(window.slotbydup=window.slotbydup || []).push({
id: '2014386',
container: s,
size: '234,60',
display: 'inlay-fix'
&&|&&0次下载&&|&&总47页&&|
您的计算机尚未安装Flash，点击安装&
阅读已结束，如需下载到电脑，请使用积分（）
下载：20积分
0人评价87页
0人评价76页
0人评价79页
0人评价97页
0人评价75页
所需积分：（友情提示：大部分文档均可免费预览！下载之前请务必先预览阅读，以免误下载造成积分浪费！）
（多个标签用逗号分隔）
文不对题，内容与标题介绍不符
广告内容或内容过于简单
文档乱码或无法正常显示
文档内容侵权
已存在相同文档
不属于经济管理类文档
源文档损坏或加密
若此文档涉嫌侵害了您的权利，请参照说明。
我要评价：
价格：20积分VIP价：16积分提示信息！
对不起，该MV不存在，将返回网站首页Beyond crisismanagement超越危机处理Bold ideas for solving America’sfinancial mess 解决美国金融危机的大胆想法EVERY financial crisis involves a tug of warbetween the tacticians and the strategists. The tacticians dash from skirmishto skirmish trying to control a crisis, deciding in each case whether taxpayersshould bail out a distressed bank, firm or country. The strategists call for amore comprehensive approach to resolving the mess―often involving newgovernment bodies to recapitalise banks or take over troubled assets.每一次的金融危机中，那些战术家和战略家 之间总是存在激烈地竞争。 战术家们不停地从一个冲突奔向另一个冲突，考虑是 否应该用纳税人的钱来拯救那些兵临破产的银行、公司甚至是整个国家，以此来 试图控制危机。 而战略家们则主张应当采取综合性措施来解决危机中的问题―― 这经常会涉及一个新的政府机构来拯救银行或者接收问题资产。 The present crisis in America conforms to this pattern.So far, the government’ s response has been ad hoc and focused on crisiscontainment. The tacticians at the Federal Reserve and the Treasury have putplenty of taxpayers’ money on the line―whether through the huge expansion inthe central bank’s liquidity facilities, the loan to Bear Stearns in March, orthe government takeover ofFannie Mae and Freddie Mac, the mortgage giants,and, now, of AIG, a huge insurer. But they have focused on staving offcatastrophe one bail-out at a time. 美国现在的状况就符合上述说法。到目前为止，政府对危机的回应是特别的，他 把精力仅仅集中在危机处理方面。 美联储和财政部的战术家们立即注入了大量纳 税人的钞票――无论是通过扩展中央银行的流动性工具， 在３月对贝尔斯登的贷 款， 还是政府对抵押借款巨头房利美和房地美的接管， 而现在又是保险巨头 AIG。 然而他们所做的仅仅是在一次紧急救援中救助一个病危企业。 Now the strategists are pushing back. From across thepolitical spectrum people are arguing that it is time for America toshift to a more systematic approach. In the past week Barney Frank, the leadingDemocrat on financial matters in the House of Representatives, Paul Volcker, aformer chairman of the Fed, as well as writers of the editorial pages of the Wall StreetJournal,have suggested that Congress may need to create a new agency todeal with themess. All have pointed to the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), a governmentbody set up in 1989 to deal with the fallout of the savings and loan (S&L)bankruptcies. 现在战略家们正在向前推进。来自不同政治背景的人 都认为，是时候该转向那些更加系统性的方法了。在过去的一周，美国众议院财 经问题专家民主党派领导成员 BarneyFrank、美联储前主席，同时也是华尔街日 报社论版撰稿人保罗?沃尔克都建议国会成立一个新的机构来处理当下的混乱状 况。而他们不约而同的都指向了美国清算信托公司，这一 1989 年成立的为处理 当时存款借贷危机的政府机构。 Americans focus on the RTC because it is the country’smost recent exampleof a comprehensive government plan to deal with a financialcrisis. Between 1980 and 1994 almost 1,300 specialised mortgage lenders, knownas thrifts, failed. Their combined assets amounted to more than $600 billion. By1986 these failures had bankrupted the Federal Savings and LoanInsuranceCorporation, the federal insurer for the thrift industry. At first thegovernment tried to muddle through by trying to recapitalise the insurer. Butthe S&L mess escalated. In 1989 Congress created the RTC, an entirely neworganisation, to dispose of the failed thrifts ’ assets in a way that minimiseddownward pressure on financial and property markets. 之所以美国对清算信托公司如此关注， 是因为这是美国政府最近一个采取综合性 计划处理金融危机的案例。在 1980 年到 1994 年间，约 1300 个专业抵押借款 人（以储蓄闻名）破产了。他们的总资产达到了 6000 亿美元。到 1986 年这些 损失使得储蓄业的承保人――联邦储蓄贷款保险公司破产。一开始，政府试图通 过援助联邦储蓄贷款保险公司来对付危机，但是这场存款借贷危机却逐步恶化 了。1989 年，国会成立一个全新的机构――清算信托公司，希望以一种新的方 式来处置那些不良储蓄资产， 同时又尽量使危机对金融和房地产市场造成尽可能 的小冲击。 The RTC is not a perfect parallel for today’s needs. Itwas set up―years after the S&L crisis began―to deal with the aftermath ofwidespread bank failures. Those who advocate comprehensive action today want tominimise the mess, not just clean up afterwards. Their proposals vary, but manywho cite the RTC envisage an institution that buys troubled mortgage-backedsecurities (not onlyfrom failing institutions), putting a floor under theirprice. Some propose that the putative new agency should manage and write downthe underlying mortgages, in effect combining the functions of the RTC with aDepression-era institution, called the Home Owners’ Loan Corporation, whichbought and restructured defaulting mortgages. Details are in short supply, butintellectual momentum is building for a broader solution. 但是清算信托公司并不是我们今天所正好需要的。 当初它是在储蓄借贷危机发生 后成立的， 用来处理银行破产所产生的烂摊子。而今天那些主张综合性行动的人 是想要使危机最小化，而不是通过救助使其赢利。他们的建议不断变化，但是很 多提议ＲＴＣ的人设想这样一个机构： 用它来以很低的价格购买那些有问题的抵 押支持债券（并不只是从破产的机构） 。另一些人主张这个被新定的机构应该管 理并处理那些潜在的抵押贷款， 并有效的整合ＲＴＣ和危机时期被称为业主借贷 公司所具有的功能， 后者负责购买和重置那些违约抵押资产。当局没有提供进一 步的细节，但是那些智囊的目标是要形成一个更广泛的解决措施。 Not a moment too soon, suggest the results of a new studyby Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia, two IMF economists.*They examined all systemically important banking crises between 1970 and 2007,creating a database on how much financial crises cost and how they areresolved. The evidence is clear. Tactical crisis containment is expensive andfrequently inadequate. In most financial meltdowns a comprehensive solution wasrequired, and the sooner it was provided the better. 没过多久，两位国际货币基金组织的经济学家 LucLaeven 和 FabianValencia 就提出了他们的建议。在系统的研究了从 1970 年到 2007 年间所有重大银行危机 后，他们形成了一个数据库，统计出了金融危机的成本和各种救助方法。证据是 很明显的。 战术家的救助行动通常成本更高而且救助不够充分。在大多数金融危 机中，一个综合全面的解决方案是非常必需的，而且出台越早效果越好。 The study looks at 42 crises in all, spanning 37countries. Like Americatoday, most governments began with ad hoc crisis management. In 74% of cases,for instance, governments their pumped emergency loans into An equally common failing has banks beenorguaranteedliabilities.tacticregulatoryforbearance. Governments allowed banks to hold less capital than was normallyrequired or softened their rules in other ways. These tactical responses,however, often did not work and ended up increasing the overall bill from acrisis. “ All too often ” , the economists conclude, “ central banks privilegestability over cost in the heat of the containment phase.” 该研究报告观察了 37 个国家的总计 42 场危机。就像今天的美国一样，大部分 政府都是以一种特殊的危机处理方式开始。比如，在 74%的例子中，政府都向 破产银行注入紧急贷款或者担保他们的债务。 同样常见的一个战术就是监管当局 延长偿还期限。 政府允许银行持有低于名义上的法定准备金，或者以其他方式放 松监管。然而，这些战术性的救助措施往往都不会发挥作用，并且都以增加危机 的总成本而告终。 “太普遍了” 一经济学家总结道， ， “在危机处理最紧张的时期，央 行最先考虑的是稳定而不是成本” 。No such thing as a free crunch没有零成本的危机Sooner or later most governments realise the need for acomprehensive solution to the crisis, involving public funds. This can take differentforms, from bank recapitalisation to forgiveness of all the underlying debts.Inthree-quarters of the cases, governments shored up bank capital by, forinstance, injecting preferred stock. About 60% of the time, governments set upinstitutions to manage distressed assets. 