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外文文献 翻译 本科毕业论文使用
重庆科技学院学生毕业设计（论文）外 文 译 文院（系） 专业班级 学生姓名 学 号法政与经贸学院 经贸普 2008-02 冯品瑜
译文要求1. 外文翻译必须使用签字笔，手工工整书写，或用 A4 纸打印。 2. 所选的原文不少于 2 万字印刷字符， 其内容必须与课题或专业方向紧密相关， 注明详细出处。3. 外文翻译书文本后附原文（或复印件） 。译文评阅评阅要求：应根据学校“译文要求” ，对学生译文的准确性、翻译数量以及译文的文字表述情况等作具体的评价。指导教师评语：指导教师（签字） 年 月 日本英文原文来自： Ivey Business J Strategic Direction, July/ August 2011, Vol. 28 Iss: 2, p1, 4p与大猩猩共舞背后的故事：跨国合作策略普瑞逊塞姆?萨满恩1来源：Ivey Business J Strategic Direction, July/ August 2011, Vol. 28 Iss: 2, p1,4p 摘要：一个小型企业如果要成功地寻找跨国公司作为合作伙伴，必须确立一些独特的观念。 不对称和其他障碍是可以克服的。 本文作者提出一些策略， 能够使小型公司参与跨国合作关 系中去。 关键词：跨国公司，伙伴合作，小公司，创业，策略。 诺基亚的首席执行官埃洛普? 史蒂芬宣布在 2011 年他的公司与微软公司建立战略联盟， 并强调： “战斗设备已成为战争的生态系统。 ”事实上，大型跨国公司（跨国公司）像微软， 诺基亚和其他几个来建立大型生态系统包括数以千计的参与者，从事各种活动点基于价值 链。但不同于微软和诺基亚之间的关系，它汇集了两家强大的、大型的跨国公司，其中的许 多生态系统的参与者，是小（通常是年轻人）的企业，在生态系统的中心方面是大大不同的 大型跨国公司。对于这样的参与者，和跨国公司生态系统提供了一个极好的机会，但它也提 出了巨大的挑战。在伦敦商学院教授布瑞肯逊?朱利安和我称之为“与大猩猩共舞”2―― 利用这个机会同时克服挑战要求。 鉴于小型企业和跨国公司之间的绝对不对称， 我们反对墨 守成规。相反，企业通过不正统的合作策略的运用，形成，巩固和扩大跨国公司关系。本文 介绍了这些战略，并建议小型企业如何克服一些跨国合作固有的障碍。 小型企业可以在跨国合作中可以采用的 3 种合作战略。 1.形成与跨国公司的关系： 大多数跨国公司希望与类似规模的伙伴采取直接正面的方法， 或者通过一个专门的联盟 关系，或通过在对应的前瞻性伙伴公司有相当地位的关键个人来建立关系。然而，对于一个 寻求跨国公司合作伙伴的较小的公司，缺乏渠道和被重视，加上不对称的资源，这意味着一 个直接的正面的方法将会失败。相反，一个小型公司最好使用间接手段。就是说，它可能是 沟通两个独立的组织的必要的桥梁。 利用与当地的盟友建立的跨国公司关系可以帮助获得更 大的合作伙伴。所以，例如，一些公共政策倡议为小型公司提供“牵头” 。举一个例子，一 个英国的小公司， 肺透明膜病临床， 利用在一个地区很有影响力的名叫苏格兰技术合作的关 系，来建立与有关的美国跨国公司在当地的子公司的决策者建立联系。 2.巩固与跨国公司的关系： 已形成了与跨国公司的关系， 小型公司必须通过明确、 重视最大价值的方式来确立自己 的资格从而强化与跨国公司的关系。它可以利用跨国公司的互补能力。例如，如果小型公司 的贡献主要涉及专业技术，它可以通过跨国公司的营销能力达到更大的国际知名度。然而， 由于固有的不稳定的关系， 小型公司也应考虑战术， 例如来自跨国公司合作伙伴的 “模块化” 的知识转移。由于知识离散的传输，即使项目被搁置或出轨，不可能实现至少部分的成功。 例如，上述的肺透明膜病临床的一个案例，卓有成效的协会与美国跨国公司开发，但由于后 者的改变优先级，最终比原计划提前。即便如此，有价值的成果包括建立一个产品原型已经 取得的成功――这意味着小型公司的努力并没有白费。 3.扩大与跨国公司的关系： 由于不对称的资源差异和长期目标的不同， 小型公司的跨国关系必将呈现出一个不可预1普瑞逊塞姆?萨满恩是高级讲师在国际商业战略的国际化与企业研究中心（茨尔）的格拉斯哥大学商学 院。在秋天，他将加入诺丁汉大学商学院中国宁波，中国副教授在国际商务和策略。 2 我们的想法最初发表的一篇文章在加利福尼亚管理评论。我们承认， “舞蹈与大猩猩”的灵感来自评论由 普拉哈拉德在会议后期对照。在本文中我提供进一步的想法来自我后来的研究课题。 1知的模式。 多数小型公司在很长一段时间能够成功的与跨国公司有效合作， 往往是通过那些 有能力跨越组织界限的个人来建立关系，因此，在开发资源和知识方面，小型公司也应该寻 求与跨国公司联合进行推导来扩大的价值链活动，在可行的情况下，扩大上游和下游效益， 从而实现范围经济――越来越热乎的关系。 举个实例来证明， 肺透明膜病临床协会与美国跨 国公司实现更有效的合作是因为个人及他在全球技术中的重要作用。 他是能够在在欧洲其他 地方甚至北美国利用有技术专长的同事。 在印度、英国和美国随后的研究活动中，我发现，往往能够成功的与大猩猩共舞的年轻 的公司存在着一些“背后”的故事。特别地，我观察了 “隐藏的故事”的三方面，在下文 讨论，这可以为与大猩猩相关的挑战与机遇中提供有益的见解，和可能的解决方法。 与大猩猩共舞： “背后”的故事 形成（开始关系） 巩固（加深关系） 扩展 （增加关系） 往往是“很久以前” ， 有可能是一个“曲折 没有永远的“快 “背后” 即先前与跨国公司的经验 的故事” ，即中段更正包括 乐” 即调整与跨国公 ， 的故事 可以产生深远影响的连接。 跨国公司的关系可能出现 司关系可能会随着时 下降。 间的推移，导致重叠 祭和目标。 意味着什 探索“野兽” ，从而避 确保战略适应，从而 认识到潜在的冲 么 免浪费的关系――努力运 增加与跨国公司的关系带 突，从而平衡合作和 用与跨国公司的关系， 在正 来 了 最 佳 的 起 动 的 可 能 竞争的程度可能（虽 确的时间适当的单位运用 性，反之亦然。 然应该承认，这不是 正确的个人策略 永远成立的） 。 需要做什 意识； 需要避免达到了 重点；目标取向和停 精明――为了让 么 盲目没有深刻理解最好的 止呆在一个与实现的主要 事情永远保持好。 警觉。 目标的系。 1.经常是“很久以前” 。 当一开始是能够形成一个与跨国公司有意义的关系时， 它经常变成一个或一个以上的高 层管理团队， 已有密切关联的跨国公司或者很像它。 在跨国公司的结构和规模上这之前的协 会提供了宝贵的见解， 将其分成不同构成因素， 其中关键的可能是决策者和组织的规则变化。 当一个小型公司深入了解这些因素， 更能够在有关业务单位的跨国公司针对适当的个人， 抛 出有说服力的合作和时间方法来最大限度的接受积极的回应。这一切，当然，说比做容易， 因为商业环境的复杂性和活力，在一个跨国公司里可以是一个移动的图片。 然而， 主要的一点是， 知道跨国公司的管理的小型公司的领导人更比那些不知道来建立 关系的人要好建立关系。例如，软件的公司麦头肯很有信心地与摩托罗拉建立关系，因为创 建的团队先前在另一家大型跨国公司的经验。这方面的经验帮助了解，作为一个小型公司， 通过引入自己的新技术并达到跨国公司无法达到的地方， 他们如何来增加给一个看似自给自 足的跨国公司增加价值。 考虑斯佩德沃克斯软件服务的情况， 在印度浦那一家小型公司， 能够迅速与微软建立一 个强有力的关系。比多数同行，这家公司似乎非常擅长知道谁的做法，以及如何产生牵引力 的建议。在进一步的调查中，作为创始人之一的 r 巴格瓦特?姆纳达，曾在休利特帕卡德的 一个团队工作，在西澳雷德蒙完全与微软工作。在这个过程中，巴格瓦特密切关注微软内部 以及与联盟伙伴密切关注。 巴格瓦特曾从他早期的工作中获得这方面的知识和接触， 事实证 明是非常宝贵的。 当小型公司试图与微软建立联系的创始团队本身缺乏第一手的经验， 它却 可以很好地使管理者具有。 2.有可能是“一个曲折的故事” 。 举一个有趣的例子， 一家小型公司与一家总部位于班加罗尔芒果技术的跨国公司是合作 伙伴关系。它与美国公司通是合作伙伴关系。然而，通不是它第一个接触到的跨国公司。事 实上，它更像是一场“第三次机会” 。第一个它所接触到的跨国公司表示跟它一起工作有极 大的兴趣。虽然短期创收是可行的和具有吸引力的，但没有真正进入公司的核心专长，它明 确成为芒果的创始人的标志性活动是跨国公司的青睐的追求。 此后， 芒果退出协会并寻求与另一个跨国公司的关系。 这标志性活动在适当的时间将芒 果技术知识展示出来。 但是， 三个月后， 它开始意识到， 走这条路将有损它实现其终极目标。2再次地，它放弃了那家跨国公司关系――而这一次，因为机会很好，几乎没提什么要求。然 而，为了决心坚持他们的计划，小型公司的创始人继续探索其他的可能性，这致使了与通的 合作关系，这证明了合作伙伴关系是互惠（见方框） 。 芒果技术：建立一个深入的跨国公司的关系。 