbroadconclusionthattradeagreementsareappealingtogovernmentssolelyasameanstoremedytheinef?cientterms-of-trade-drivenrestrictionsintradethatarisewhentradepoliciesaresetunilaterally.Toes-tablishthisconclusion,wedemonstratethatunilateraltradepolicieswouldbeef?cientinahypotheticalworldinwhichgovernmentspursuedpoliticalgoalsbutwerenotmotivatedbytheterms-of-tradeimplicationsoftheirtradepolicies.Inotherwords,ifgovernmentswerenotmotivatedbytheterms-of-tradeim-plicationsoftheirtrade-policyselections,thentherewouldbenoreasonforthecreationofGATT.2Thishypotheticalexperimentyieldsasetofpoliticallyoptimaltariffs,whichareef-?cientpreciselybecausethemotivationforsuchtariffs3isseparatefromanycost-shiftingincentive.Armedwiththisbasicconclusionastothepurposeoftradeagreements,wenextinterpretandevaluatethekeyprinciplesonwhichGATTisfounded.Followingthelegallitera-tureonGATT(see,e.g.,JohnH.Jackson,1989pp.85C89),weinterpretGATTasa‘‘rules-based’’institutionwhereby,priortonegotiatingovertradepolicy,membergovern-mentsagreetoasetofrulesorprincipleswhichdescribethelimitsofacceptablebehav-iorandtherebygovernthe‘‘bargainingchips’’thatcanbebroughttotheactualtrade-policynegotiationsthatfollow.4WhileGATThasalargenumberofspeci?carticles,itiswidelyacceptedthatthetwo‘‘pillars’’oftheGATTapproacharetheprinciplesofreciprocityandnondiscrimination.Theprincipleofreciproc-2Apoliticalmotivationfortradeagreementsmightariseifgovernmentsseeksuchagreementstogaincom-mitmentrelativetotheirprivatesectors.Thispossibility,whichisnotincludedinourmodelingframework,isex-ploredbyStaigerandGuidoTabellini(1987),Staiger(1995),andGiovanniMaggiandAndresRodriguez-Clare(1998).However,whetherthiscommitmenttheoryoftradeagreementsoffersaninterpretationofthebasicprin-ciples3ofGATTisstillanopenquestion.Thepoliticallyoptimaltariffscorrespondtorecipro-calfreetradewhengovernmentsmaximizenationalincome.4Aseparatequestionishowtheserulesaretobeen-forced.Weabstractfromtheissueofenforcementinthebodyofthepaper,butreturntoitintheconcludingsection.VOL.89NO.1BAGWELLANDSTAIGER:ANECONOMICTHEORYOFGATT217ityisaGATTnormunderwhichonecountryagreestoreduceitslevelofprotectioninreturnforareciprocal‘‘concession’’fromitstradingpartner.Atthebroadestlevel,thisprinciplereferstothe‘‘ideal’’ofmutualchangesintradepolicywhichbringaboutequalchangesinimportvolumesacrosstradingpartners.Theprincipleofnondiscriminationisaseparatenorm,underwhichamembergovernmentagreesthatanytariffonagivenproductap-pliedtotheimportsofonetradingpartnerap-pliesequallytoallothertradingpartners.Thisdiscussionmotivatesoursecondquestion:Dotheprinciplesofreciprocityandnondiscrimi-nationservegovernmentsassimplerulesofnegotiationthatpromoteef?ciency,by‘‘un-doing’’theterms-of-trade-driveninef?ciencythatarisesintheabsenceofanagreement?Webeginwiththeprincipleofreciprocity.Ourdiscussionherebuildsuponakeyobser-vation:mutualchangesintradepolicythatconformtotheprincipleofreciprocityleaveworldpricesunchanged.Recallingthattrade-policydecisionsareinef?cientifandonlyifgovernmentsaremotivatedbytheirabilitiestochangetheworldprice,weproposeatagen-erallevelthattheprincipleofreciprocitycanbeef?ciencyenhancing,sinceitneutralizestheterms-of-tradeexternalitythatunderliesin-ef?cientbehavior.Todevelopthisgeneralproposalinamoreconcretefashion,wethenidentifyandconsiderthetwospeci?cappli-cationsofreciprocitythatariseinGATTpractice.A?rstapplicationariseswhengovernmentsseeknegotiatedtariffreductions.WhilethereisnoformalrequirementinGATTarticlesthatgovernmentsexchangereciprocaltariffreduc-tionsinthesenegotiations,ithasbeenob-servedthatgovernmentsinfactseekabalanceofconcessions(i.e.,tariffcuts).Thisemphasisonreciprocaltariffreductionscontrastssharplywiththestandardeconomicargumentthatunilateralfreetradeisthebestpolicyfora(small)country,independentofthetariffse-lectedbyitstradingpartner,andthiscontrasthasledmanytoconcludethatgovernmentsap-proachtradenegotiationsfromamercantilistperspectivethatisdrivenbypoliticalforcesanddivorcedfromsoundeconomicreasoning.Weshowinsteadthattheprincipleofreci-procityasitarisesinthisapplicationcanbegivenaratherdirecteconomicinterpretation:whatevertheirunderlyingpoliticalmotiva-tions,governmentsaredriventochooseoverlyprotectivetradepoliciesbecauseofthecost-shiftingeffectsoftheworld-pricemovementsassociatedwiththeirunilateraltariffchoices,andtheywouldthereforeseeklowertariffsiftheworld-priceimplicationsoftheirliberal-izationcouldbeneutralized―afeatthatrec-iprocityachieves.AsecondapplicationofreciprocityinGATTpracticeoccurswhenagovernmentde-cidestoincreaseapreviously‘‘bound’’(i.e.,negotiated)tariffandinvokesGATT’spro-ceduresforrenegotiation.Here,GATT’srec-iprocityrulesexplicitlyrequiremoderationonthepartoftradingpartners,whoarepermittedtowithdrawsubstantiallyequivalentconces-sionsoftheirown.Inthiscase,theprincipleofreciprocitygovernsthemannerinwhichtariffsmaybeincreasedaspartofarenego-tiation.Inlightofthispossibilityforrenego-tiation,animportantissueiswhetheranyef?cientsetoftariffsthatmightbeagreedtoinanoriginalnegotiationisinfact‘‘renego-tiationproof’’undertherulesofGATT.WeshowthatGATT’sinsistenceonreciprocityinrenegotiationsisindeedcompatiblewithanef-?cientsetoftariffs,andwefurther?ndthattheonlyef?cienttariffsthatareimpervioustorenegotiationofthisnaturearethepoliticallyoptimaltariffs.Ifgovernmentsseekanef?