迟早， 大多数政府会认识到他们需要一个综合性的解决方案来处理危机，包括公 共基金。它可以采取从银行资本重组到赦免所有不良基础资产等多种不同的形 式。比如说，在四分之三的危机中，政府通过注入优先股来支持银行资本。多半 时候，政府则通过建立专门的机构来处置不良资产。The evidence from these attempts is sobering forproponents of an RTC II. Some institutions worked well. In the early 1990s, forinstance,Swedensuccessfully set up an asset-management company to take over and sell the badloans from its biggest banks. But, in general, the paper argues, suchgovernment-owned asset-management firms are ineffective ― often becausepoliticians try to push them around. 以前种种尝试的证据使得那些ＲＴＣ二代的支持者变得清醒些了． 一些机构运作 地是很不错。比如在上个世纪 90 年代早期，瑞典就成功地设立了一个资产管理 公司来接管和处置银行的呆账坏账。但是研究报告表明，从总体上来看，那些由 政府所有的资产管理公司是无效的――因为政客们总是互相推诿。On average, the study finds that government attempts tostanch systemic banking crises over the past three decades have cost 16% ofGDP. That average hides enormous variation, much of which depends on how criseswere handled. America’smess, even if it has already led to the demise of famous Wall Street firms, isfar from finished. That is why the international lessons are worth takingseriously. Resolving a financial mess is cheaper, quicker and less painful ifgovernments take a rounded approach. For the moment, the bail-out tacticiansare in overdrive. But the strategists’ moment is approaching. 报告发现，平均来说，在过去的三十多年，政府尝试处理银行系统性危机的成本 是 GDP 的 16%。但这个平均水平掩盖了巨大的变动性，他们其中很多还是要看 具体的危机处理方法。 美国的危机， 即使现在已经导致了知名华尔街公司的破产， 但还远没有结束。 这就是仍然应该从国际案例中认真学习的原因。解决金融危机 时，如果能够采取一个考虑周全的方法，那么成本会更低，而且更迅速，对经济 的伤害也较轻。现在，那些救助战术家们已经进入了加速挡，接下来应该是战略 家动手的时候了。The financial crisis 金融危机A break in the clouds 黑云裂日，曙光显现But questions abound over a $700 billion rescue plan for Wall Street有关 7000 亿美元华尔街拯救计划的问题仍然不少THE threat of impending financial disaster concentrates political minds wonderfully. On Thursday a group of Congressional leaders heard Hank Paulson, the Treasury secretary, and Ben Bernanke, the Federal Reserve chairman, paint a dire economic scenario if they did not approve a more sweeping remedy for the financial crisis. Student and car loans, not just mortgages, would all be harder to get. The economy would sink into a severe recession. 迫在眉睫的金融灾难引起了相当多的政治关注。上周四，一群国会领袖听了财长 保尔森和美联储主席伯南克所描述的， 当国会不通过这项全面拯救金融危机的方 案，经济上将会出现的可怕场面。那时，不仅仅是抵押贷款，甚至连助学贷款和 买车贷款可能都很难获得。经济将陷入严重的衰退。 So by Sunday September 21st support was coalescing around the Treasury’s rescue proposal: that Congress authorise it to purchase up to $700 billion in mortgage and other assets in an effort to resolve the root of the financial crisis, which is the mountains of illiquid and uncollectible mortgage debt on financial institution balance sheets. (One senator predicted $1 trillion would be needed.) Passage this week, before Congress breaks for the election, seems likely. 因此，周日（9 月 21 日）之前国会议员大多支持财政部的拯救提案：国会授权 使用多达 7000 亿美元来购买抵押贷款以及其它资产，从而解决这次金融危机中 最根本的问题。 这些资产正是金融机构资产负债表上堆积如山的非流动资产和抵押贷款坏账。 一位参议员预计大约需要 1 万亿来处理这些东西。 国会有望于本周 ――在因大选休会前――通过这项提案。 Democrats in Congress have two priorities in negotiations. They want mortgages written down so that homeowners can avoid foreclosure and that any firm selling assets to the Treasury accept limits on executive compensation. This is more contentious. If “it's punitive…institutions aren't going to participate,” Mr Paulson noted. 国会里的民主党人有两个优先考虑的问题。 他们希望抵押贷款减记从而能避免房 主被取消赎回权， 而且任何将资产卖给财政部的公司必须接受限制高管薪酬的规 定。后者很容易引起争议。保尔森说，如果“这是惩罚性质的…那么一些机构就 可能不参与了。 ” Mr Paulson’s plan is stunning in its brevity (two-and-a-half pages) and audacity. It would authorise him to purchase any “residential or commercial mortgages and any securities, obligations, or other instruments that are based on or related to such mortgages,” implying the right to take over derivative positions. A fact sheet later distributed by the Treasury broadened it to include “other assets, as deemed necessary to effectively stabilise financial markets.” The government could, in effect, buy anything it wanted: student or car loans, loans, equities, entire companies. 保尔森计划的简洁（只有两页半纸）和大胆令人惊讶不已。这个计划授权他可以 购买任何“住房和商业抵押贷款和任何证券、债务，以及其它任何基于或者与抵 押贷款有关的票据， ”这暗示其有权购买衍生品头寸。 稍后由财政部发布的情况说明书将范围扩大包括“其它任何被认为可以稳定金融市场的资产。 ”实际上，政府 可以买任何它想买的东西：助学和购车贷款，贷款，股权，甚至整个公司。The treasury secretary’s decisions “may not be reviewed by any court of law or any administrative agency.” He would report to Congress three months after the programme begins and every six months thereafter. It is now conventional wisdom that recent events have guaranteed a heavier regulatory hand for government in the economy. Mr Paulson’s programme raises the prospect of it becoming a huge player in the allocation of capital as well. The ability to purchase assets expires after two years, but its management of those assets would continue. 财政部长的决定“不会被任何法庭或者行政机构重新检阅。 ”他将在计划实施三个 月后向国会首次报告，并在之后每六个月向国会报告一次。人们普遍认为，近期 在金融市场发生的此类事件会使得政府加大其对经济调控监管的力度。 保尔森的 计划将会使政府成为市场中分配资本的重要参与者。政府购买资产的期限为两 年，但是其对这些买到资产的管理将会继续。 Mr Paulson said that the lack of oversight gives future administrations “flexibility to run this any way they would like to run it.” And some experts say decisions must not risk being tied up in lawsuits, or confidence could suffer. But the great discretionary power seems to fly in the face of the original rationale for the programme, which was for a systematic rules-based approach to resolving the crisis rather than ad-hoc bailouts. Future administrations could find a $700 billion fund a potent tool for various policy goals.保尔森说监察的缺失使得可能使得未来的管理“会非常灵活，使他们想怎样运营 便怎样运营。 ”有些专家认为，此项决定不要冒陷入法律诉讼的风险，否则会让公 众的信心受损。 但是太大的自行决定权却与这个计划的原意相悖。这个计划的原 意是用一个系统的， 基于法律的方法来解决危机，而不是使用特别的紧急救援来 解决问题。未来的管理可以建立一个 7000 亿美元基金的强大工具来解决各种问 题。 To acquire mortgages the Treasury plans to use “reverse auctions”. But as Lou Crandall of Wrightson ICAP, a research firm notes, “Auctions work well when you have a group of bidders for a single set of identical assets. They work less well when you have a single bidder for a group of disparate assets.” 为了得到抵押贷款资产，财政部计划使用“倒拍卖”的方法。但是研究机构 Wrightson ICAP 的 Lou Crandall 认为： “一群竞标人争夺仅单组同类资产时，拍 卖会很有效。一个竞标人却有一大堆不同的资产时，拍卖就不那么有效了。 ” Another problem is that it would reward the least deserving institutions the most. “Banks that stayed clear of this debt or sold such debt at cut-rate prices earlier this year in an effort to move beyond the crisis would receive no direct gain from such a programme, ” notes Doug Elmendorf of the Brookings Institution, a think-tank, while banks who had the most junk and had dragged their feet on writing it down would benefit most. 另一个问题是，最不该得到的机构却会得到更多的援助。当拥有最多垃圾资产而 且迟迟不愿减记的银行获益最多时，智库布鲁斯金学会的 Doug Elmendorf 指 出： “不接触这些垃圾资产的， 或者今年早些时候低价卖出这些垃圾资产以远离危机的银行在这次计划中不会获得直接的收益。 ” Mr Paulson has rightly noted that the cost of the programme should be well below $700 billion since some of the mortgages will be repaid. But it may be optimistic to expect it to turn a profit. Indeed, profit is inconsistent with the point of such a programme which is to socialise losses that would otherwise cripple the financial sector and toss millions of people out of their homes. The lack of an upside for taxpayers is one reason that some scholars, like Mr Elmendorf, favour the taking of direct stakes by the government in financial firms instead. 保尔森肯定地指出，这项计划的成本肯定比 7000 亿美元要低，因为有些抵押贷 款会偿还的。但是期望它能带来收益就未免太乐观了。而且，收益与其计划的原 意有所违背， 这项计划就是让金融业收到巨大冲击并让数百万的人失去房屋的损 失成本由大家来共同承担。缺少对纳税人的好处，这正是有些学者，例如 Elmendorf，更倾向于用政府直接入股金融机构来取代上述计划的一个原因。Profit is possible, of course. The market prices of many mortgage securities today reflect not just the likelihood of default, but a steep liquidity premium, because the paper no longer trades. The Treasury could conceivably buy something above market value but below fair value and hold it to maturity. But it could deepen the financial crisis by forcing institutions to recognise the assets’ deeply distressed prices. 当然， 收益也是有可能的。 许多抵押贷款证券今天的市场价格不仅反映了违约的 可能性，也有过高的流动性风险溢价，因为这些证券不再交易了。财政部可以购买到高于市场价值但是低于公平价值的债券，持有直至到期。但是强迫金融机构 认可这些资产的过低的价格会加深金融危机。 Even if the program is designed perfectly, it’s no sure thing it will end the crisis. It does address the root problem, defaulting mortgages, and Mr Bernanke has long worried that bad debt would fuel a vicious circle of crippled lenders, constricting credit, weakening growth and more defaults. But that’s not what happened last week. Losses on Lehman debt forced several money-market funds to “break the buck”, triggering a flight out of short-term commercial paper. Banks, forced to contemplate redeeming hundreds of billions of dollars in maturing commercial loans, began hoarding liquidity. Interbank lending froze. This generalised loss of confidence was many steps beyond the root cause of the crisis. Announcement of bail-out plans helped ease things, but the effect was purely psychological. 即是这项计划设计的非常完美， 但是并不能确定它就能够终结这场金融危机。它 确实瞄准了根本问题， 违约抵押贷款，而且伯南克一直担心这会引起贷方陷入困 境，信贷紧缩，增长放缓从而更多违约的恶性循环。但是上周这些没有发生。雷 曼债务引起的损失使好几家货币市场基金“跌破净值” 从而引发投资者大规模逃 ， 离短期商业票据。 银行被迫考虑收回数千亿美元的到期商业贷款，从而囤积其流 动性。 银行间的拆借几乎停滞。 信心的全面丧失使得危机从其引发原因开始扩散。 接管的拯救计划有助于危机的缓和，但是其效果仅限于心理层面。 For this reason, ad hoc responses will still be critical, such last week’s federal guarantees for money-market funds, Fed loans to banks to purchaseasset-backed commercial paper and, on Sunday, approval of the remaining two big independent investment banks, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs, to become Fed-regulated bank holding companies whose investment bank units can now borrow from the Fed on the same terms as other banks. 基于这样的原因，特别的拯救措施仍然非常关键，上周对货币市场的联邦担保， 通过美联储购买资产抵押的商业票据对银行的贷款， 以及在周日允许剩下的两家 大型投行――摩根斯坦利和高盛变为美联储监管银行控股公司， 使其投行部分现 在也可以向其它银行一样向美联储借钱。 It could be some time before the Treasury is able to purchase mortgages en masse, and longer still before that starts to affect the broader financial system and economy. In the meantime, the crisis could claim other victims. 财政部可以购买所有的抵押贷款可能还需要一段时间， 而且对整个金融系统和经 济产生作用也要好久。其间，还会有其它的金融危机的受害者。And then there were none 投行之死What the death of the investment bank means for Wall Street 投资银行模式消失对华尔街来说意味着什么THE radical overhaul of Britain’s financial sector in 1986 was dubbed the Big Bang. The brutal, unplanned reshaping of Wall Street might be better described as the Big Implosion. As if too ashamed to go on after the humblingof the country’s mortgage agencies and its largest insurer, the “bulge-bracket” brokerage model has collapsed in on itself. Even more humiliating for the erstwhile masters of the universe, the new force in finance is now the government. 1986 年英国金融系统的大整顿被称为“金融大爆炸” 而这次对华尔街进行的残酷 。 而又无计划的重塑应该被称为“金融大风暴” 在继美国最大的两家抵押贷款机构 。 和最大的保险商蒙羞受辱之后，华尔街的“顶级投行”的经纪模式也似因连遭重创 而无法运行下去，只得轰然垮台。对昔日的世界巨头来说更丢脸的是, 如今金融 市场的主导力量变成了美国政府。 The last remaining investment banks, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley, were forced to seek sanctuary by converting into bank holding companies after the trampling of Lehman Brothers turned into a full-scale run on the industry. Though neither was particularly sickly, markets could no longer stomach their potentially lethal combination of illiquid assets and skittish wholesale liabilities. 硕果仅存的两家投行――高盛和摩根斯坦利在雷曼垮台后，寻求政府保护：允许 其成为银行控股公司从而能够全面涉足金融行业业务。 尽管二者都不是完全陷入 困境， 但是市场对于其潜在的致命缺陷――非流动资产和不可靠的大规模债务的 模式已经不再信任。 Both will now start gathering large amounts of deposits, a more stable form of funding. Signing up strong partners should also help. Mitsubishi UFJ, a giant Japanese bank, will buy up to 20% of Morgan. Late on Tuesday September 23rd Goldman went one better, coaxing $5 billion from Warren Buffett, aninvesting legend. This endorsement helped Goldman to raise a further $5 billion in a share offering the next day. 高盛和摩根斯坦利现在会去用吸收大量存款这种稳定的模式来筹资。当然，他们 如能和强有力的伙伴合作， 那么会对他们筹资有很大帮助。日本银行巨头三菱日 联银行会购入摩根斯坦利 20％的股份。高盛做的更好，在周二（9 月 23 日）晚 些时候，它从传奇投资人物巴菲特那里搞到 50 亿美元。巴菲特的这个支持有助 于高盛第二天从股票发行中再筹得 50 亿美元。 Mr Buffett, no idle flatterer, describes Goldman as “exceptional”. But some doubt that it can adapt and thrive. As a bank it faces more intrusive supervision from the Federal Reserve, tougher capital requirements and restrictions on investing. Universal banks, such as Citigroup and Bank of America, long dismissed as stodgy, argue that their vast balance sheets and wide range of businesses, from cards to capital markets, give them an edge in trying times. The head of one bank suggests that the golden times enjoyed by investment banks in 2003-06 were an “aberration”, fuelled by a global liquidity glut big enough to hide a multitude of risk-taking sins. 巴菲特先生显然不是无所事事的马屁精，他将高盛描述为“异常出色” 但是有些 。 人怀疑高盛是否能够改革并再次兴盛。作为一个银行它将面临美联储更多的监 管， 更严格的资本储备率和投资限制。长期以来由于其古板顽固而失宠的综合银 行， 例如花旗和美国银行， 认为他们资产负债表上充足的资本和从银行卡到资本 市场广泛的业务，在困难时期给他们带来许多优势。一家银行的老板认为，投资 银行在 2003 到 06 年间所享受的黄金时光是“不正常的”――由过剩的流动性驱使而来，流动性大到足以掩盖诸多的风险过错。 Private-equity firms and hedge funds spy opportunity. The buyout barons got good news this week, when the Fed relaxed its rules on their ownership of banks. These investors are also going after the investment banks’ “talent”. Hedge funds will be particularly keen to get their hands on cutting-edge risk-takers who fret that new regulation will clip their wings. 私募股权公司和对冲基金正在伺机以动。它们本周得到个好消息，美联储放松了 这些收购巨头对银行控股的限制。这些投资者正在追逐投行的“人才” 对冲基金 。 将会对那些担心自己被新规定束缚手脚的精英冒险家们（译者注：投行的人才） 表现的格外热情。 