举一个关于小型公司如何能有效地保障与跨国公司的关系的例子， 具体地是， 总部位于 班加罗尔的芒果技术与通的跨国合作关系。芒果创建于 2006，当时是一家专注于移动电话 的细分市场的底部结构的软件产品的小型公司。 在一年之内， 局部地提高了其知名度和信誉， 芒果试图进一个著名的地方商业学校，班加罗尔的印度金属学会。经过严格的选拔程序，公 司付诸的努力收获了回报。 从一开始， 芒果的首席执行官梅何森瓦瑞? 苏尼尔从跨国公司的规模和技术市场两个方 面来观察与跨国公司合作的前进方向。经过多种选择这样做（平行）探索，芒果成功地在合 作伙伴人际网中向通的技术访问经理展示了它的技术。 由于它迅速向他证明了芒果的技术是 直接关系到他自己的在通的前程， 该技术得到了经理的直接关注。 这次一连串的对抗使芒果 和通在出售知识产权（简称 IP）达到了一个利润丰厚的高潮，这被称为印度商业媒体作为 一个独特的“数百万美元的交易”3。 从一个相当随意的碰面到一个高额利润的知识产权销售的一个成功的旅程可以作为一 个“深入”的关系渐进的过程来描述。就是说，经过一段时间，合作关系通过细粒度的信息 交流，共同解决问题来体现信赖，这又反过来促进了小型公司的学习成果。这个渐进的步骤 包括以下内容： 一个过程开始让芒果体现它的技术在通的技术平台技术更加精心。 当这圆满 实现，尽职尽责后，下一步是准备研发协议允许通展出但非市场化的芒果产品。它也使通在 产品接触前的全球客户优先内部评价芒果产品。 然后，一个允许通上市芒果软件连同自己 的芯片组的商业协议签署了。最后，简而易见，通过获得，能利用最有效芒果的技术，最终 导致一个如上所述的网络销售。 除了两个相当不同的组织明显的匹配性，成功的关系进展的关键有两个因素。第一，芒 果一心一意致力于提供灵活有效的技术。 其次， 通巧妙地谈判取得了内部官僚机构在芒果的 技术开发工作中提供支持。 无论是在通的圣迭戈的总部还是其在印度的行动， 特别的努力的 关键人物，是“内部冠军“芒果。在这个例子中，这些努力包括，不干涉从而使芒果能够瞄 准一家小型公司。 此后他们提供设备和人力援助技术和商业发展。 他们还促成与其他生态系 统的成员包括一个在中国设计公司的合作关系。 并且他们在一些正式的关系商业方面引导芒 果，这是一个给小型公司的新的经验。 显然， 构建一个小型公司与跨国公司之间深入的关系不是懦弱者的选择： 这当然需要在 双方的部分做一些努力，一旦成功完成，收入的回馈和学习成果可相当可观的。 （我承认研 究教授库马尔和苏雷什巴加万图拉在印度邦加罗尔管理学院合作研究芒果和通的关系。 ） 因此， 主要的一点事， 与一家具有吸引力的跨国公司的关系最初的出现可能是不理想的。 在某些情况下，一家小型公司在这个过程中可能会坚持它拥有的并放弃一些它原有的意图。 战略学者将这种做法作为紧急战略， 就其本身而言这可能是一个合理的途径。 在其他情况下 （例如芒果） ，那家小型公司能坚持它的目标并放弃某些关系直到它找到一个适合的公司。 这是一个深思熟虑的策略。然而，无论战略是深思熟虑还是紧急，它都一个能改变故事情节 的明显的可能。这需要小型公司各部门具有灵活性和敏捷性。 3.有并非总是“永远快乐” 。 在某些情况下，尽管跟跨国公司有了密切关系，小型公司可能发现势头受到了阻碍，局 势紧张的进行，中断的前景的想法才是真实的。尽管这可能发生的原因有多种，奇怪的是经 过一段时间后这可能导致小型公司和跨国公司解除亲密的联盟关系。 虽然在技术和商业策略 上高度一致是是与一个跨国公司有密切关系的先决条件， 可想而知， 随着时间的推移和提供 的产品共同的演变，可能出现重叠的特点和功能，导致摩擦。也就是说，最初的互补性产品 可能相互竞争。 这个关键是： 与跨国公司在一段关系中很顺利并不能确保是一个永久的事态， 小型企业3见，例如， http://articles.//news/_software-products-qualcomm-mangot echnologies 3应该认识到与跨国公司结成联盟， 随着时间的流逝， 它与跨国公司的冲突将越来越多的可能 性。也就是说，初创企业和其他小型公司能从跨国公司越来越重视他们的事实得到安慰，不 仅因为――作为明显的观测指出――他们认识到他们从事战争的生态系统。 因此， 一些跨国 公司已经想出与小型公司的合作经营，反过来，经过巧妙的杠杆。要实现这一目标，这是尤 其的小型公司在互惠的基础上主动培养关系。举一个在 Linxter 与微软的关系的兴旺案例 （见方框） 。虽然这种积极主动的行为并不排除在路途上有冲突的可能，这让深思熟虑的企 业家在急流中的与跨国公司有了一个相当长的时间的接触。 Linxter：积极利用跨国公司合作倡议。 跨国公司 （MNCs） 也开始认识到与较小的公司包括创业公司合作的好处。 在某些情况下， 创新的安排已经到位， 通常地形成了一个合作计划。 这样的举措提供了一个很好的进入跨国 公司生态系统和年轻的公司和跨国公司之间相互作用的结构的切入点。 BizSpark One，一个在微软的硅谷校园中运行的合作计划，是一个一些大型公司积极参 与创新创业的各方面越来越成熟的显著的例子。 虽然许多跨国公司的合作计划涵盖广泛的参 与者（包括微软自己的来自世界各地超过 3500 名成员的“定期”BizSpark One 计划） ， BizSpark One 具有高度选择性。拥有全球范围内 100 个有实力的成员，该计划的目标是确 定 （通过一个严格的挑选程序） 和邀请最具创新创业的可能产生重大影响并且技术能够和微 软联盟的小型公司。实际上，微软正在寻求在未来可称为其重要合作伙伴的发展中的公司， 这成为成千上万的与微软合作的其他小型公司可以学习的例子。 该计划提供创始成员一个在一对一的基础上 （而不是最典型的合作伙伴项目中的一对多 的方式） 与微软建立关系的机会， 因为小型企业可指定一个经常扮演者良师益友并且连接公 司与在需要的领域提供经验的外部导师的客户经理。这个计划是有时间限制的，通常是 12 个月的运行时间并且要求在一定的地域范围内要覆盖先进的和其他新兴的经济。 这个计划在 2009 年底没有大张旗鼓的提出。相反，它的目标是去“证明”本身和展示帮助创业者成功 的首要目标。 这个计划最知名的网络活动的日期是在 2010 年 10 月硅谷的一个高峰， 聚集了 BizSpark One 的创始企业和其他网络合作伙伴和风险资本家。 佛罗里达州的 Linxter，专门从事云端通讯技术，用积极主动的方式中表明这是一个多 么年轻的公司，能使它趁机会提出一个创新的伙伴关系的倡议，如微软 Biz Spark 计划。这 家公司的主动证明了在不同阶段的关系：关系的形成，关系的巩固和关系的扩大。 通过 Biz Spark One 计划形成与微软一对一的关系，Linxter 的首席执行官米尔格拉姆 讨?杰森通过他积极主动地在当地软件社区的技术会议上的演讲，他打出了知名度。在他很 多次谈话中， 米尔格拉姆讨论了微软的云端技术。 这意味着当总部设在佛罗里达州的微软的 经理正在寻找能在将来被邀请进入 Biz Spark One 计划的人时，米尔格兰姆已经准备好了他 的雷达。 在关系的巩固中，米尔格兰姆继续积极主动，因为他认为，是他在利用责任。他以多种 方式来这样做。他通过运用摘自关键的管理人员的发布定期新闻稿的引言来利用微软关系。 他也通过诸如邀请邀请微软管理层讨论他们在 linxter-run 播客系列中关于小型企业的合 作倡议的方式在公共的机会中宣传来回报。 他提倡与微软其他团队及其他公司进行对话来探 索合作机会。 可见， 米尔格兰姆有效地运用的战略是积极创建与微软生态系统的多个接触点。 因此，战略，有效是，积极创建多个接触点在微软。 为扩展关系，以下 2011 年 2 月份的 BizSpark One 计划的 Linxter“毕业” ，米尔格兰 姆是再次坚定地雷达有关微软经理。Linxter 已经并入另一个微软倡议侧重于从事云技术平 台的高度创新的企业， 以及被引入到技术采纳计划在同一个空间。 米尔格拉姆也被邀请成为 2011 年微软最有价值人员全球峰会的一个专家小组成员。 从 Linxter 的 BizSpark One 计划中反映了一个经验，米尔格兰姆观察得出： “像这样的 程序不提供你一个菜单项， 但它给你直接接触反过来可以帮助你做出有价值的关系的人， 这 些关系可以帮助你来创造进一步的相互作用。这完全取决于你自己创造的。 ” 鉴于这其中包含的相当大的挑战， 可想而知， 一些新成立的公司想知道与跨国公司合作 的关系是否有值得麻烦的代价。实际上，一些小公司，特别是是那些营业范围集中在相对较 少密集和选择低洼水果，从事跨国公司可能没有真正有益的。然而，对于那些有尖端技术提 供的前景， 拒绝参与跨国公司可能会导致错失机会。 并且在全球的野心下对创新创业企业而 言这真的可能没有什么选择只能学会与大猩猩共舞。