-cientoutcomethatwillnotberenegotiatedasallowedundertheprincipleofreciprocity,theythereforewillnegotiatetothepoliticallyoptimaltariffs.Wethenturntotheprincipleofnondiscrim-ination.Extendingourframeworktoamulti-countrysetting,webeginbyestablishingan‘‘af?nity’’betweenpoliticallyoptimaltariffsandtheprincipleofnondiscrimination:whiletherewillingeneralbemanypointsontheef?ciencyfrontierthatentaildiscriminatorytariffs,weshowthatpoliticallyoptimaltariffsareef?cientifandonlyiftheyconformtotheprincipleofnondiscrimination.Wenextex-ploretheimplicationsofreciprocityinourmulticountrysetting,?ndingthatanef?cientmultilateraltradeagreementisimpervioustorenegotiationasallowedundertheprincipleofreciprocityifandonlyifitischaracterizedbypoliticallyoptimaltariffsthatsatisfythe218THEAMERICANECONOMICREVIEWMARCH1999principleofnondiscrimination.Thus,ifatradeagreementpermitsrenegotiationthatconformstotheprincipleofreciprocity,thengovern-mentscanachieveanef?cientoutcomeonlyiftheagreementalsoimposestheprincipleofnondiscrimination.5Thecomplementaryrelationshipbetweentheprinciplesofreciprocityandnondiscrimi-nationingeneratingef?cientoutcomesrestsuponasimpleintuition.Aswehavediscussedabove,theprincipleofreciprocityhastheef-fectofneutralizingtheworld-priceeffectsofagovernment’sdecisiontoraisetariffs,andsoitcaneliminatetheexternalitythatcausesgov-ernmentstomakeinef?cienttrade-policychoicesprovidedthattrade-policyexternali-tiestravelonlythroughworldprices.Whileexternalitiesindeedtravelonlythroughworldpricesinthebasictwo-countrymodel,whenthemodelingframeworkisextendedtoin-cludemultiplecountries,therearisesaswellthepossibilityofalocal-priceexternality.Inparticular,ifacountrydiscriminateswhenset-tingitstradepolicy,then,allelseequal,itwouldpreferthatagreaterfractionofagivenimportvolumebeprovidedbytheexportsourceonwhomitplacesthehighesttariff.Buttheexportvolumesfromtradingpartnersareinturndeterminedinpartbythelocalpricesinthesecountries,andsoalocal-priceexternalityiscreated.Iftheimportingcountryadoptsapolicyofnondiscrimination,how-ever,thepreferenceforoneexportsourceoveranotherisremoved,andtheonlyremainingexternalityisagaintheworld-priceexternality,whichtheprincipleofreciprocityiswellde-signedtoneutralize.Drawingonthese?ndings,weofferasoursecondbroadconclusionthattheprinciplesofreciprocityandnondiscriminationmaybein-terpretedassimplenegotiationrulesthatworkhandinhandtoassistgovernmentsastheyat-tempttoundotheterms-of-trade-driveninef-?ciencythatcharacterizesunilateraltradepolicies.Infact,weofferthemorespeci?c?ndingthattheseprinciplesdirectnegotiationoutcomestowardthetariffsthatarebothpo-liticallyoptimalandnondiscriminatory,and5Theprincipleofnondiscriminationistriviallysatis-?edinthebasictwo-countrymodeldescribedearlier.hencetowardthetariffsthatgovernmentswouldhavechosenhadtheynotbeenmoti-vatedbycost-shiftingincentivesinthe?rstplace.Weinterprettheseresultsasestablish-inganef?ciency-enhancingroleforthetwoprinciplesthatformthepillarsoftheGATTarchitecture.Finally,weconsidertheimplicationsofamajorexceptiontotheprincipleofnondis-criminationthatmustbegrantedwheneverGATT’smembergovernmentsnegotiatepref-erentialagreements.Thisexception,embod-iedinArticleXXIVofGATT,wascontroversialinitsinceptionandhasmetwithrenewedcontroversyrecentlyasmanyGATTmembershaveincreasinglyexercisedtheirrightsunderthisarticletonegotiatepreferen-tialagreements.Againstthisbackdrop,weuseourmodelingframeworktoaddressathirdquestion:Willpreferentialagreementsinter-ferewiththeef?ciencypropertiesofamulti-lateraltradingsystemthatisotherwisebuiltuponthepillarsofreciprocityandnondiscrimination?InaccordwithArticleXXIV,weconsidertwoformsofpreferentialagreements:free-tradeareas,inwhichmembercountrieselim-inateinternalbarrierstotrade,andcustomsunions,inwhichmembersalsoadoptacom-monexternaltariff.Preferentialagreementsareinherentlydiscriminatory,andsotheyre-vivethelocal-priceexternalitydescribedabove.Asaconsequence,theprincipleofrec-iprocitytypicallydoesnotdeliveranef?cientoutcomewhenpreferentialagreementsareinplace.Theonlyexceptionarisesinthespecialcaseinwhichthepreferentialagreementtakestheformofacustomsunionformedbymem-berswithsuf?cientlysimilarpreferences.Inthiscase,thecustomsunioncanberegardedasa‘‘single’’countrywithnointernaltariff,andourpreviousresultsthenimplythattheprinciplesofreciprocityandnondiscrimina-tioncanservetodeliveranef?cientoutcome.Moregenerally,weofferasourthirdbroadconclusionthatpreferentialagreementsposeathreattotheef?ciencypropertiesoftheexist-ingmultilateralsystem.ThispaperbuildsontheapproachfromBagwellandStaiger(1996),inwhichwestudythepurposeofreciprocaltradeagree-mentsbutdonotinterpretandevaluatetheVOL.89NO.1BAGWELLANDSTAIGER:ANECONOMICTHEORYOFGATT219principlesofreciprocityandnondiscrimina-tionasembodiedinGATTpractice.AmorecloselyrelatedpaperisBagwellandStaiger(1997a),whereweadoptapartialequilibriumframework,imposeaparticularrepresentationofpoliticaleconomy,andexploresimilarthemes.Theremainderofthepaperproceedsasfol-lows.SectionIpresentsourbasicframeworkinatwo-countrysettingandexaminesthepur-poseofreciprocaltradeagreements.SectionIIthenturnstoaninterpretationandevaluationoftheprincipleofreciprocity.Amulticountryextensionofthemodelingframeworkisde-velopedinSectionIII,andtheprincipleofnondiscriminationisanalyzed.PreferentialagreementsareexaminedinSectionIV.Next,inSectionVweconsiderwhygovernmentsmightchoosetodesignaninstitutionalar-rangementsuchasGATTthatadoptsarules-basedapproachtotradenegotiations.Wearguethatthisapproachcanencouragepartic-ipationofweakercountriesinGATT,andweshowthatstrongercountriesmightsupportthecreationofsuchaninstitutionforthisreason.Finally,inSectionVI,weconcludethepaperwithadiscussionofevidencerelatingtoourimplicithypothesisthatgovernmentshavetheabilityandthedesiretomanipulatethetermsoftradeinaquantitativelysigni?cantfashion.I.ThePurposeofReciprocalTradeAgreementsInthissection,wedevelopamodeloftheeconomicenvironmentforthecaseinwhichtwocountriestradetwogoods.Allowingforawiderangeofgovernmentpreferences,wethenshowthattradeagreementsareappealingtogovernmentsifandonlyiftheyserveasameanstoremedytheinef?cientterms-of-trade-drivenrestrictionsintradethatariseun-derunilateraltradepolicies.A.TheEconomicEnvironmentWebeginwithadescriptionoftheeco-nomicenvironmentinwhichtradetakesplace.Weworkwithinastandardtwo-sector,two-countryperfectlycompetitivegeneralequilib-riumtrademodel.Twocountries,home(no*)andforeign(*),tradetwogoods,xandy,takentobenormalgoodsinconsumptionandproducedunderconditionsofincreasingop-portunitycosts.Productiontakesplaceunderperfectcompetition,facingtariffsonimportsbyeachcountry.Letx(y)bethenaturalimportgoodofthehome(foreign)country,andde-?nep?px/py(p*?p*x/p*y)tobethelocalrelativepricefacinghome(foreign)producersandconsumers.Witht(t*)representingthehome(foreign)advaloremimporttariffwhichwetaketobenonprohibitive,andwitht?(1/t)andt*?(1/t*),wehavep?tpw?p(t,pw)andp*?pw/t*?p*(t*,pw),wherepw?p*x/pyisthe‘‘world’’(i.e.,untaxed)relativeprice.Theforeign(domes-tic)termsoftradearethenmeasuredbypw(1/pw).Weinterprettú1(t?1)tobeanimporttax(importsubsidy)andsimilarlyfort*.6Productionineachcountryisdeterminedbyselectingthepointonitsproductionpossibil-itiesfrontieratwhichthemarginalrateoftransformationbetweenxandyisequaltothelocalrelativeprice:QQ*forii?Qi(p)andQ*i?i(p*)√{x,y}.Consumptionisafunctionofthelocalrelativeprice―whichde-?nesthetrade-offfacedbyconsumersandde-terminesthelevelanddistributionoffactorincomeintheeconomy―andoftariffrevenueR(R*),whichisdistributedlumpsumtodo-mestic(foreign)consumersandwhichwemeasureinunitsofthelocalexportgoodatlocalprices.Werepresentdomesticandfor-eignconsumption,respectively,asDi?Di(pR)andD*i?D*,isi(p*,R*)fori√{x,y}.Tariffrevenuede?nedimplicitlybyR?