Power may shift in two other directions: abroad and, to a lesser extent, to boutique investment banks. Mitsubishi is not the only foreign bank making a move. After a brief wrangle in the bankruptcy courts, Britain’s Barclays has taken over Lehman’s American operations. 权力正在两极分化：一是朝向海外，国际化方向聚集，另一个则是朝向小型专业 投行聚集。三菱并不是唯一一个行动的外资银行。在破产法庭上简单争执之后， 英国的巴克莱银行接管了雷曼在北美的所有业务。 But all is not lost for the former investment banks. For one thing, they may not have to cut leverage by as much as feared. Though their overall leverage ratios are high, their risk-adjusted capital ratios under the Basel 2 rules are stronger than those of most commercial banks. 但对前投行而言，尚有卷土重来的一线希望。至少，他们不用减掉杠杆像原来担心的那么多。尽管它们的全面杠杆比率很高，但在巴塞尔 2 协议下，他们的风险 调节资本比率比绝大多数商业银行都要好。 Moreover, there are some advantages to becoming a bank now. Dozens of regional lenders are expected to fail in the coming months. Goldman and Morgan should thus be able to amass deposits on the cheap, and without the headaches that would accompany a merger with a big commercial bank. As two of the sharpest distressed-debt investors, they will also be looking to pick up assets from the government’s giant loan-buying entity when it gets going. 此外，现在变为银行还有一些优势。许多地区性商业银行在近期会倒闭。因此， 高盛和摩根斯坦利就可以吸收大量便宜的存款， 而不必头痛要与一家大型商业银 行合并的事情了。 作为两家债券严重受损的投资者，它们也同样希望在政府巨大 的贷款购买实体成立后，能够回笼些资产。 Given the acute stress in money markets, however, the accent for the time being is more on survival than grabbing opportunities. Banks continue to treat each other with suspicion in interbank loan markets. 虽然银行在货币市场里受到了巨大的压力， 但是在短期内的工作重点不是抓住各 种机会， 而是存活下来。 从银行间拆借市场可以看出银行之间依然存在着巨大的 疑虑。 Financial firms fear further fallout from the recent, potentially catastrophic run on money-market funds that prompted the government to step in with guarantees. “Prime” money funds, which are important buyers of corporate debt, remain under pressure and are pulling away from anything deemed risky.This is a big problem for banks, since money funds hold up to $1.3 trillion of their short-term debt. As the funds retreat, the banks will be forced to turn to longer-term (and more expensive) funding markets. 金融公司担心最近在货币市场基金上潜在的灾难会有更严重的辐射影响。 这促使 美国政府介入市场提供担保。重要的公司债券购买者， “首要”货币基金仍处于压 力之下，而且不再涉及任何有风险的债券。这对银行来说是个大问题，因为货币 基金只有它们 1.3 万亿美元的短期债券。随着这些基金的撤退，银行将被迫使用 期限更长（且成本更高）的筹资手段。 Once markets stabilise, Wall Street will start to wonder if it is better or worse off without its standalone investment banks. They may leave behind a vacuum. As broker-dealers, regulated more lightly by the Securities and Exchange Commission, they were free to put large dollops of capital to work, providing liquidity, making markets and assuming risk. As banks, they may find the Fed takes a more restrictive view. 一旦市场企稳， 华尔街就会考虑缺乏独立投行模式对其有利还是有害。独立投行 之死留下了一片真空地带。 作为经纪交易商， 证券交易委员会对其监管宽松一些， 它们可以自由地运作巨额资本，提供流动性，造市并承担风险。而作为银行，美 联储对他们的监视则更为苛刻一些。Pay and the financial crisis 薪酬和金融危机Questions of equity 公平问题和股权问题Salary ca but the crisis also carries lessons for regulators and workers 薪酬限制是个极糟糕的主意； 但是这场危机也给监管者和工作者都上 了一课IT IS easy to understand why many in Congress and beyond have demanded salary caps on bank executives as a condition of approving the Bush administration’s bail-out of the financial system. After all, many of the people who will be leading the effort to get the banks back on their feet were the very same masters of the universe whose greed and myopia brought the industry to its knees in the first place. Nonetheless the lawmakers’ apparent decision to impose some form of still unspecified wage limit, a demand reluctantly accepted by Hank Paulson and the Bush administration this week, is a mistake. 为何众多国会议员和广大群众都要求将银行高管的薪酬限制作为批准布什政府 金融救援计划的一个条件呢？这个很好理解。毕竟，尽管是这些银行高管将要用 他们的力量来帮这些银行摆脱困境，恢复原样。而正是由于这些曾是世界霸主的 银行高管的贪婪和短视，首先将整个行业拖入泥淖。尽管如此，立法者这个强制 限制薪酬――本周被保尔森和布什政府勉强接受――也是个错误的决定。Just now, it is a struggle to keep a straight face when you read the words “talent” and “Wall Street” in the same sentence. And yet, precisely because it is in a mess, the financial system will need decent managers if it is to return to the health that benefits the rest of the economy. The sort of sums that would satisfy Congress as a cap may be far above the incomes of average Americans, but there is no surer way of driving finance offshore or into hedge funds where it is beyond the gaze of regulators. Besides, if ever there was a time when pay in banking and broking is likely to be depressed by the market, it is now. The bubble did not only inflate asset prices, it also inflated pay. Now the bubble has burst and hundreds of thousands of finance professionals want work. 刚才，当你在同一个句子里读到“人才”和“华尔街”这些词的时候，会努力控制自 己不要笑出声来。可是，恰恰由于其正处困境，金融系统要想恢复健康进而使其 余经济部分也从中获益，必须要有优秀的经理人。国会满意的薪酬上限应该比美 国人平均收入要高的多， 但是并不能保证那些金融资本不会转移到离岸金融公司 或者对冲基金，在那里不必担心金融监管者的监视。此外，现在正是银行和经纪 业由于市场疲软而薪酬低迷的时候。以前的泡沫不仅膨胀了资产的价格，同时也 膨胀了薪酬。现在泡沫破裂了，成千上万的金融专业人士在寻找工作。 American politicians have a lamentable record of intervening in setting executive pay. In the early years of the Clinton administration, Congress imposed a salary cap of $1m, beyond which firms faced a tax penalty. Pay rose, as one set of executives, beneath the cap, realised that they were“underpaid” and another set gained from an outpouring of creativity, as consultants invented myriad option schemes, perks and pension benefits to get around the limit. This only made it harder for shareholders to know who was getting what. 美国政客在干预高管薪酬设定上曾经有段不愉快的历史。在克林顿政府早期，国 会将高管薪酬强制定在 100 万美元，超过这个数字将会受到税收惩罚。于是， 对于高管来说有就一套低于那个最高限制薪酬标准。薪酬提高了，一部分高管， 意识到薪酬限制让他们受到“剥削”了，而另外一部分人通过创新方式，作为公司 顾问发明出诸多的期权计划，补助，养老津贴等等来绕过薪酬限制。这么做的唯 一结果就是让股东更难知道那些高管拿多少薪酬了。 If the foolishness of Congress setting corporate pay levels is an old lesson, the financial crisis is teaching some new ones to shareholders. First, forget the received wisdom that paying people in large amounts of shares in their own firm ensures they take sensible value-maximising decisions. In the collapse of Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns, the management did not just take reckless gambles with other people’s money. Dick Fuld and Jimmy Cayne took reckless gambles with their own―and still they failed to do the right things and ended up losing most of their fortunes. Outside shareholders should remember that loading up the people at the top with shares can be an aid to corporate governance, but not a substitute for it. 如果国会愚蠢地设定公司的薪酬是个老教训， 那么这场金融危机正在给股东带来 一个新的教训。 首先，不要相信广为认可的论断――给那些经理人大量本公司的股份就能保证使他们做出利益最大化的决定。 在雷曼和贝尔斯登倒台中我们可以 看到， 那些管理层不仅仅是拿着别人钱的在鲁莽赌徒。迪克福德和杰米凯恩还是 拿着自己的钱来鲁莽地下赌注， 但最终他们都未能做出正确的抉择从而失掉了其 绝大部分的财产。 处于管理层外的股东要牢记，给那些管理者以股票只能对其管 理有帮助，但是并不能代替公司管理。