4The Hidden Story behind Dancing With Gorillas: Strategies for Partnering With a Multi NationalBy Shameen Prashantham Abstract: A tiny start-up looking to partner with a colossal multinational must develop some original ideas if it is to be successful. Asymmetry and other obstacles can be overcome. This author advances several strategies that will enable a start-up to enjoy a productive partnership with a multi-national. Keywords: Multinationals, Partnering, Small firms, Start-ups, Strategy Announcing his company?s strategic alliance with Microsoft in 2001, Nakia?s CEO Stephen Elop observed:” The battle of devices has now become a war of ecosystem.” Indeed, large multinational corporations (MNCs) like Microsoft, Nokia and several others have come to build large ecosystems comprising thousands of participants that engage in various activities and points on the value chain. But unlike the relationship between Microsoft and Nokia, which brings together two formidable, large MNCs, many of these ecosystem participants are small (and often young) firms that are drastically different from the large MNC at the center of ecosystem. For such participants, and MNC ecosystem provides a great opportunity, though it also presents great challenge. Leveraging the opportunity while overcoming the challenge calls for adeptness at what London Business School Professor Julian Brikinshaw and I have referred to as “Dancing with Gorillas”1. Given the sheer asymmetries between start-ups and MNCs, we have argued that business as usual is unlike to bear fruit. Instead, start-ups must form, consolidate and extend MNC relationships through less orthodox partnering strategies. This article describes those strategies and suggests how smaller firms can overcome some of the obstacles inherent in partnering with multi nationals. There are 3 partnering strategies that start-ups can employ to work with large multi nationals. 1. Forming MNC relationships: Most MNCs wishing to engage with a partner of similar size will take a direct frontal approach to that relationship, perhaps through a dedicated alliance department or through key individuals who have direct counterparts in the prospective partner company. For a smaller firm seeking to partner with an MNC, however, the lack of access and attention coupled with the asymmetry in resources means that a direct frontal approach is likely to fail. Instead, a start-up would be better off using an indirect means of access. That is, it may be necessary to form a bridge between the two disparate organizations. Using local allies to forge MNC relationships can help gain commitment from the larger partner. So, for example, some public policy initiatives provide even greater ?hand-holding? for smaller firms. For example, a British start-up, HMD Clinical, leveraged a regional initiative called Scottish Technology and Collaboration to build links with relevant decision-makers at a locally based U.S. multinational subsidiary. 2. Consolidating MNC relationships: Having formed a relationship with an MNC, a start-up must establish its credentials by being5clear about, and focusing on, the greatest value that it can add to the relationship. It can then leverage the MNC?s complementary capacities. For instance, if the start-up?s main contribution pertains to specialized technology, then it can draw upon the MNC?s marketing capabilities to achieve greater international visibility. However, given the inherent instability in such relationship, the start-up should also consider tactics such as “modularizing” knowledge transfer from the MNC partner. With discrete knowledge transfers, it is possible to achieve at least partial success even if the project gets shelved or derailed at some point down the road. For example, in the case of the above-named HMD Clinical, a fruitful association with the U.S. multinational developed but then ended earlier than planned owing to the latter?s changing priorities. Even so, valuable outcomes had already been achieved- including the successful building of a product prototype- which meant the start-up?s efforts had not been wasted. 