[Dx(p,R)0Qx(p)][p0pw]orR?R(p,pw)forthedomesticcountry,andsimilarlybyR*?[D*y(p*,R*)0Q*orR*y(p*)][1/p*0pw1/]?R*(p*,pw)fortheforeigncoun-try,witheachcountry’stariffrevenueanin-creasingfunctionofitstermsoftradeundertheassumptionthatgoodsarenormal.Na-tionalconsumptionineachcountrycanthusbewrittenasCi(p,pw)?Di(p,R(p,pw))andC*i(p*,pw)?D*i(p*,R*(p*,pw)).6TheLernersymmetrytheoremensuresthattradetaxesorsubsidiescanbeequivalentlydepictedasapplyingtoexportsortoimportsinthistwo-sectorgeneralequilib-riumsetting.包含各类专业文献、行业资料、文学作品欣赏、外语学习资料、应用写作文书、幼儿教育、小学教育、An 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　GATT 关贸总协定 General Agreement on Tariffs and ...4. How much do you know about an economic ...The theory of absolute advantage B. The theory ... 　change thirdly,the impact of changes in the private sector,particularly globalization and,fourthly,changes in ... 　Economies of scope increasing the number of different goods produced. An economic theory stating that the average total cost of production decreases as a ... 　political market 政治市场 主要阅读文献: Anthony Downs (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy, (New York: Harper & Row Publishers). 建议阅读: Mancur ... 　General agreement on Tariffs and trade (GATT ) is an intergovernmental ...of technological progress, industrial upgrading and economic restructuring, ... 　(2) Change (3) The impact of change in the private sector ,particularly globalization
(4)Changes in ... 　The comparative advantages theory of Ricardo only ...of GATT and undertaki (3)...An economic union is the highest form of ... 　An important insight of international trade theory ...(d) have been the preoccupation of economic ...(e) None of the above. Answer: B The GATT ... 　(typically abbreviated GATT GATT) was negotiated ...(about 40%) and agricultural subsidies, an ...creation of the European Economic Community (EEC)...我的家乡-嘉鱼12
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我的家乡-嘉鱼12
嘉鱼县-基本概况；历史由来；嘉鱼古名沙阳堡，位于长江大片沙洲之南，又名沙阳洲；【位置面积】嘉鱼县位于湖北东南部，长江中游南岸；/1017平方千米/977平方千米；【人口民族】2004年底，人口363581人；嘉鱼县古名沙阳堡，因取《诗经?小雅?南有嘉鱼》之；境内有20万亩无公害蔬菜基地、17万亩优质螃蟹基；嘉鱼县-自然环境；地貌；地处幕阜山脉与江汉平原结合部