Esop’s fables 员工持股的寓言For employees, the tale of Lehman, especially after Enron, is a reminder of the danger of having too many savings tied up in the firm where you work. More of the truly talented will now demand their bonuses in cash, or perhaps ask for even more shares. That surely will have an effect on the way that firms recruit staff and on employee share-ownership schemes. Paying ordinary workers in shares is expensive―because equity is costly to issue and discounted by employees. And the idea that ordinary workers who own shares in their firm will stop senior managers taking bad decisions has taken another knock. 在安然倒台之后， 对雇员来说雷曼事件应该特别引起注意，它提醒雇员不要将自 己太多的储蓄和公司绑到一起。 许多有才干的雇员从今之后将会要求他们的奖金 以现金形式发放，也许或者要求更多的股份。这肯定会对公司招募新员工和员工 持股计划产生影响。 给普通员工股权会非常昂贵――因为股票发售代价很高，而 在员工那里又打折不少。 而普通员工持股会阻止高级经理做出错误决定的想法也 遭重创。 The structure of bonus schemes is more important than their level―especiallyin finance. Foolish short-term risk-taking could be discouraged by matching the timing of bankers’ pay to the timing of the risks they are trading. Britain’s Financial Services Authority may ask banks to put up more capital if their pay structures are dangerously risky. That makes far more sense than capping pay. But in the end companies and shareholders are better at setting salaries than bureaucrats. 奖金方案的结构远比其数量更为重要――在金融界尤其如此。 根据其对风险的交 易时机制定支银行家付薪酬的时机，不失为防止愚蠢的短期冒险行为的良策。英 国金融服务当局可能会要求银行持有更多的资金以防薪酬结构改变而带来的风 险。 这比限制薪酬要有意义的多。但是最终公司和股东会比官僚设定的薪酬要好 得多。All’s fair 绝对公平Sep 18th 2008 From The Economist print edition The crisis and fair-value accounting 信贷危机与公允价值记账法SO CONTROVERSIAL has accounting become that even John McCain, a man not known for his interest in balance sheets, has an opinion. The Republican candidate for the American presidency thinks that “fair value” rules may be “exacerbating the credit crunch”. His voice is part of a chorus of criticism against mark-to-market accounting, which forces banks to value assets at the estimated price they would fetch if sold now, rather than at historic cost. Some fear that accounting dogma has caused a cycle of falling asset prices and forced sales that endangers financial stability. The fate of Lehman Brothers and American International Group will have strengthened their conviction.会计已经变得如此的备受争议， 以至于连麦凯恩这样对财经事务漠不关心的人也 有了自己的主张。这位共和党的总统候选人认为“公允价值”的法则也许正在使信 贷紧缩恶化。 他的发言构成了针对这种盯市原则的批评之声的一部分，后者强制 银行按照所估计的销售价格评估其资产的价值，而不是按照历史成本。一些人担 心这样的会计教条导致了一个资产价格下降与被迫变卖的（恶性）循环，进而威 胁着金融的稳定。雷曼与 AIG 的不幸命运估计已经加强了他们的坚定看法。In response America’s Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and the London-based International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) have not budged an inch. So, for example, banks will have to mark their securities to the prices Lehman receives as it is liquidated. The two accounting bodies alreadyact cheek by jowl, and America will probably soon adopt international rules. Are they guilty of obstinately pursuing an abstract goal that is causing mayhem in financial markets?美国财务会计准则委员会（FASB）与位于伦敦的国际会计准则委员会（IASB） 的反应却是不为所动。 举个例子，银行将不得不按照雷曼被清算时得到的价格为 他们的证券标价。 两大会计机构已经表现得形影不离，而美国将可能很快正式接 受国际会计准则。 那么， 他们应该为了自己固执地追求一个抽象的目标而导致金 融市场的混乱而承担罪责吗？Banks’ initial attack on fair value was self-serving. In April the Institute of International Finance (IIF), a lobbying group, sent a confidential memorandum to the two standard-setters. This said it was “obvious” markets had failed and that companies should be allowed to suspend fair value for “sound” assets that had suffered “undue valuation”. Even at the time this stanc Goldman Sachs resigned from the IIF in protest at “ Alice in Wonderland accounting”. Today it is abundantly clear that those revelations were not a figment of accountants’ imagination. For example, in July Merrill Lynch sold a big structured-credit portfolio at 22% of its face value―less than what was entered on its balance sheet. Bob Herz, FASB’s chairman, argues that fair value is “essential to provide transparency” for investors.由银行挑起的针对公平价值的攻击图得不过是一己私利。 4 月， 在 国际金融协会 （IIF）――一家游说集团――寄了一份秘密备忘录给两家准则制定人。上面说， 市场瘫痪是“明显的” 应该允许公司中止采用公允价值处理遭受“过度评估”的“健 ， 康”资产。即使在当时这种说法也缺乏可信性。高盛退出 IIF，以反对后者“童话般 的会计准则” 如今，事实已经十分清楚，这些披露绝非会计师想象出来的虚构产 。 品。例如，美林在 7 月以 22%的账面价值（低于当初入账的价格）卖了一个巨 大的结构性信贷产品的资产组合。FASB 的主席 Bob Herz 认为（即便如此）公 允价值也是向投资者“提供透明度所必不可缺的” 。Yet not all criticism of fair value can be so easily dismissed. The credit crunch has raised three genuinely awkward questions. The first of these concerns “procyclicality”. Bankers say that in a downturn fair-value accounting forces them all to recognise losses at the same time, impairing their capital and triggering firesales of assets, which in turn drives prices and valuations down even more. Under traditional accounting, losses hit the books far more slowly. Some admire Spain’s system, which requires banks to make extra provision for losses in good times, so that when loans turn sour their profits and thus capital fall by less.然而， 并非所有针对公允价值的批评都可以轻易忽略。信贷紧缩引发了三个的确 十分棘手的问题。第一个问题涉及到所谓的“顺周期循环” 银行家们认为，公平 。 价值的会计方法会迫使他们在一个不景气的环境里同时确认损失， 减记资本价值并诱发资产的火线出卖， 反过来导致更多的价格与价值损失。在传统的记账法则 下，损失对整个帐簿的冲击会慢很多。一些人还对西班牙的制度称赞有加，它要 求银行在景气良好的时期为损失提存额外的储备，这样当贷款变糟的时候，他们 的利润以及自有资本的损失就会减少。It is too soon to know if prices exaggerate the ultimate losses on credit products. Some people argue that swift write-downs in fact help to re-establish stability: Yoshimi Watanabe, Japan ’s minister for financial services, says Japanese banks exacerbated their country’s economic woes by “avoiding ever facing up to losses”. But the principle defence of standard-setters is that enhancing financial stability is not the purpose of accounting.然而， 了解价格是否扩大了信贷产品的最终损失还为时尚早。一些人认为迅速折 旧事实上可以帮助重建稳定。日本金融服务部长官，渡x喜美认为正是日本银行 “总在避免正视亏损”加重了他们国家的经济悲哀。只是标准制定者的原则性辩护 在于，提高金融稳定并非会计的真正意图。Over to the regulators 转向监管者In other words, if procyclicality is a problem, it is someone else’s. Already central banks have relaxed their rules on what they will accept from banks ascollateral, which has helped to support the prices of risky assets. And the mayhem in the swaps market has shown the importance of on-exchange trading, so that trading remains orderly in times of stress.换句话说，如果“顺周期波动”是个问题，它也是别人的问题。中央银行已经放宽 了其接受来自银行抵押品的规定， 这样的措施已经在支撑风险资产价格方面给予 了帮助。 掉期市场的一片混乱业已表明互换交易的重要，此交易在紧张时期依旧 井然有序。Ultimately, though, responsibility for interposing a circuit-breaker between market prices and banks’ capital adequacy falls on bank regulators, not accountants. They are already examining “countercyclical” regimes, which would force banks to save more capital in years of plenty. They could go further by suspending capital rules during times of stress if they think asset prices have overreacted. Europe ’s national regulators already use some discretion when defining capital adequacy. There is a precedent in pension regulation, where corporate schemes are marked to market but the cash payments companies make to keep them solvent are smoothed over time. Banks’ financial statements could be modified to show assets at cost as well as fair value, so that if regulators or investors wanted to use traditional accounting to form a view, they could.