3. Extending MNC relationships: Given the asymmetry of resources and differences in long=tem objectives, a start-up?s MNC relationships are bound to unfold in an unpredictable pattern. Start-ups most successful at collaborating effectively with MNCs over a long period of time are often those that build links with individuals who span organizational boundaries and who can, therefore, tap into resources and knowledge terms, start-ups should also seek to broaden the value chain activities they undertake jointly with MNCs to derive, where feasible, both upstream and downstream benefits, thus achieving economies of scope- getting more bang for their buck- from the relationship. To illustrate, HMD Clinical?s association with the U.S. multi- national became more effective when an individual with a global technology role got involved. He was able to draw on the technical expertise of his colleagues elsewhere in Europe and even North America when needed. In subsequent research on activities in India, Britain and the U.S., I have discovered that more often than not, there is something of a “hidden story” behind the successes of young firms that have been able to dance with gorillas. In particular, I observed three facets of the “hidden story” that are discussed below, and which can provide useful insight into the nature of the challenges associated with chancing with gorillas, and possible ways to overcome them. Dancing with gorillas: The “Hidden Story” Forming (Initiating the relationship) The “Hidden Story” The often is a “once upon a time” i.e. pre-founding experiences with MNCs can have profound effects on the connections forged. Fathoming the “beast”, thereby avoiding wasteful relationship- forming efforts with an MNC6Consolidating (Deepening the relationship) There may be a “twist in the tale” i.e. midcourse corrections including dropping an MNC relationship may occur.Extending (Multiplying the relationship) There isn?t always a “happy ever after” i.e. aligning closely with an MNC may over time lead to overlapping offerings and goals. Recognizing the potential for conflict, thus balancing cooperation and competition to theWhat it entailsEnsuring a strategic fit and thus increasing the odds that the relationship with the MNC brings the bestby targeting the right individuals in the right units at the right time What it takes A alertness C need to avoid reaching out blindly without a deep understanding of the best.out of the start-up and vice versa.extent possible (although it should be recognized that this is not always tenable). Shrewdness C and making no na? ve assumption that things will remain fine forever.F goalorientation C and desisting from staying in a relationship that distracts from achieving key aims.There often is a “Once upon a Time”. When a start up is able to forge a meaningful relationship with an MNC it quite often turns out that one or more of the top management team has already had a close association with that MNC or one like it. This prior association provides valuable insight into the structure and scale of the MNC, what makes its different constituents tick, which the key decision-makers are likely to be, and what the organization?s rhythms are. When there is a deep understanding of these factors the start-up is more likely to be able to target the appropriate individuals in the relevant business units of the MNC, pitch the proposition of collaboration persuasively and time the approach to maximize the odds of receiving a positive response. All this is, of course, easier said than done, and because of the sheer complexity and dynamism of the business environment, the inside of an MNC can be something of a moving picture. Nevertheless, the main point here is that start-up