嘉鱼县 - 基本概况 历史由来嘉鱼古名沙阳堡，位于长江大片沙洲之南，又名沙阳洲。夏、商、周属荆州，春秋战国属楚，秦属南郡。汉高祖六年（公元前201）置沙羡县，属之。南唐保大十一年（953），以县治西北有鱼岳山，又盛产&嘉鱼&，因取《诗经?小雅?南有嘉鱼》之义，命为嘉鱼县，属鄂州。元属武昌路，明、清属武昌府，民国元年（1932年）属第一行政督察区。日解放后属沔阳专区。1951年7月改属大冶专区，1952年2月属孝感专区，1959年12月撤销孝感专区后属武汉市；1960年4月合于武昌县，属武汉市；1961年6月恢复孝感专区，属之，1961年11月复置为嘉鱼县，属孝感地区；1965年5月建咸宁地区，属之于今。 【位置面积】 嘉鱼县位于湖北东南部，长江中游南岸。面积1018.4平方千米/1017平方千米/977平方千米 【人口民族】 2004年底，人口363581人。 嘉鱼县古名沙阳堡，因取《诗经?小雅?南有嘉鱼》之义而得名，公元280年设县，距今已有1700多年历史。县境地处长江中游南岸，地属武汉城市圈，北与武汉接壤，南近洞庭岳阳，东邻京广铁路、京珠高速和107国道，西与荆州洪湖隔江相望，史称“武昌上游之邑，湘湖要冲之区”。全县国土面积1017平方公里，现辖8镇1场，164个行政村，总人口36万人，耕地面积42万亩，大体形成“一山三水四分田，两分道路与庄园”的地貌格局。境内有20万亩无公害蔬菜基地、17万亩优质螃蟹基地和全国最大的美国叉尾鱼回种苗繁育基地，常年蔬菜种植面积达45万亩，水产养殖面积达25万亩。有亚洲第一、世界第二的粘土型黄金矿藏；有享誉全国的高性能磁性材料、桥用缆索、电子光源等产品的科研与生产基地；有国家定点建设的“中国博士后”基地；有国家A级产品联乐牌席梦思，有嘉鱼麻糖等一批荣获国优、部优和省优称号的名优产品。有万里长江向东流，独此西流30里的长江第一湾――牌洲湾；有湖北第一组――官桥八组；有名冠古今的三国古战场和周瑜智取荆州的大本营――陆口，有风光旖旎的休闲旅游圣地――三湖连江风景区，还有人文景观荟萃的南宋文化古迹。现已初步建成蔬菜、水产、意杨、畜牧、优质水稻、苎麻等10大农业产业基地和黄金、纺织、化工、机电、食品、森工、皮件等9大支柱工业体系。2003年，全县实现国内生产总值29.01亿元，完成全口径财政收入1.53亿元，外贸出口创汇3000万美元，农民人均纯收入2627元，县域经济综合实力居全市第2位，全省第22位。为“锦绣江南、鱼米之乡”的嘉鱼赢得了“蔬菜之乡”、“螃蟹之乡”和“黄金之乡”的美誉。 嘉鱼县 - 自然环境 地貌地处幕阜山脉与江汉平原结合部，可划分为长江冲积平原、西南垅岗平原和切割残丘三种地貌，大体形成“一山三水四分田，两分道路和庄园”的地貌格局。地势从东南向西北倾斜，海拔高程最低18米，最高243米，其中大部分高程在19-50米之间。 地形嘉鱼地属长江冲积平原，地面高程都在18-26米之间。东南部有鱼岳、大岩、牛头、蜀山等残丘39座，最高的大岩山为海拔243米。地势由南向北倾斜。河湖密布，较大湖泊有大岩湖、蜜泉湖、白湖、蜀湖、西梁湖、斧头湖等。 嘉鱼县 - 旅游资源三湖连江水库 三湖连江水库从东、南两面旁绕县城，地理位置在北纬29°55′～30°00°，东经113°53～113°56'。水库因其由人工将原来的白湖、梅懈湖、小湖(又名金虾湖)疏通，并与长江相连而得名――三湖连江。 三湖连江建有牛头山森林公园、岳公亭、观音阁、地藏殿、南如寺、湖心娱乐岛等景点。是湖北境内湖光山色相映成趣的著名风景游览胜地。水库库域在白云山、牛头山、马鞍山一带的残丘洼间，承雨面积30．64平方公里，库面14．4平方公里，库底海拔高程19米，总库容为10468万立方米，控制库容为8224万立米，有效库容为5650万立方米。 水库建于1959年，经过逐年配套，水库建筑物计有：主坝一座，全长3166米，副坝两座，共长1110米。主副坝的坝顶高程为海拔30．7米。马鞍山进洪闸一座，闸身长23米，高3.5米，流量24立方米／秒，灌溉干渠3条，渠道均建有节制闸，渠长共59．4公里。三湖连江水库是嘉鱼县农田灌溉骨干设施，现已形成了以三湖连江水库为中心的一套蓄、引、提大型排灌系统，使鱼岳、官桥、新街、渡普、潘湾、婶洲等6个乡镇及头墩农场共30万亩农田受益，其中已有14万亩基本实现了园田化。 三湖连江不仅风景秀丽，而且是天然繁殖鱼类多品种原种基地，年产鲜鱼20万公斤，鱼苗10万公斤。建库后，县在此建有三湖连江水库养殖场，放养水面18000亩，精养鱼池274亩，寄养鱼池1160亩，同时利用处于库中心的、三面环水的牛头山植树造林，建立有牛头山林场，植树面积700多亩，还建有牛头山桔园场，植有桔、梨400多亩。 嘉鱼的国宝1980年1月，湖北省嘉鱼县渔民在靠近洞庭湖口的长江边捕获世界上第一头活体雄性白暨豚，其随即被送往位于湖北武汉的中国科学院水生生物研究所人工饲养。这条白鳍豚就是鼎鼎大名的“淇淇”，他的发现开辟了中国对白鳍豚研究的先河。 “活化石”――中华鲟这种与大熊猫齐名的国家一级保护动物已濒临灭绝了，但是曾经多次在嘉鱼附近发现其踪迹，并且也捕获过较多，更重要的是其质量都是其它地区难以迄及的。 嘉鱼的自然资源 嘉鱼县位于湖北省南部，地处长江中游南岸，含湖滨江，盛产粮、棉、油、麻、 鱼，素称“鱼米之乡”。全县土地总面积1017平方公里。地热西南高，东北低，平原、丘岗兼有。沿长江一线为冲积平原，约占面积的60%，地势平坦，土壤肥沃； 东南部为丘岗，约占总面积的40%，多为岭谷相间。县境内河网纵横源泊众多，大体上构成了“一山、三水、六分田”的自然格局。1. 滨江邻城，地理位置优越。嘉鱼县北临长江，东近武汉，南邻蒲圻，水陆交通四通八达。水路以长江联通沿江各港；公路以嘉鱼――武汉、嘉鱼――咸宁、嘉鱼――蒲圻三条干线，联通武汉及鄂南各地；北面以汽车轮渡联结洪湖抵达荆州、沙市，并通过嘉鱼――蒲圻公路干线与京广铁路相联结，构成了水陆两便、内通外联的交通网络。从地理位置看，东距武汉仅100公里，有利于接受中心城市的经济与技术辐射，发展城乡经济与技术联系，振兴嘉鱼经济。 2.农业自然资源富，发展前景广阔。全县农业人口人均占有耕地2.3亩。种植业资源中，粮食作物有稻谷、小麦、豆类、包谷、荞麦、杰谷等21种；经济作物有棉花、芝麻、油菜籽、花生、苎麻、甘蔗等10余种。芝麻为嘉鱼地方特产之一，素以壳薄、味香、出油率高而称誉全省；林业虽然所占比重较少，只有林业用地 14 .68万亩，但有树种资源89种，意杨、地杉、水杉等在平原地区尚有较大发展前途；家畜以猪、牛为主，兼有羊，生猪中的“牌州猪”为地方良种，在全省及邻省享有盛名。