然而， 在市场价格与银行资本充足率之间插入一个暂缓交易的机制终究是银行监 管者而不是会计师的责任。 他们已经在考察一个将会强制银行在好年头里储备更 多资本的“反周期”机制。如果认为资产价格做了过分的反应，他们也可能在紧张 时期走得更远并解除这些资本规定。 欧洲各国的监管者在定义资本充足率时已经 表现出了一定的谨慎。对养老金的监管里就有一个范例，在那儿，企业方案按照 市价调整， 但是企业用来保持支付能力的现金款项则平分其间。银行的财务报表 可以适当调整以便显示按成本以及按市值估算的资产， 因此如果监管者或投资人 愿意使用传统的会计方法来形成观点，他们就应当可以。Even if they leave procyclicality to bank regulators, standard-setters still have a lot on their plates. The second―and immediate―question is how to value illiquid (and sometimes unique) assets. A common solution is to use banks’ own models. But some investors are concerned that this gives banks ’ managers too much discretion―and no wonder, because highly illiquid (or “Level 3”) assets are worryingly large relative to many banks’ shrunken market values. Such is the complexity of many such assets that it may not be possible to find a generally acceptable method. The best answer is to disclose enough to allow investors to form their own views. This week IASB gave new guidance which should help in this regard.纵然可以把顺周期循环的问题留给银行监管者， 会计准则的制定者们依旧有很多 值得耗费精力的事情。 第二个――且直接的――问题是如何估算非流动（且有时独一无二）的资产。一个普遍的做法是利用银行自己的评估模型。但是一些投资 者担心这会让银行经理过分随意――毫不奇怪，高非流动（或者“第三级” 资产 ） 相对于银行缩水的市值已经大得令人担忧。这就是此类资产的复杂所在，你无法 为他们找到一个可以广泛接受的评估方法。 最好的答案是披露足够的信息以便让 投资者形成自己的看法。本周，IASB 给出了新的指导意见，期待在这方面可以 有所助益。The third problem is a longer-term one: the inconsistency of fair-value rules. Today the treatment of a financial asset is determined by the intention of the company. If it is to be traded actively, its market value must be used. If it is only “available for sale” it is marked to market on the balance sheet, but losses are not recognised in the income statement. If it is to be “held to maturity”, or is a traditional loan, it can be carried at cost, subject to impairment. This is a dog’s breakfast. Different banks can hold the same asset at different values. According to Fitch, a ratings agency, at the end of 2007, Western banks carried about half of their assets at fair value, but the dispersion was wide: from 86% at Goldman Sachs to 27% at Bank of America (see chart).第三个是个更长期的问题，即公平价值准则的非一致性。现今，对一项金融资产 的处理取决于公司对它的打算。 如果它将被积极交易， 使用市场价值便无可回避。 如果它只是“可供出售” 就只按市价在财务报表上调整，其损失不必在损益表里 ， 加以确认。如果它被打算“持有到期” 或者只是传统借款，就可以作为会计减损 ，的主体按照成本入账。 实在是混乱不堪，不同的银行可以不同的价值持有相同的 资产。依照惠誉（一家评级公司）的计算，至 2007 年底，西方银行有大约一半 的资产按照公允价值入账，只是分布区间相当的广：从高盛的 86%直到美国银 行的 27%。The obvious solution is to use fair value for all financial assets and liabilities. This is exactly what both FASB and IASB propose. In parallel they want to clean up the income statement, so that changes in the value of assets or liabilities are separated clearly from recurring revenues and costs.很明显的解决办法是使用公平价值评估所有的资产跟负债。这也正是 FASB 与 IASB 所建议的。与之平行他们还想清理损益表，以便将资产与负债的价值变动 同再发生的收入与成本清晰的区分开来。For low-risk banks, this would make little difference: both HSBC and Santander report that the fair value of their loan books is slightly above their carrying value. But it could mean big losses for riskier institutions. When Bank of America bought Countrywide, a big mortgage lender, it was forced, under another quirk, to mark its troubled acquisition’s loans at fair value, wiping out Countrywide’s equity. Bankers are therefore likely to resist the idea of fair value for loans fiercely: one executive calls it “lunacy”. Here standard setters’ quest for intellectual consistency will run into a political quagmire.对于那些低风险的银行来说， 这也许无关紧要：汇丰以及桑坦德银行均报告说他 们借款账簿上的公平价值仅比账面价值略高一点。然而对于风险更大的机构来 说，这可能意味着巨大损失。当美国银行购买美国国家金融服务公司（一家大的 按揭贷款提供商）的时候，他被迫令遇巧合的按照市值来评估收购的麻烦贷款， 结果彻底毁了后者的股票价值。 因此，银行家们很可能会凶猛地坚持自己在公平 价值上的观点：一名高级主管把它称作“愚蠢至极” 在这里，会计准则的制定者 。 们对公允价值一致性的追求陷入了管理层无限纠缠的沼泽地。Marks out of ten 账外打分Has accounting had a good credit crunch? The last year has shown that standard-setters are now truly independent and focused on investors’ needs rather than the wishes of management, regulators and the taxman. Reforms to IASB’s governance should bolster this independence. That is to be welcomed. For all fair value’s flaws, banks ought not to have licence to carry their dodgy credit exposures at cost.会计经历了一个良性的信贷紧缩吗？过去的一年已经表明标准制定者的确是独 立的， 比起那些来自管理层， 监管者以及税务员的愿望他们更关注的是投资者的需要。对国际会计准则协会治理上的改革应该鼓励这种独立。那也将受到欢迎。 即便考虑到公平价值的所有瑕疵， 银行也不该放纵地按照历史成本来估算他们那 些危险的信贷暴露。At the same time the fair-value revolution is incomplete. Regulators may need to abandon the traditional, mechanistic link between accounting and capital adequacy rules if they really want to try to fight banking crises. That is no bad thing either. Investors and regulators should be able to share a market-based language to describe financial problems, even if they disagree about what needs to be done.同时，公平价值的重大革命尚未完成。监管者如果真的想去尝试战胜银行危机， 或许需要放弃那些位于会计与资本充足率之间的传统的机械联系。这并非坏事。 投资者与监管者应该能够用一种基于市场的共同语言来描述金融问题， 即使他们 可能在需要采取的措施上存在分歧。AfricaThere is hopeDespite the persistence of Africa’s natural and man-made horrors, the latesttrend is cheeringly positive 天灾人祸不断 局势有望好转UNTIL the past few weeks of global turmoil, Africa’s doughty band of boosters were feeling they at last had something to smile about. After four decades of political and economic stagnation that kept most of their 800m-odd people in poverty and gloom, the continent’s 48 sub-Saharan countries have been growing for the past five years at a perky overall rate of 5% or so. If they maintain this pace or even bump it up a bit, Africa still has a chance of taking off. Now, with commodity prices likely to fall, world markets sure to shrivel and Western aid set to plateau or even dip, Africa, though more isolated from the global economy than other parts of the world, is bound to suffer from its ill breeze. But maybe not as badly. Once described by this newspaper, perhaps with undue harshness, as “the hopeless continent”, it could yet confound its legion of gloomsters and show that its oft-heralded renaissance is not just another false dawn prompted by the passing windfall of booming commodity prices, but the start of something solid and sustainable. Despite its manifold and persistent problems of lousy governments and erratic climates (see article), Africa has a chance of rising. 经过了持续几周的全球动乱，致力于推动非洲发展的改革者们终于可以略展笑 颜。政治，经济上 40 多年的停滞不前曾使非洲 8 亿的人民的人们陷入贫穷和黑 暗，但最近 5 年来，48 个撒哈拉以南的非洲国家正以 5%的总体速率飞速发展。如果他们能使这一速率维持甚至略有提高，非洲将有望摆脱贫困。现今日用品价 格有望下调，世界市场将必然走向萎缩，相应地，西方的援助也会趋于稳定，甚 至有所下降。尽管与其他地方相比，非洲地区相对独立于全球经济，却也难免殃 及池鱼。 “无望的陆地”本报从前曾这样过于苛刻地描述过这片土地。但也许，现 实并非如此糟糕， 以至于会让许多持悲观态度的人会感到不解，并且不时显现的 复苏迹象也不只是日用品价格飙升所带来的表面繁荣， 这一切昭示着一个切切实 实的开端。