leaders who know the lay of the land in the MNC are better placed than those who are not so aware then it comes to establishing a relationship. For example, the software start-up Mitoken made confident strides in establishing a link with Motorola because of the founding team?s prior experience in another large MNC. This experience helped them understand just how they, as a start-up, could add value to a seemingly self-sufficient MNC by introducing their own novel technology with a fleet-footedness that the MNC could simply never mach. Consider also the case of SpadeWorx Software Services, a start-up in Pune, India, which was able to rapidly develop a strong relationship with Microsoft. Compared to most of its peers, this company seemed unusually adept in knowing whom to approach and how to generate traction for its proposal. Upon further investigation, it emerged that one of the co-founders, Mnadar Bhagwat, had previously worked for Hewlett Packard, on a team that worked exclusively with Microsoft in Redmond, WA. In the process, Bhagwat had become intimately aware of the way in which Microsoft worked internally and with alliance partners. This knowledge, and the contacts that Bhagwat had from him earlier job, proved invaluable when the start-up sought to engage with Microsoft Where the founding team itself lacks such first-hand experience it may do well to hire managers who have it. There may be “a twist in the tale”. A fascinating example of a start-up that partnered with an MNC is that of Bangalore-based Mango Technologies. It partnered with the American firm, Qualcomm. However, Qualcomm wasn?t the very first MNC it reached out to. In fact, it was more of a case of “third time lucky”. The first MNC that the start-up approached evinced interest in working with it. However, it became clear to Mango?s founders that the joint activity that the MNC favored pursing, although7feasible and attractive in the short-term for revenue generation, did not really tap into the start-up?s core expertise. Thereafter, Mango dropped that association and pursued a second MNC relationship. The joint activity embarked upon this time was suitably oriented towards Mango?s technical expertise but, after about three months, the start-up realized that going down that route would detract it from reaching its ultimate goals. Once again, it dropped its MNC relationship- and this time, raised a few eyebrow because the opportunity had been a good one. However, determined to stick to their plans, the start-up?s founders continued exploring other possibilities, which resulted in a partnership with Qualcomm that proved to be mutually beneficial (see Box). Mango technologies: building an embedded MNC relationship For an example of how a start-up can effectively engage with an MNC, consider the relationship that Bangalore-based Mango Technologies forged with Qualcomm. Mango was formed in 2006 as a start-up with a focus on building a software product with a niche focus on mobile telephony for base-of-the-pyramid market segments. Within a year, partly to raise its visibility and credibility, Mango sought to enter the incubator of a prestigious local business school, IIM Bangalore. Following a rigorous selection process, the start-up was successful in its efforts. From inception, Mango?s CEO Sunil Maheshwari viewed partnering with an MNC as the way forward for the company to scale up and take its technology to market. Having explored multiple options to do so (in parallel), Mango succeeded in showcasing its technology to a visiting Qualcomm manager at a partner-networking event. The technology got the manager?s immediate attention because it became rapidly evident to him that Mango?s technology was directly relevant to his own agenda at Qualcomm. This encounter set of a string of incremental steps that reached a lucrative culmination