家禽以鸡、鸭为主，兼有鹅、鹑等；渔业资源更为丰富。全县有大小河流16 条。长江流经县境96公里，陆水、金水河穿境入江。湖泊主要有西凉、斧头、密泉、珍湖大岸等大小湖泊15处，还有三湖、连江等大、中、小型水库16处。塘堰遍布，水域阔，水质良好，水(陆)生植物种类繁多，饵料丰富，为发展水产养殖业创造了得天独存的条件。 3.矿藏资源较为丰富，工业发展前景良好。嘉鱼县的矿藏资源计有煤、硅性耐火石砂、云母石、石灰石，还有已经探明且尚待开发的锰、铁、磷及石油、天然气等，较为丰富的矿藏资源与丰富的农副产品原料相配套，为工业的发展开创了良好的前景。 嘉鱼县 - 资源物产嘉鱼县地处江汉冲积平原，属副热带湿润季风气候，日照充足，雨量充沛，土地肥活，物产丰富，素有“锦乡江南，鱼米之乡”的美誉。全县盛产蔬菜、
螃蟹、美国叉尾回鱼及粮、棉、油、茶、果、麻、意杨等农产品，已初步建成40万亩无公害蔬菜、15万亩牌洲湾螃蟹、15万亩速生意杨、6万亩优质苎麻、2万亩优质茶叶、3万亩芒苇及20万亩优质稻、18万亩双低油菜、2万亩优质桃李等十大农业产业基地。主要矿藏有金、煤、锰、铝、银、铁、方解石、磁土和耐火砂等，县属蛇屋山金矿第一期探明黄金贮量达40吨，系“亚洲第一、世界第二”大型红粘土富金矿藏。全县已开采开发钙石、大理石等化工、建材产品20多种。依托优势资源，全县已建成黄金、纺织、机电、化工、建材、食品、森工、酿酒等八大支柱工业产业，新建了田野高新技术产业园、十景铺工业园和新街、潘家湾蔬菜高新技术示范园、官桥八组博士后基地。 农业主要产品有水稻、小麦、棉花、芝麻、苎麻、茶叶等。尤其盛产芝麻，是全国芝麻商品基地县之一。境内多湖泊，水产品以鲜鱼享有盛名，可养水面23．6万亩，放养水面13．08万亩。林业多为速生丰产林，有林面积33．15万亩，森林覆盖率为26．4％，是全国营造速生丰产林的试点县。 工业有冶炼、麻纺、床单、丝织、造纸、化肥、水泥、陶瓷、砖瓦、造船、钢管、模具、电机等50个主要产品。初步形成了以冶炼、轻工、纺织、建材、机械、化工、食品等为主的工业体系。 高高井架架起希望1981年，国家在牌洲湾进行了第一次石油勘探。嘉鱼牌洲湾也能出石油？！这个消息让当地人既有几分激动，又有几分难以置信。但由于当时地质理论的限制和勘探设备的落后等原因，承载了牌洲湾人殷切希望的勘探未获成功。2006年底，牌洲湾再次迎来地质勘探队，随后，传出“牌洲湾地下天然气储量约为3000亿立方米”的消息，牌洲湾乃至整个咸宁都沸腾了。日11时，位于嘉鱼县牌洲湾镇大垸村的牌深1井正式开钻。事实上，牌深1井的开钻，除了对咸宁人有着重大意义外，它本身还具有更深的地质理论意义。牌深1井，是第一口海相深井，也是中国南方最深的一口区域性探井，它的钻探，是江汉油田乃至中石化南方海相勘探史上的大事。一旦取得突破，将迎来巨大的发展前景，不仅能迅速扩充江汉油气规模，带动湖北地方经济发展，还有望改变我国南方能源结构布局。 嘉鱼风俗 嘉鱼的“王爷”抢着供鄂东南嘉鱼县一带，每年六月十九要做“王爷会”。“王爷会”的中心内容是祭祀靖江王丁奉。这一天长江上下200里江面上风平浪静，驾船人为了感激靖江王爷保佑，纷纷到陆溪口、嘉鱼口、牌州湾一带祭祀王爷。王爷会上，最有趣的活动是“扛王爷菩萨”。当地有不少靖江王庙，每一座靖江王庙都有两个王爷塑像，一个固定在庙里，接日常香火；一个由附近的村子轮流抢回去供奉。这种抢供王爷的活动就叫“扛王爷菩萨”。每年六月十九的清晨，沿江一带的村庄就热闹起来，上一年“扛”赢了的村民们，将王爷从村边小庙抬出，放在村子当中，男女老少一齐动手掸尘扫土。只见王爷头戴英雄冠，身披金鳞甲，胸嵌护心宝镜，脚踏龟蛇二将，左手按一柄斩妖剑，右手持两颗定风珠，端坐在宝座上好不威风。宝座靠背雕出双凤朝阳，两边扶手刻成二龙出水。村民用四根袖木长杠将王爷菩萨绑得稳稳当当，似坐在一乘小轿上，然后抬着王爷去庙会。先由村里年纪最大的老人点燃万字鞭，鞭炮声中王爷菩萨前行，后边有四人举着长方金字木牌，上书“靖江王”几个大字。牌子之后是一面四人抬的大鼓，米筛大的铜锣，一对大钹，一支六尺长的喇叭和一对小唢呐。大队人马一路吹打欢呼向前。与此同时，周边的各个村庄同样挑选出八名棒小伙，在鞭炮锣鼓的助威声中，精神抖擞地赶到庙会，准备“扛王爷”。待四乡八里的村民汇齐后，由靖江王庙里的老和尚出来主持祭奠。各村争着摆上鱼、羊、猪头三牲，奉上一坛用新收的谷子酿成的酒。祭品中间放一个大大的簸箕，各村都把带来的盐茶卤鸡蛋放在里面，称之为“定风珠”，请靖江王爷用它平息风浪，减少船民的颠簸之苦。随后献上一条五尺长的红绸，扎在宝座和杠子上。 虔诚的祭奠仪式结束后，场上气氛顿时活跃起来。小伙子们享受特权，分吃卤鸡蛋，个个情绪高涨。这时。老和尚点燃一柱香，宣布“扛王爷菩萨”开始！刹那间，锣鼓震天，鞭炮齐呜。上年得胜村的小伙子们先过去抬起王爷菩萨，随即有另一村八名小伙子上来“扛”。他们一个对一个，凭力气、技巧争夺长杠。锣鼓越敲越急，叫好声、助威声响成一片，人群随着长杠的移动而左右奔走。王爷会虽热闹异常，但很有秩序，争杠者不耍蛮，王爷始终端坐杠上。 一柱香烧过，老和尚发令“停！”这时，谁控制了杠子，谁就算获胜。获胜村的小伙子迅速解下杠上的红绸带，斜佩在身上，抬起王爷菩萨，同村的人随菩萨举着牌子敲着锣鼓，兴高采烈地把靖江王爷接回去，在村里供奉一年。到明年六月十九将又有新的一轮“王爷会。” “扛春神” 鄂东南嘉鱼县牌州一带民间流行着这样一种风俗，每年立春日，无论天气多冷，都要举行一个特别的“扛春神”仪式。 “扛春神”仪式上，一个人装扮成“春神”，光着上身，穿着短裤，一手拿把大蒲扇，一手提着小酒壶，坐在椅子上由4人抬着。人们前呼后拥，喇叭锣鼓开道四乡游行。扮春神包含各类专业文献、幼儿教育、小学教育、生活休闲娱乐、各类资格考试、中学教育、高等教育、我的家乡-嘉鱼12等内容。　
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