尽管不良政权和多变气候有其重重弊端，非洲仍有望崛起A long way to go 长路漫漫 Pessimists have plenty of evidence to call on. There have been spurts of growth before, especially when commodity prices have risen sharply. But when those prices have fallen, growth has fizzled. Africa ’ s few recent successes tend to be set against a previous history of disaster. Ghana, for instance, is often cited as one of the most hopeful cases, but at independence in 1957 it was nearly as well off as South K now, despite its recent bounce, it is still some 30 times poorer in wealth per person. The lively growth in several other hopeful spots ― for instance, Mozambique, Rwanda and Uganda―must likewise be set against the horrors of their quite recent past. In fact, the sole country in Africa with a record of consistently strong political and economic progress is Botswana. 悲观主义者仍可言之凿凿。过往的日子里，特别是日用品价格飙升之际，经济增 长多是昙花一现。但一旦价格回落，这种涨势则不堪一击。然而，非洲近来为数不多的成功例子则与先前灾难历史形成鲜明对比。加纳，是一个人们乐于引用的 希望之地， 但是早在 1957 年这个国家宣布独立之时， 它的富足程度就可比南韩， 而现今，尽管近期经济局势略有反弹，但同比于韩国，国民人均财富仍缩水了 30 倍。另外几个国家的所谓“希望” 例如莫桑比克，卢旺达，乌干达，也只是与 ， 过往苦难形成的鲜明对比。 实际上，唯一的一个保有政治经济上强有力持续增长 的国家是博茨瓦纳。Many basic indices remain grim. Africans’ lifespan is still declining, owing largely to the scourge of AIDS, 60% of whose worldwide victims are African. A recent World Bank paper was guarded as to whether the African surge would last. Most of the quicker growth, it notes, is due to soaring revenues enjoyed by just eight sub-Saharan African countries blessed with oil. A third of Africa’s countries―by far the highest proportion in any continent―are trapped in civil wars or cycles of violent unrest. The two biggest in area, Sudan and Congo, are ravaged by strife and misgovernment. Zimbabwe, once a jewel of southern Africa, is still a nightmare, despite a recent agreement to forge a government of national unity. The World Bank paper bemoans Africa ’s standards of governance. 很多基本指标仍不容乐观。 非洲的人均寿命仍在下降， 很大一部分归因于艾滋病， 这一疾病 60%的受害者都来自非洲。一份最新的世界银行报表对于非洲的增长 势头能否持续持谨慎态度。报表显示，高于平均速度的大部分增长只是得益于 8 个撒哈拉以南的产油国由于石油产出所带来的国民收入。三分之一的非洲国家（目前为止占所有大洲的最高比例） 陷于内战和暴动的漩涡。 两个最突出的例子， 苏丹和刚果，被长年的战乱和暴政摧毁。津巴布韦，这个曾被称为南非宝石的地 方， 尽管最近达成一项致力于建立国家统一政府的协定， 如今却也成了一场噩梦。 这份世界银行的报表对于非洲标准的政府管理表示出悲观态度。Perhaps even more worrying, in the past year or so, three of Africa’s leading countries have had heavy setbacks. Nigeria’s election was the shoddiest since the country ’ s return to civilian rule in 1999; Kenya, east Africa ’ s hub, succumbed to ethnic mayhem a and South Africa, easily the sub-Saharan continent’s leading power in every way, producing one-third of its entire GDP, has entered an ugly phase of politics, authoritarian if not yet undemocratic, just when it should be setting an example of tolerant pluralism to the rest of Africa. The recent violence against black foreigners is a reminder that the bottom third of South Africans still face gnawing poverty. 但也许更令人担忧的是，大约在去年，非洲大陆的三个巨头都遭遇了严重倒退。 自从 1999 年这个国家转变为文官统治以来，尼日利亚的大选遭遇了最严重的舞 弊。肯尼亚，作为东非的轴心，在一次富有争议的选举之后经历了种族迫害。在 各个方面作为撒哈拉以南领军国家的南非，国民生产总值占据整个 GDP 的三分 之一，理应为其他非洲国家树立包容榜样，其政府却接近独裁的边缘。最近反对 外国黑人的暴力事件提醒世人，三分之一的底层南非人民仍然面对着重重贫困。All the same, the boosters’ case is stronger than before. Political freedom,however patchy, is commoner than it was a generation ago. Two-thirds of African countries now limi at least 14 leaders (with a few bad exceptions) have felt obliged to step down as a result. Multi-party systems, however fraught, the notion of political accountability and choice is more widely accepted. The media, partly because of the internet, are livelier. The latest index of African governance funded by Mo Ibrahim, a Sudanese-born telecoms mogul, suggests a general improvement. 与此同时， 改革势头也更加明朗。 政治自由尽管有待完善， 却比上一代更加普遍。 三分之二的非洲国家现在已经对总统任期加以限制。 至少 14 位领导人被迫下野。 多党制尽管情势紧张，却也普及更广。政治义务和选择权的观念更加深入人心。 由于互联网的部分原因，媒体变得更加活跃。由 Mo Ibrahim（出生于苏丹的电 信巨头）资助设立的最新的非洲行政指数，表明了一种普遍的进步。The presumption of state control under the rubric of “African socialism” (an illusory third way) has been junked. Most local leaders accept that Africa must join the global economy to prosper, however shaky it looks right now. The mobile-phone revolution has hugely helped Africans, especially poor peasants and traders. Banking systems are modernising and mortgages more readily offered to an emerging middle class. Businessmen around the world have been investing more, especially in Africa’s better-governed countries. Even those that lack natural wealth have grown a bit faster. The spectacular adventof China into Africa’s market is, on balance, a bonus. 非洲社会主义 （不靠谱的第三种途径）红字下的国家统治假设已被证明是一堆垃 圾。大多数地方领导人相信，尽管现在看起来局势不定，非洲繁荣离不开世界经 济。手机革命大大帮助了非洲人民，特别是贫困的农民和商人。银行系统正处于 现代化， 信贷业务也对新兴的中产阶级更加开放。世界各地商人的投资力度也不 断加强， 尤其是对治理较好的非洲国家。即使是那些自然资源匮乏的国家增长速 度也在加快。中国进军非洲市场，总的来说，利大于弊。Another report, co-sponsored by the World Bank, gently dissents from the certitudes of the “Washington consensus” that pure free marketry could cure all, and that Africa must just open up to trade, tighten its fiscal strings and sell off the state. One size in varied Africa does not fit all. The rich world could, for instance, offer time-limited trade preferences. 同样由世行联合发起的另一项报告，则对“华盛顿共识”颇有微词， “共识”确信，纯 粹的自由市场是一剂万能药， 非洲应当实行贸易开放， 加强财政紧缩， 清偿国家。 然而针对非洲国家的不同情况，不能一以概之，比如，富裕国家倾向于提供具有 时限的贸易优先权。Feel each stone as you cross the river 摸着石头过河 Other devices could help too. America’s Africa Growth and Opportunity Act of 2000 has spurred African exports by dropping American tariffs. Another promising new mechanism is the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative,a voluntary code that a score of African countries have adopted, with governments and foreign firms accounting openly for their dealings ― in contrast to mineral-rich Congo, whose government ludicrously claimed in 2006 to have received only $86,000 in mineral earnings. The creation of national savings funds in commodity-flush countries is another good idea. On the farming front, issuing individual land titles, no easy task in a continent where much land is still communally held, is another. Pragmatism often beats dogma. 其他的方法也会带来裨益。 美洲的“非洲成长与机会 2000 年法案” 通过下调美洲 ， 关税刺激了非洲出口。另一个方案是“采掘行业透明度行动计划” 这是一项已有 ， 12 个非洲国家参与的自愿履行的规则，政府与国外公司将公开交易，与富产矿 产的刚果形成鲜明对比（该国可笑地宣称 2006 年的矿产收入只有$86,000。对 于轻工业国家，国家储备基金的建立也不失为一个好主意。对于农业方面，将土 地定位个人名下也是一个好办法。在一片土地共有的大陆上，似乎很难成事。现 实总是会击败教条。So Africa has a rare chance to break out of its poverty trap. It would be hard even if governments were honest and efficient. Sadly, most are still not. Amid all the grim drawbacks of climate, disease, illiteracy and ethnic division, bad and corrupt government is still by far the biggest. But the news overall is cheerier. And the rich world, troubled as it is, must never give up in its effort to help the poor one to stand on its own feet. 