in a sale of intellectual property (IP) by Mango to Qualcomm, which was hailed by the Indian business media as a unique “multimillion dollar deal”2. The remarkable journey from a rather casual encounter to a high-profile IP sale can be a described as a progressive process of relationship “embedding”. That is, over time, the relationship came to be characterized by deep trust, fine-grained information exchange, and joint problem solving, which in turn facilitated considerable learning outcomes for the start-up. The incremental steps included the following: A process was initiated to enable Mango to demonstrate its technology more elaborately on Qualcomm?s own technology platform. When this was satisfactorily achieved, following due diligence, the next step was to prepare an R&D agreement allowing Qualcomm to demonstrate but not commercialize Mango products. It also enabled Qualcomm to first evaluate Mango?s products internally before exposing them to their worldwide customers. Later, a commercial agreement was signed allowing Qualcomm to ship Mango?s software along with its own chipsets. Finally, it became evident to Qualcomm that it could utilize Mango?s technology most effectively by acquiring it, leading ultimately to an IP sale as mentioned above. Aside from the obvious fit between the two rather dissimilar organizations, two factors appear to have been the key to the successful progression of the relationship. First, Mango single-mindedly devoted itself to being flexible and delivering effectively on the technology front. Second, Qualcomm deftly negotiated internal bureaucracy to provide support for Mango?s technology development efforts. This was particularly down to the efforts of the key individuals, both at Qualcomm?s headquarters in San Diego as well as its operations in India, which emerged8as “internal champions” for Mango. These efforts included, in the first instance, non-interference so that Mango was able to operate with the agility of a start-up. Thereafter they provided equipment and manpower to aid both technology and business development. They also brokered relationships with other ecosystem members including a design company in China. And they guided Mango in some of the commercial aspects of formalizing the relationship, which was a new experience for the start-up. Clearly, building an embedded relationship between a start-up and an MNC is not for the faint-hearted: it certainly takes some doing on the part of both parties, but when successfully accomplished, the payoff in terms of revenue and learning outcomes can be considerable. (I acknowledge the research collaboration of Professors K Kumar and Suresh Bhagavatula at the Indian Institute of Management Bangalore in studying Mango?s relationship with Qualcomm.) The main point here, therefore, is that what initially appears to be an attractive MNC relationship may turn out to be less than ideal. In some cases, a start-up may stick with what it has and sacrifice some of its original intentions in the process. Strategy scholars refer to such an approach as emergent strategy, and of itself this can be a legitimate way of progressing. In other cases (such as Mango), the start-up may stick to its guns and drop certain relationships until it has arrived at a suitable one. This is a more deliberate strategy. Whether strategy is deliberate or emergent, however, it is a distinct possibility that there are changes to the storyline. This calls for flexibility and agility on the part of the start-up. There isn?t always a “happy ever after”. In some cases, despite having developed a close relationship with an MNC, a start-up may discover that the momentum has suffered, tensions have crept in and the prospect of discontinuing the association is a real one. While this could occur for a variety of reasons, paradoxically this may result from close alignment between a start-up and an MNC over time. Although a high degree of alignment, in terms of technology and business strategy, is a prerequisite for a close relationship with an MNC, it is conceivable that as time progresses and the offerings of each party evolve, there may be overlapping features and functionality that lead to friction. That is, what were initially complementary offerings could turn into competitive ones. The point here is that smooth sailing in a relationship with an MNC is not guaranteed to be a permanent state of affairs and that start-ups must be cognizant of the possibility that the more it aligns with an MNC over time, the more it could come into conflict with it. That said, start-ups and other small firms could take heart from the fact MNCs appear to be taking them more and more seriously, not least because C as evident from the observation noted at the outset C they recognize that they are engaged in a war of ecosystems. As a consequence, some MNCs have come up with innovations in their management of partnering with start-ups that, in turn, have been skillfully leveraged. In achieving this, it is especially vital that the startup be proactive in cultivating the relationship on the basis of reciprocity. This is seen, for example, in the case of Linxter?s thriving relationship with Microsoft (see Box). While such proactive behavior does not rule out the possibility of conflict down the road, it certainly provides scope for thoughtful entrepreneurs to navigate the rapids of MNC engagement for a considerable length of time. Linxter: Proactively leveraging an MNC partnering Initiative Multinational corporations (MNCs) have themselves begun to recognize the benefits of partnering with smaller firms, including start-ups. In some cases, innovative arrangements have9been put in place, typically in the form a partnering program. Such initiatives provide a well-defined point of entry into the MNC?s ecosystem and structure to the interactions between the young firm and MNC. BizSpark One, a partnering program run out of Microsoft?s Silicon Valley campus, is a striking example of the growing sophistication on the part of some large MNCs to actively engage with innovative start-ups. While many MNCs have partnering programs that cover a broad range of participants (including Microsoft?s own “regular” BizSpark program with over 35,000 members worldwide), the BizSpark One program is highly selective. With a worldwide capacity of 100 members, the goal of the program is to identify (through a rigorous selection procedure) and invite on to the program the most innovative start-ups that are likely to make a significant impact, and whose technology is aligned with Microsoft?s. In effect, Microsoft is seeking to foster the development of firms that may turn into significant partners in the future and also become examples from which the thousands of other start-ups partnering with Microsoft can learn. The program provides start-up members with the opportunity to forge a relationship with Microsoft on a one-to-one basis (as opposed to the one-to-many approach typical of most partnering programs) because start-ups get access to a named account manager, who frequently doubles as a mentor and also connects the start-ups to outside mentors with explicit experience in areas of needs. The program is time bound, normally with a 12-month duration and operates in a range of geographies covering both advanced and emerging economies. Formed in late 2009, the program was intentionally launched without fanfare. Instead, the goal was to ?prove? itself and demonstrate its overarching goal of helping start-ups to succeed. The program?s most high-profile networking event to date was the One Summit in Silicon Valley in October 2010, which brought together BizSpark One start-ups and other network partners and venture