所以非洲现在有一个摆脱贫困陷阱的难得机会。即使对于一个诚信高效的政府，这一切仍是不易，更不要说，大多数政府并非如此。算上气候，疾病，文盲，种 族分化种种不利，政府腐败仍是最大的弊端。但总体的消息还是令人鼓舞。而那 些富裕的国家也有他们的烦恼，但他们绝不会放弃帮助贫困国家自力更生的努 力。The economy and the election 经济与大选 It’s an ill wind 乌云与彩虹Oct 9th 2008 | ABINGTONAs the economy sags, Barack Obama’s electoral prospects soar 奥巴马的竞选在经济泄瘪之际，气势如虹iN A small town in Pennsylvania, where the liquor store is called “Beer World”, the mini-golf course has a Statue of Liberty hole and a sign boasts that this is the “21st best town in the US”, Barack Obama is making a speech. The latest unemployment statistics have just been released, and they are grim. It is the day after the vice-presidential debate, during which Sarah Palin accused the Democrats of wanting to impose job-killing tax hikes on business.在宾夕法尼亚州的一个小镇上，有家名叫 “啤酒世界” 的啤酒店。店里的迷你高 尔夫球场上有孔“自由女神”洞，还有个标牌自誉是 “21 世纪美国最好的小镇” 。 奥巴马正在该店发表演说。 最新出炉的失业率统计数字令人担忧。在此前一天的 副总统候选人辩论会上，萨拉?佩林指责民主党人企图强行增加企业税，导致失业。“Just since January, we’ve lost more than 750,000 jobs across America, 7,000 in Pennsylvania alone,” says Mr Obama. “So when Senator [John] McCain and his running-mate talk about job-killing, that’s something they know a thing or two about. Because the policies they’re supporting are killing jobs every single day.”“至 1 月起，美国已经失去了 75 万以上的就业机会，仅宾州一地就达 7000 份工 作” 奥巴马说， ， “因此，当参议员[约翰]麦凯恩和他的竞选同伴谈论制造失业的话 题时，他们还真可以说点内容，因为他们所支持的政策每天都在制造失业” 。On the page, Mr Obama’s speeches can seem long-winded. But when he reels off each rhythmic sentence before an adoring crowd, the effect is almost musical. Did Mr McCain once mention that the fundamentals of the economy were sound? “Well, Abington,” says Mr Obama, “where I come from, there’s nothing more fundamental than having the sense of meaning and purpose that comes with showing up at work in the morning. There ’ s nothing more fundamental than being able to put your kids through college, or having health care when you get sick … There ’ s nothing more fundamental than a good-paying job.”看起来， 奥巴马的讲话似乎过于长篇大论了些。但他侃侃而谈的每一个句子带着 排比的韵律，对赞赏他的听众来说好似音乐一般。嗯，麦凯恩是否曾提到过，经 济根基仍然是坚固的？ “阿宾顿的民众们” 奥巴马先生说， “以我的出身体验， ， 没有什么比早起上班更基本了； 没有什么比能够供您的孩子读完大学，或者您生 病时有医疗保更基本了......没有什么比一份好薪水更基本了” 。Bad news is good news when you are the challenger, and the news has been awful of late. Stockmarkets are tumbling, taking a big chunk of voters ’ pensions with them. No one knows if the latest interest-rate cut or the $700 billion rescue package Congress approved recently will stop the panic. Unemployment is still only 6.1%, but everyone expects it to rise. The American economy is probably already in recession, and voters feel it is. House prices are slumping, and homeowners are losing their homes. A 90-year-old woman about to be evicted in Ohio shot herself last week. (She survived, and the mortgage firm forgave her debt.)作为挑战的一方，坏消息成了好机会。近来的新闻跟不上变幻，股票市场风起云 涌，卷走了大把选民们的养老金。无人能预测最新的降息或国会最近批准的 7 千亿美元的救世计划是否阻止得了惊慌。失业率虽然只有 6.1 ％ ，但是人人都 预感它会上升。美国经济可能已经陷入了衰退，选民们已经感同身受。房价还在 下跌，物主们正失去自己的家园。上周，俄亥俄州一名 90 岁的妇女因为即将被 赶出家门而开枪自杀。 （她活了下来，贷款公司取消了她的债务。 ）Few voters understand why the economy is ailing, but many blame President George Bush. Mr Obama, as the candidate whose party does not control the White House, is the default choice of the disgruntled. This gives him a hefty advantage in the polls, which show him leading Mr McCain by five points nationwide and by significant margins in most swing states. He has more money to press his message home, too. A cash-strapped Mr McCain gave up running ads in Michigan the day Mr Obama spoke there last week. Barring a sudden, unlikely, uplift in the national mood, Mr Obama’s prospects look peachy. 选民极少能搞懂美国经济的病因，但许多人将之怪罪于现任总统布什。奥巴马先 生作为不执掌白宫的在野党候选人，是愤懑者的心中的预定对象。这使他在民调 中夺得优势。 他不仅在全国范围内领先了麦凯恩 5 个百分点， 在摇摆州也明显占 着优势。并且，他有充裕的资金让更多人接受自己的政治观点。奥巴马上周在密 歇根演说的那天， 受资金限制的凯恩却放弃了做广告。除非全国会突发高涨情绪 （几乎不可能） ，奥巴马的前景看好。Voters anxious for change are warming to his message. And he has a gift for wrapping centre-left (by American standards) policies in language that has wide appeal. He often says, for example, that he will cut taxes for 95% of Americans. That is an attractive promise. The “cut taxes” bit appeals to conservatives, while the “95%” part appeals to liberals and moderates.选民急切求变的心态是奥巴马政治口号的温床。他具有语言天赋，能把（按美国 人的标准）中立及偏左的政策用语言包装完好，让更多的听众乐意接受。例如， 他常诱人地许诺要为 95 ％的美国人减税。 “减税”之说让保守派听了悦耳，同时， “ 95％”也让自由派和温和派听了舒心。Fact-checkers quibble that, according to his written plans, he really means 95% of families with children, not 95% of Americans. But his real sleight-of-hand is to count handouts administered through the tax code as “tax cuts”. You might think that a tax cut means keeping more of what you earn. The way Mr Obama uses the phrase, however, it can also mean being given a chunk of money that someone else has earned. That is how he is able to offer “tax cuts” to “95% of Americans” when about a third of American households already pay no federal income tax.追究事实者则反讥说，根据奥巴马的书面计划，他的 95％指的是有孩子的家庭， 而不是 95％的美国人。另外，其花枪之下的实质是把根据税收法给出的优惠也 算作“减税” 。你或许以为， “减税”表示留下更多自己的收入。但按照奥巴马对该 短语运用， 它还意味着别人的收入中也会分你一份。 只有这样奥巴马才能为“95％ 的美国人” “减税” 事实上，大约三分之一的美国家庭已经不再缴纳联邦收入税 。 了。Such re-packaging is effective. “I’m for McCain,” says Matthew Julian, a biology student who has just heard Mr Obama speak in Michigan. “But I liked [what Mr Obama said]. He’s not going to tax the middle class. I thought he would. You know, I might change my mind and vote for Obama.”此等重新包装很有效果。 “我支持麦凯恩” 生物学生马修?朱利安说。他刚在密 ， 歇根听过奥巴马演说。 “但我喜欢[奥巴马议员所说的] 不会对中产阶级加税的 话。我认为他能做到。也许我会改变主张，投票给奥巴马” 。The way Mr Obama describes his opponent’s tax plans is also deft. Mr McCain plans to reduce the corporate tax rate. That sounds boring. So Mr Obama describes it as a “$4 billion tax break for big oil companies”. He is not lying. Big oil firms would indeed benefit from a lower corporate tax rate. But he makes it sound as if Mr McCain is doing special favours for an industry many Americans regard as villainous.奥巴马解说他对手的税收计划时， 用词也十分巧妙。 麦凯恩打算降低企业的税率， 这听起来并无新意可言。 但奥巴马把它解说为一个“对大石油公司减税 40 亿美元 的政策” 他并没有撒谎。大型石油企业的确会受益于较低的公司税率。但奥巴马 。 的解说让人听起来更像麦凯恩特别关照了石油公司， 这个行业目前被许多美国人 视为罪魁。Mr Obama offers detailed and mostly sensible plans for dealing with problems from energy to health care. But it is not the details of his policies that voters recall after hearing him speak. It is the zingers.针对从能源到医疗保健方面的处理问题，奥巴马提供了详细且大都合理的计划。 意外的是，选民在听完他在听证会上发言之后，记住的并非他的具体政策，而是 一些调侃话。Consider health care, which Americans get very worried about during economic downturns. Most working Americans are insured via their employer. If they lose their job, they may lose their cover. This makes them understandably nervous.以美国人在经济衰退期非常担忧的医保问题为例： 大多数有职业的美国人通过其 雇主投保。如果他们失去了自己的工作，就意味着可能失去医保。可以