capitalists. Florida-based Linxter, which specializes in cloud-based messaging technology, illustrates how a young firm, by being proactive, could enable it to take advantage of the opportunity presented by an innovative partnering initiative such as Microsoft?s BizSpark One program. The proactiveness of this start-up is evidenced in different phases of the relationship: forming, consolidating and extending. In forming its one-to-one relationship with Microsoft via BizSpark One, Linxter?s CEO Jason Milgram was building upon the visibility he had proactively built within the local software community through speaking engagements at technology conferences. In many of his talks Milgram discussed Microsoft?s cloud-related technologies. This meant that when a Florida-based Microsoft manager was looking for prospective invitees to BizSpark One, Milgram was already on his radar. In consolidating this relationship, Milgram continued to be proactive because he believed that the onus was on him to make the most of it. He did so in multiple ways. He leveraged the Microsoft connection by using quotes from key managers in periodical press releases. He also reciprocated on publicity opportunities through, for instance, inviting Microsoft managers to discuss their partnering initiatives for start-ups on a Linxter-run podcast series. And he initiated dialogues with other Microsoft teams as well as other start-ups engaging with Microsoft to explore collaborative opportunities. Thus a strategy that Milgram effectively used was that of proactively creating multiple touchpoints within the Microsoft ecosystem. As for extending the relationship, following Linxter?s “graduation” from the BizSparkOne program in February 2011, Milgram was once again firmly on the radar of relevant Microsoft10managers. Linxter has since been absorbed into another Microsoft initiative that focuses on highly innovative firms that work on its cloud technology platform, as well as being inducted into a technology adoption program in the same space. Milgram was also invited to be a panelist at a session of the Microsoft 2011 MVP Global Summit. Reflecting on Linxter?s BizSpark One experience, Milgram observes: “A program like this does not provide you a menu of items, but it gives you direct access to individuals who in turn can help you make valuable connections that help create further interactions. It?s completely up to you what you make of it.” Given the considerable challenges involved, it is conceivable that some start-ups will wonder whether collaborative MNC relationships are really worth the trouble. Indeed for some smaller firms, specifically those that are content to focus on relatively less knowledge-intensive offerings and pick the low-lying fruit, engaging with MNCs may not be truly beneficial. However, for those that do have cutting-edge technologies to offer, spurning the prospect of engaging with MNCs is likely to result in missed opportunities. And there may really be little option for innovative start-ups with global ambitions but to learn to dance with the gorillas.1Our ideas were initially published in an article in California Management Review. As we acknowledge in it, the phrase “dancing with gorillas” was inspired by a comment made by the late CK Prahalad at a conference. In this article I provide further ideas emanating from my subsequent research on the topic. 2 See, for example, http://articles.//news/_software-products-q ualcomm-mangotechnologies The Author: Shameen Prashantham Shameen Prashantham is a Senior Lecturer in International Business & Strategy at the Centre for Internationalization and Enterprise Research (CIER) of the University of Glasgow Business School. In the Fall he will join the Nottingham University Business School China in Ningbo, China as Associate Professor in International Business and Strategy.11